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I. INTRODUCTION
Citizen suits have long played an important, indeed integral, role in

environmental enforcement.'

Most environmental statutes include

citizen suit provisions that allow citizens to enforce those statutes against
both private parties and the government when environmental statutes and
regulations are allegedly violated through malfeasance, nonfeasance or
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law.
J.D., Yale Law School, B.A. Queens College of the City University of New York. I am very
grateful for the research assistance I received from Kristin Meinhart, Columbus School of Law '04
and Nicole Stach, Columbus School of Law '05. 1 am also thankful for all of the contributions to
this Article made by reference librarian Steve Young of the Columbus School of Law Library.
1. Indeed, one commentator has called such fees "the fuel that drives the private attorney general
engine." Pamela S. Karlan, David C. Baum Memorial Lecture: Disarming the Private Attorney
General, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 183, 205 (2003). A full discussion of citizen suits is beyond the scope
of this paper. However, for background on citizen suits and the myriad legal issues they raise, see
generally JEFFREY G. MILLER, CITIZEN SUITS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF FEDERAL POLLUTION
CONTROL LAWS (1987), MICHAEL D. AXLINE, ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS (1992), and Barry
Boyer & Errol Meidinger, PrivatizingRegulatory Enforcement: A PreliminaryAssessment of Citizen
Suits Under FederalEnvironmental Law, 34 BUFF. L. REV. 833 (1985).
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both.2 Acknowledging the importance of citizen suits in giving teeth to
environmental laws, and recognizing the often prohibitive costs of such
litigation, Congress also included fee-shifting provisions in most
environmental citizen suit statutes. 3 These fee-shifting provisions change
the so-called "American rule" for attorney fees by allowing victorious
citizen plaintiffs to recover their attorney fees from the losing party.4
It is well established that those plaintiffs who win a judicial ruling in
their favor qualify for the benefits of fee-shifting. What is less clear,
however, is whether those parties whose successes come outside the
courtroom-as they often do in the environmental context--can also
recover fees. In the past, the so-called "catalyst theory" answered this
question affirmatively. Parties were entitled to fees by demonstrating
that their litigation was the catalyst for obtaining the relief sought, albeit
in another venue such as through the defendant's voluntary change in
conduct or via a private, non-judicial settlement agreement.
However, in 2001, the "catalyst theory" was dealt a fatal-or nearly
fatal-blow in Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources.5 In Buckhannon, the
Supreme Court defined the meaning of "prevailing party" in the context
of the fee-shifting provision of the Fair Housing Amendments Act and
the Americans with Disabilities Act. The Buckhannon majority adopted a
narrow view of the term "prevailing party," ruling that, for these two
statutes at least, "the 'catalyst theory' is not a permissible basis for the
award of attorney's fees." 6 The Court required some "judicially
sanctioned" victory as a prerequisite to a fee award.7
This ruling garnered instant attention as scholars and advocates
contemplated its significance for litigation generally 8 as well as in a wide
2. See discussion accompanying notes 41-50, infra.
3. See Michael S. Greve, The PrivateEnforcement of EnvironmentalLaw, 65 TUL. L. REv. 339,
340 (1990) (calling environmental law "the prime field for the expansion of private enforcement").
4. The complex and controversial issues pertaining to the question of whether victorious
defendants may also recover fees against losing plaintiffs is explored more fully in the text
accompanying notes 410-12, infra, although a full discussion of this issue is beyond the purview of
this arti cle.
5. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Virginia Dep't of Health and Human Res., 532

U.S. 598 (2001).
6. Id. at 610.

7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Kyle A. Loring, Note, The Catalyst Theory Meets the Supreme Court-Common
Sense Takes a Vacation, 43 B.C. L. REv. 973 (2002); Aimee McFerren, Note, Buckhannon Board

and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Deparment of Health and Human Resources: The Supreme
Court's Latest Assault on Prevailing Plaintiffs Eliminates the Catalyst Theory of Fee-Shifting, 41
BRANDEIS L.J. 155 (2002); Supreme Court Update, 48 JUL FED. LAW. 4245 (July 2001);
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variety of substantive contexts. 9 Because environmental law relies

heavily on citizen suits,10 those in the environmental arena speculated on
Perspectiveson the Law, 58-JUL BENCH & B. MINN 36, 41 (July 2001) (predicting that Buckhannon
"may have a substantial impact on future litigation under the numerous statutes that provide for feeshifting"); William Funk, Court Rejects "Catalyst Theory "for Qualifying for Attorneys Fees, 26SUM ADMIN & REG. L. NEWS 12 (SUMMER 2001); Ellen Ross Belfer, Comment, Buckhannon
Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources: Goodbye to Our "PrivateAttorneys General," 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 267 (2002); J. Douglas Klein, Note,
Does Buckhannon Apply? An Analysis of JudicialApplication and Extension of the Supreme Court
Decision Eighteen Months After and Beyond, 13 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 99 (2002); Robin
Stanley, Note, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources: To the PrevailingParty Goes the Spoils... and the Attorney's Fees 36 AKRON
L. REV. 363 (2003); James D. Brusslan, High Court Rejects 'Catalyst' Theory: Momentum Shifts to
Citizen Suit Defendants, 32 ENVTL. RPTR. 1346 (July 6, 2001); William J. Hunter, Case Note,
Buckhannon Board & Home Care, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health & Human Resources:
A "Catalyst" for Controversy? The Supreme Court's Decision Limiting Attorneys Fees in Civil
Rights Cases, 56 ARK. L. REV. 185 (2003); Say Goodbye to "Catalyst Theory" Fee Awards, 16 No.
7 FED. LITIGATOR 183 (2001) [hereinafter Say Goodbye]; Caroline L. Curry, Recent Developments:
Attorney's Fees- "PrevailingParty" andRejection of the "Catalyst Theory," 54 ARK. L. REV. 727
(2001); William Funk, Supreme Court News, 26-SUM ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 12 (2001); Leading
Cases, 115 HARV. L. REV. 457 (2001) [hereinafter Leading Cases]; Marcia Coyle, Fee Change Is a
Sea Change, NAT'L L. J., June 11, 2001 at Al; Michael Ashton, Note, Recovering Attorneys'Fees
With the Voluntary Cessation Exception to Mootness After Buckhannon Board and Care Home Inc.
v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources, 2002 Wis. L. REv. 965 (2002).
9. The titles of these articles clearly demonstrate in a self-explanatory way, the range of fields in
which Buckhannon triggered alarm. See, e.g., Jennifer R. Rowe, Note and Comment, Implications of
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human
Resources for Due Process Under the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 2002 B.Y.U.
EDUC. & L.J. 333 (2002); Mark C. Weber, Special Education Attorneys' Fees after Buckhannon
Board and Care Home, Incorporated v. West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources,
2002 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L. J. 273 (2002); Richard L. Gibson, Note, Redefining the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Award Act: Buckhannon Board and Care Home and the End of the Catalyst Theory,
52 CATH. U. L. REV. 207 (2002); Michael W. Kelly, Weakening Title Ill of the Americans With
DisabilitiesAct: The Buckhannon Decision and Other Developments Limiting Private Enforcement,
10 ELDER L. J. 361 (2002); David Arkush, Note, Preserving "Catalyst" Attorneys' Fees Under the
Freedom of Information Act in the Wake of Buckhannon Board and Care Home v. West Virginia
Department of Health and Human Resources, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 131 (2002); Jeff Lerner,
Comment, Encouraging Litigation at the Expense of Our Children: The Inapplicability of
Buckhannon Board and Care Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Dept. of Health and Human Resources to
the Individuals With DisabilitiesEducation Act, 76 TEMP. L. REV. 381 (2003); Macon Dandridge
Miller, Comment, Catalystsas PrevailingPartiesUnder the Equal Access to JusticeAct, 69 U. CHI.
L. REV. 1347 (2002); Ann K. Wooster, Annotation, Award of Attorney's Fees to Prevailing Parties
in Actions Under Fair Housing Act, 159 A.L. R. FED. 279 (2001); David Shub, Note, Private
Attorneys General, Prevailing Parties,and Public Benefit: Attorney's Fees Awards for Civil Rights
Plaintiffs, 42 DUKE L.J. 706 (1992); Ronald D. Wenkart, Attorneys Fees Under the IDEA and the
Demise of the Catalyst Theory, 165 ED. LAW REP. 2 (2002); Paolo Annino, The Buckhannon
Decision: The End of the Catalyst Theory and a Setback to Civil Rights, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 11 (2002); Ann C. Hodges & Douglas D. Scherer, The Employment Law
Decisions of the October 2000 Term of the Supreme Court: A Review and Analysis, 5 EMPLOYEE
RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 391 (2001); Daniel L. Lowery, Comment, "PrevailingParty" Status for Civil
Rights Plaintiffs: Fee-Shifting's Shifting Threshold, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 1441 (1993); Ronald D.
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what the Court's interpretation of "prevailing party" in Buckhannon
might mean in that context." Although many environmental statutes
may be distinguishable from the statutes at issue in Buckhannon, it is
undeniable that Buckhannon ushered in an era of uncertainty for
environmental fee-shifting. This is problematic from both a practical and
a policy perspective. Fortunately, however, Buckhannon can itself serve
as a useful catalyst for complete legislative and judicial reexamination of
the wisdom of the catalyst theory for fee-shifting in environmental
citizen suits.
This Article will examine the future of the catalyst theory in
environmental citizen suits. 12 First, it will explore the provisions in
environmental law that provide the statutory basis for fee-shifting. Next,
it will briefly survey the leading decisions up to and including
Buckhannon that interpret the catalyst theory, with particular attention to
those cases that arose in the environmental context.
The Article will then examine Buckhannon's progeny as lower courts
have tried to clarify the contours and extent of Buckhannon's reach.
More specifically, several appeals courts have ruled that Buckhannon
should not apply in certain environmental contexts. Most notably, in
Sierra Club v. Environmental Protection Agency' 3 and Loggerhead
Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County14 respectively, the District of
Columbia Circuit ruled that the Clean Air Act "authorizes awards of
attorney's fees to catalyst parties,"' 15 and the Eleventh Circuit held that
"the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon does not prohibit use of
the catalyst test as a basis for awarding attorney's fees and costs under
Wenkart, Attorney's Fees Under the IDEA and the Demise of the Catalyst Theory, 165 ED. LAW
REP. 2 (2002); Attorneys' Fees/Advocacy Issues, 25 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 532

(2001); Marilyn Mahusky et al., Erosion of Civil Rights Enforcement: Judicial Constrictionof the
Civil Rights and DisabilityLaw Bar, 28 VT. B.J., June 2002 at 41; Stefan R. Hanson, Buckhannon,
Special Education Disputes, and Attorney's Fees: Time for a CongressionalResponse Again, 2003
BYU EDUC. & L. J. 519 (2003).
10. See discussion in and accompanying notes 38-50, infra.
11. See, e.g., Adam Babich, Fee Shifting After Buckhannon, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,137 (January
2002); Daniel J. Dunn, EnvironmentalCitizen Suits Against Natural Resource Companies, 17-WTR
NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 161, 198200 (2003); Marisa Ugalde, The Future of Environmental

Citizen Suits After Buckhannon Board & Home, Inc. v. West Virginia Department of Health and
Human Resources, 8 ENVTL. LAW. 589 (2002).
12. Although this Article focuses primarily on catalyst suits in the environmental context, it is
hoped that the issues discussed and the proposals made may prove to be useful in other contexts as
well. However, as the Article discusses, there are features of environmental law that distinguish it
from other areas of law.
13. Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
14. Loggerhead Turtle v. County Council of Volusia County, 307 F.3d 1318 (1Ith Cir. 2002).
15. Sierra Club, 322 F.3d at 728.
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the... Endangered Species Act."' 16 These cases were both justified by
the courts' findings that the fee-shifting language used in these two
environmental statutes differed from the "prevailing party" standard
found in the statutes at issue in Buckhannon.17 By distinguishing the
legal issue, these appellate courts were able to remove two significant
8
environmental statutes from the restrictions imposed by Buckhannon.1
Yet, at the same time that courts have allowed the catalyst theory in
cases such as Sierra Club and Loggerhead Turtle, they have ruled against
plaintiffs who assert the catalyst theory as the basis for a fee award
pursuant to statutes that use the "prevailing party" language like that at
issue in Buckhannon. This has given rise to a complex and conflicting
19
pattern of post-Buckhannon jurisprudence that this Article will explore.
Indeed, Sierra Club has already been the subject of an unsuccessful
petition for certiorari. 20 This uncertainty reflects the continued judicial
confusion in this area of law.
This judicial analysis, however, is not the major focus of the Article.
Instead, once this background discussion is presented, the Article will
argue that the availability of the catalyst theory in environmental citizen
suits should not be left to the courts. Fee-shifting--or the lack thereofcan have a significant impact on the way in which environmental statutes
are enforced. Hence, Congress itself must define with precision the
circumstances in which fee-shifting should occur and should provide
guidance to the courts as to whether and
when the catalyst theory should
2
1
fee-shifting.
for
basis
acceptable
be an
The time is ripe for Congress to take the initiative in this arena.
Indeed, such an initiative is long overdue. Thus, the Article will conclude
with a proposal for legislative action. This proposal first explores the
complex policy questions that must be considered before crafting such a
rule. It then evaluates the proposals currently pending before Congress
16. Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at 1327.
17. See discussion in and accompanying notes 346-71, infra.
18. As explained in the discussion in and accompanying note 358, infra, the court has also
removed statutes in other fields from the structures of Buckhannon if the statutory language did not
hinge on the "prevailing party" standard.
19. See Section V, infra.
20. Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2003), petitionfor cert.filed, 72 U.S.L.W. 3269
(Oct. 3, 2003) (No. 03-509). Although the Supreme Court decided not to grant certiorari in this case,
the policy questions raised by catalyst recovery will not be resolved, and Congressional intervention
will still be needed.
21. Indeed, Buckhannon has already triggered several unenacted Congressional initiatives to
overrule its holding through legislation adopting a more expansive definition of "prevailing party"
for purposes of fee-shifting statutes. See discussion in and accompanying notes 429-35, infra.
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and offers a new proposal to resolve the angst about catalytic recoveries
and to establish a clear and legally binding statement as to how broadly
"prevailing party" should be defined in the environmental context.
II. STATUTORY BACKGROUND TO ENVIRONMENTAL FEE-SHIFTING
American courts generally follow the "American Rule" for payment of
court costs and attorney fees.22 First articulated by the Supreme Court in
Arcambel v. Wiseman23 and now "fairly entrenched, 2 4 the American
22. The American Rule, in which each litigant pays his or her own legal fees regardless of
outcome, has been widely commented on. See, e.g., John Leubsdorf, Toward A History of the
American Rule on Attorney FeeRecovery, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 9 (1984); John F. Vargo, The
American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L.
REV. 1567 (1993); Calvin A Kuenzel, The Attorney's Fee: Why Not a Cost of Litigation, 49 IOWA L.
REV. 75 (1963); Comment, Court Awarded Attorney's Fees and Equal Access to the Courts, 122 U.
PA. L. REV. 636 (1974); see also Miller, supra note 9, at 1349 ("Litigants in the United States
traditionally must bear their own attorney's fees, regardless of whether they win or lose."); Charles
T. McCormick, Counsel Fees and Other Expenses of Litigation as an Element of Damages, 15
MINN. L. REV 619 (1931) (discussing attorney fee rules in an historical context); Walter B. Russell,
III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Note, Awards of Attorney's Fees in Environmental Litigation:Citizen
Suits and the "Appropriate"Standard, 18 GA. L. REV. 307, 312-22 (1984) (discussing American
rule and its exceptions); Dean R. Nicyper, Note, Attorney 's Fees & Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club:
Discouraging Citizens from ChallengingAdministrative Agency Decisions, 33 AM. U.L. REV. 775
(1984) (discussing origins of and exceptions to the American Rule); Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v.
Wilderness Society et al., 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975) ("At common law, costs were not allowed; but
for centuries in England there has been statutory authorization to award costs, including attorney's
fees."); Note, State Attorney Fee Shifting Statutes: Are We Quietly Revoking the American Rule 47
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 321 (1984) (discussing attorney fee-shifting issues at the state level and
exploring the impact of those statutes on the American Rule); Hunter, supra note 8, at 190-93
(tracing historical development of American Rule); Martha Pacold, Comment, Attorneys' Fees in
Class Actions Governed by Fee-Shifting Statutes, 68 U. CHI. L. REV 1007 (2001) (discussing fee
issues particularly relevant to class action suits). For what may well be the most classic article on
the contrast between the English cost system and the American, see Arthur L. Goodhart, Costs, 38
YALE L.J. 849 (1929). The historical origins of the American Rule are also commented on at length
in Fleischmann Distilling Corporation v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714, 717 (1967) (discussing
American Rule and its varied exceptions):
As early as 1278, the courts of England were authorized to award counsel fees to successful
plaintiffs in litigation. Similarly, since 1607 English courts have been empowered to award
counsel fees to defendants in all actions where such awards might be made to plaintiffs.... It
is now customary in England, after litigation of substantive claims has terminated, to conduct
separate hearings .. In order to determine the appropriateness and the size of an award of
counsel fees.... Although some American commentators have urged adoption of the English
practice in this country, our courts have generally resisted any movement in that direction. The
rule here has long been that attorney's fees are not ordinarily recoverable in the absence of a
statute or enforceable contract providing therefor.
For a thoughtful analysis of the economic impact of the American Rule vis a vis other attorney fee
models, see Thomas D. Rowe, Predictingthe Effects of Attorney Fee Shifting, 47 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS 139 (1984).
23. Arcambel v. Wiseman, 3 U.S. 306 (1796) (rejecting request for counsel fees, ruling "[T]he
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Rule requires that all litigants-whether victor or vanquished-pay their
own attorney fees. Although this rule is often sharply criticized,2 5 its
initial rationale was to ensure that would-be litigants are not deterred
from bringing suits for fear that a loss would require them to pay the
litigation costs for both sides.26 The American Rule was thought to
benefit impoverished litigants by reducing such risks.27 Implicit in the
general practice of the United States is in opposition to it; and even if that practice were not strictly
correct in principle, it is entitled to the respect of the court, till it is changed, or modified, by
statute."). Subsequent Supreme Court decisions upheld this rule. See., e.g., Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I
(1973); F.D. Rich Co., Inc. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co., Inc., 417 U.S. 116 (1974);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1879); Stewart v. Sonnebom, 98 U.S. 187 (1879); Flanders v.
Tweed, 15 Wall. 211 (1872); Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211 (1872); Day v. Woodworth, 13 How.
363 (1852) (cited in Fleishmann Distilling,386 U.S. at 718.)
24. Samuel R. Berger, CourtAwarded Attorneys'Fees: What is Reasonable?, 126 U. PA. L REV.
281 (1977).
25. For a stinging critique of the American Rule, see Albert A. Ehrenzweig, Reimbursement of
Counsel Fees and the Great Society, 54 CAL. L. REV. 792 (1966). Professor Ehrenzweig denounced
the American Rule as "a festering cancer in the body of our law without whose excision our society
will not be great." Id. at 794. For more moderate critiques of the American Rule that highlight its
weaknesses, see Vargo, supra note 22, at 1590-93 (suggesting that American Rule has negative
consequences for judicial efficiency, compensation of victorious parties, and incentives to litigate
small claims), Charles W. Wolfram, The Second Set of Players: Lawyers, Fee Shifting, and the
Limits of Professional Discipline, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 293 (1984) ("The 'American
Rule,' . . . has never been able to boast avid support. The rule insists that a possessor of legal rights
should swallow most of the great expense necessary to vidicate them. It strikes many lay and
professional observers as unjust."), and John Leubsdorf, Recovering Attorney Fees as Damages, 38
RUTGERS L. REV. 439, 442 (1986) (arguing that American rule is defective because "[i]f damages
are meant to put the plaintiff where he would have been but for the defendant's unlawful acts, that
goal cannot be reached if one third or more of the sum needed to reach it does not go to the plaintiff
but to his lawyer").
26. See, e.g., Edward F. Sherman, From "Loser Pays" to Modified Offer of Judgement Rules:
Reconciling Incentives to Settle with Access to Justice, 76 TEX. L. REV. 1863, 64 (1998):
Perhaps the strongest historical justification for the American Rule is centered in the American
faith in liberal access to the courts for righting wrongs. If a wronged party is deterred from
filing and prosecuting a suit by the risk that he will have to pay the opposing party's attorneys'
fees if the suit is unsuccessful, there is concern that many wrongs could go unremedied....
27. See, e.g., FleischmannDistilling, 386 U.S. at 718 ("[T]he poor might be unjustly discouraged
from instituting actions to vindicate their rights if the penalty for losing included the fees of their
opponents' counsel."); Jeffrey S. Brand, The Second Front in the Fight for Civil Rights: The
Supreme Court, Congress and Statutory Fees, 69 TEX. L. REV 291, 297 (1990) (observing that the
American Rule "grew out of the notion that requiring each party to pay its own fees would increase
access to the courts because impecunious plaintiffs could bring meritorious lawsuits without fear that
they would be responsible for paying opposing counsel's fees if unsuccessful"); Martin Patrick
Averill, Comment, "Specters " and "Litigious Fog"?:The Fourth CircuitAbandons Catalyst Theory
in S-I & S-2 by and through P-I & P-2 v. State Board of Education of North Carolina, 73 N.C. L.
REV. 2245, 2252 (1995) (noting that the American Rule "was originally viewed as a progressive
change in the law because it made litigation available to plaintiffs who otherwise would be deterred
by the prospect of paying attorney's fees to victorious defendants"). However, not all commentators
view this effect of the American Rule in a positive light. See, e.g., Kuenzel, supra note 22, at 80 ("If
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American Rule is also the understanding that the legal merits of a claim

are often difficult to predict prior to adjudication. Hence, the American
Rule makes the financial repercussions of being on the losing side of a
novel or intricate legal argument far less draconian.2 8 The rule has also
been justified on the basis that it is judicially efficiene 9 because it does

not require a separate proceeding to determine fees after the substantive
litigation is concluded. 30 Thus, unlike the majority of other legal
systems, American courts have rejected the "loser pays all" regime in
favor of the rule that all litigants generally foot the bill for their own
attorney fees.31

However, courts have crafted exceptions to the American Rule 32 when
33

"overriding considerations of justice seemed to compel such a result.

The most basic exception is that a losing litigant may be forced to pay all

a party abusing the system is made to pay the actual expense of the injury caused, it is to his
financial advantage not to abuse the system. The possibility of having to pay a lawyer's fee for both
sides of the litigation would make a plaintiff think twice before he files a petition."); id. at 83
(arguing that the fee system should encourage settlement and not litigation because "[lIlitigation is
an expensive and wasteful process").
28. See, e.g., FleischmannDistilling, 386 U.S. at 718 ("[S]ince litigation is at best uncertain one
should not be penalized for merely defending or prosecuting a lawsuit."). But see Kuenzel, supra
note 22, at 84 (arguing that the American Rule also imposes a financial burden, since "[t]he fact that
even if successful the litigant is presently charged for these expenses also tends to restrict [the]
openness requirement").
29. Fleischmann Distilling,386 U.S. at 718 (warning that "[t]he time, expense, and difficulties of
proof inherent in litigating the question of what constitutes reasonable attorney's fees would pose
substantial burdens for judicial administration").
30. Indeed, in the view of one commentator, it was an overly simplistic and optimistic view of
judicial efficiency that also contributed to the early appeal of the American Rule. See Kuenzel,
supranote 22, at 81:
[A]t the time our judicial system was established, there was a wish to maintain a system of laws
and procedures in which every man would be able to represent himself adequately before the
courts. The idea that the successful litigant would be reimbursed for the expense of his attorney
would appear improper as the litigant himself should have been able to succeed without this
unnecessary assistance.
31. See e.g., T. Rowe, supra note 22, at 140-41 (describing the range of attorney fee models
available, including "the American rule of no fee shifting, the English idea of 'two-way' shifting,
and 'one-way' approaches providing for fee awards to prevailing plaintiffs or defendants only. Each
of these basic approaches can be modified by other key types of attributes .. "). For a broader
analysis of the positive and negative impacts of various rules on attorney fee-shifting, see JOHN E.
SHAPARD,

THE INFLUENCE

OF RULES

RESPECTING RECOVERY

OF ATTORNEYS'

FEES ON

SETTLEMENT OF CIVIL CASES (Fed. Jud. Ctr. 1984) (providing economic analysis of the impact of
various fee-shifting rules on litigants' behavior).
32. See Berger, supra note 24, at 281 ("In an increasing number of litigation contexts, the critical
arena for determining who will ultimately bear the burden for the attorney's services shifts from the
lawyer's office to the courtroom.").
33. Fleischmann Distilling,386 U.S. at 718.
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costs and fees if the litigation is frivolous or abusive. 34 This obviously
serves a punitive function and helps to police the courtroom against
abuse. Other exceptions have allowed fee-shifting in a variety of
equitable circumstances such as the common fund doctrine,35 the
common benefit doctrine,36 and, for a short time, the "private attorney
general" doctrine.37
There is another set of exceptions to the American Rule that is more
important in environmental law-explicit statutory fee-shifting rules,
through which "Congress has created statutory exceptions to the
American Rule that allow recovery of attorney's fees under certain
34. See Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Society et al., 421 U.S. 240, 258 (1975)
(discussing the court's authority to assess attorney's fees against bad faith litigants); see also Russell
& Gregory, supra note 22, at 313 (noting that "[u]nder the bad faith exception, courts awarded fees
to punish litigants who abuse the judicial process.... The courts have thus awarded fees for filing
suit without just cause whether maliciously or frivolously, unreasonably delaying or disrupting
litigation, or willfully violating a court order."); Archie T. Wright, I1l, note, Awarding Attorney and
Expert Witness Fees in Environmental Litigation, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1222, 1230-33 (1972-73)
(discussing development of bad faith doctrine in the context of fee awards); Joseph H. King, Jr. &
Zigmunt J.B. Plater, The Right to Counsel Fees in Public Interest Environmental Litigation, 41
TENN. L. REV. 27 (1973) (tracing development of bad faith doctrine and its punitive function);
Vargo, supra note 22, at 1583-87 (discussing fee-shifting in cases involving bad actors or bad faith);
Dan B. Dobbs, Awarding Attorney Fees Against Adversaries, 1986 DUKE L. J. 435, 441-45 (1986)
(discussing role of fee-shifting in cases of litigation misconduct).
35. See, e.g., Cent. R.R. & Banking Co. v. Pettus, 113 U.S. 116 (1885); Internal Improvement
Fund Trs. v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881) (both applying the common fund doctrine); Alyseska,
421 U.S. at 257-58 (discussing history of and support for common fund doctrine); see also Berger,
supra note 24, at 295-98 (discussing origins of common fund doctrine); Pacold, supra note 22, at
1014-15 (exploring policy rationale for common fund doctrine); John P. Dawson, Lawyers and
Involuntary Clients: Attorney Fees From Funds, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1597 (1974) (discussing
implications of the common fund doctrine); McCormick, supra note 22, at 622-24 (discussing
development of and implications of common fund doctrine.); Wright, supra note 34, at 1233-37
(discussing development of common fund doctrine and its application); Berger, supranote 24, 298302 (discussing development of common fund doctrine); Dobbs, supra note 34, at 440-41
(evaluating common fund doctrine); King & Plater, supra note 34 (detailing historical development
of common fund doctrine); Vargo, supra note 22, at 1579-81 (discussing cases in which the
common fund doctrine was developed).
36. See generally Russell & Gregory, supra note 22, at 313-18 (discussing origins of common
benefit doctrine as a means for "the award of fees to a litigant who successfully sued to protect a
fund in which he and others had a common monetary interest"); Vargo, supra note 22, at 1581-83
(describing application of common, substantial benefit doctrine).
37. See generally Russell & Gregory, supra note 22, at 317-19 (discussing the brief life of the
private attorney general doctrine); Carl Cheng, Comment, Important Rights and the PrivateAttorney
General Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1929 (1985) (discussing merits of private attorney general
doctrine); Wright, supra note 34, at 1237-46 (discussing private attorney general doctrine with
special attention to its applicability in the environmental context); King & Plater, supra note 34
(discussing origins of and legal uncertainty inherent in private attorney general doctrine); Dobbs,
supra note 34, at 439-40 (discussing short lived private attorney general theory). The private
attorney general doctrine was abolished by the Supreme Court in Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 240.
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circumstances. 38 Indeed, these exceptions occur quite often as
"Congress has authorized more than 150 fee-shifting statutes that allow
plaintiffs to recover costs for attorney's fees.",39 This development
reflects changes in the nature of modem litigation.4 ° It is particularly
prevalent in environmental law, 4 1 a field in which citizen suit and feeshifting provisions are found in all major statutes except for the National

38. Miller, supra note 9, at 1349. As noted by commentators, "[t]he main justification for
statutory fee shifting is to provide an incentive for citizens to enforce certain laws as private
attorneys general." Pacold, supra note 22, at 1011.
39. Ugalde, supra note 11, at 591. See also Klein, supra note 8, at 105 ("There are currently
over 150 statutes containing fee-shifting provisions available to litigants in the United States.").
Depending on the commentator, however, estimates of the exact number of fee-shifting statutes
varies. Indeed, as one observer has noted, "Congress has included attorney fee provisions in so
many statutes creating private rights of action that its failure to include one might well be considered
significant." Leubsdorf, supra note 25, at 472. Perhaps the most expansive of such fee-shifting
provisions can be found in the Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. §504 (1981) ("EAJA"), which
makes attorney fees available to prevailing parties in a wide range of actions against the federal
government. For an interesting overview of the attorney fee provisions of the EAJA-which is, by
analogy, helpful in analyzing the environmental fee-shifting provisions-see Gregory C. Sisk, The
Essentials of the Equal Access to Justice Act: Court Awards of Attorney's Fees for Unreasonable
Government Conduct (Part One), 55 LA. L. REV. 217 (1994).
40. For an interesting discussion of how the modem litigation model differs from the traditional
view, see Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV L. REV. 1281,
1284 (1976), observing that in much modem public litigation:
The party structure is sprawling and amorphous, subject to change over the course of the
litigation. The traditional adversary relationship is suffused and intermixed with negotiating
and mediating processes at every point. The judge is the dominant figure in organizing and
guiding the case, and he draws for support not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a
wide range of outsiders-masters, experts, and oversight personnel. Most important, the trial
judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms of ongoing relief,
which have widespread effects on persons not before the court and require the judge's
continuing involvement in administration and implementation.
In many ways, this is also an extremely accurate description of modem environmental litigation. See
also id. at 1302 (describing public law litigation and its characteristics).
41. See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 11, at 199 ("Each of the major environmental laws applicable to
natural resource operations contains a fee shifting provision."); Ugalde, supra note 11, at 589
("Citizen suit and fee-shifting provisions have been invaluable litigation tools for the enforcement of
environmental law."); Kerry D. Florio, Comment, Attorneys Fees in Environmental Citizen Suits:
Should Prevailing Defendants Recover?, 27 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 707 (2000) ("[A]ttomey's
fee provisions are now included in virtually all environmental legislation. Without provisions for the
award of attorney's fees, legislation allowing for private citizen enforcement would be practically
meaningless."); id. at 712 ("Citizen suits are fundamental to the effective enforcement of
environmental legislation"). For a helpful overview of the attorney fee provisions in federal
environmental statutes, see Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards of Attorneys Fees Against the
Federal Government, 25 ARIz. ST. L.J. 733, 776-83 (1993). For one of the earliest commentaries on
the question, see King & Plater, supra note 34. For an excellent, recent analysis of the role of citizen
suits in environmental enforcement, see Matthew D. Zinn, Policing Environmental Regulatory
Enforcement: Cooperation, Capture & Citizen Suits, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 81 (2002).
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44
Management Act ("CZMA"), the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 ("OPA"),
and the Pollution Prevention Act of 1990 ("PPA").4 6
In environmental law, the Clean Air Act led the way. Passed in 1970,
at the dawn of the early modem environmental era, the Clean Air Act

was the first environmental statute to include a citizen suit provision,47
and it has "served as a prototype for almost all other citizen suit
provisions in major environmental statutes. 4 8 The citizen suit provision
in the Clean Air Act-like the analogous provisions in the statutes that
would follow it--did not merely give citizens the power to enforce
environmental statutes. It also provided
that attorney fees could be
49
recovered by the victorious plaintiff.

Moreover, as a cursory review of the fee-shifting provisions in various
environmental statutes reveals, where fee-shifting statutes differ from
each other is in the language they use to define who is entitled to recover
attorney fees.50 In general, there are two types of attorney fee provisions
common in the environmental arena: the "appropriate" standard and the
"prevailing or substantially prevailing party" standard.

42. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1969).
43. Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1996).
44. Costal Zone Management Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1465 (1972).
45. Oil Pollution Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2720 (1990).
46. Pollution Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. §§13101-13109 (1990).
47. For discussion of the Congressional debate leading up to the passage of the CAA's citizen
suit provisions, see Florio, supra note 41, at 710-12, Miller, supra note 9, at 4-5, and Boyer &
Meidinger, supra note 1, at 844-48.
48. Ugalde, supra note 11,at 593. For a fuller, early discussion of the attorney fee provisions
under the Clean Air Act, see Comment, Citizens Association of Georgetown v. Washington:
Awarding Attorneys' Fees in Citizen Suits to Enforce the Clean Air Act, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 1402
(1977).
49. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §7604(d) ("The court... may award costs of litigation ...to any
party, whenever the court determines such award is appropriate.").
50. See Dunn, supra note 11,at 199 ("The statutes differ in their standards."); Klein, supranote
8, at 105-09 (discussing, and providing examples of, various standards for fee-shifting, including the
"prevailing party" standard at issue in Buckhannon, as well as the "substantially prevailed" standard,
the "finally prevailed" standard, and the "appropriate" standard); Ugalde, supra note 11, at 596
("The standard for an award of costs in fee-shifting statutes falls primarily into two categories: those
that allow the court to award fees when appropriate and those that limit fees to a prevailing or
substantially prevailing party. A large number of environmental ... statutes apply the appropriate
standard.., however, the majority of statutes use the prevailing party language."); Nicyper, supra
note 22, at 788-92 (discussing the variety of fee-shifting statutes that include "mandatory fee awards
made regardless of the outcome of trial; fee awards to prevailing parties; fee awards to substantially
prevailing parties; fee awards to successful parties; and fee awards made whenever the court
determines that an award is appropriate").
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5
A. The "Appropriate" Standard 1

The more common standard for the award of attorney fees in
environmental statutes is the standard that allows such awards
"whenever... appropriate. ' 52 This is the more discretionary of the
standards since none of the statutes that employ this language gives the
53
court any concrete guidance as to how to determine "appropriateness.,
A version of the "whenever... appropriate" standard can be found in the
Toxic Substances Control Act ("TSCA"),54 the Endangered Species Act
("ESA"),55 the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act
("SMCRA"), 5 6 the Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act
58
("MPRSA"), 57 the Public Health Service Act (Title XIV) ("PHSA"),
6
0
59
the Noise Control Act ("NCA"), and the Clean Air Act ("CAA").
In none of these statutes is there language that clearly narrows or limits
the range of discretion to be employed by the court in making fee
determinations. Instead, much deference is paid to the judgment of the
trial courts as to the circumstances that justify fee-shifting.

51. For general commentary on the use of and interpretation of the "appropriate" standard in
environmental statutes, see Ugalde, supra note 11, at 600-01, 613-15. See also Nicyper, supra note
22, at 791 (noting that the dual purposes of the "appropriate" standard are "to effectuate both the
encouragement and discouragement functions of fee awards").
52. This terminology is "[i]n contrast with other fee-shifting statutes, which generally provide for
awards in favor of prevailing parties." Sisk, supranote 41, at 778.
53. See Florio, supra note 41, at 716 ("The 'appropriate' standard differs from other fee-shifting
provisions because it gives the courts more discretion in fee awards."); Note, Awards of Attorneys
Fees to Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, 96 HARV. L. REV. 677, 680-81 (1983) [hereinafter
Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants] ("Most of the major federal environmental statutes, however,
specify that, in private actions for enforcement or judicial review, attorneys' fees may be granted to
any party whenever. ... [t]he statutory language and legislative history of the environmental fee
shifting provisions provide little direct guidance to judges deciding whether to award attorneys' fees.
The decision is explicitly delegated to the courts .. "); and Id. at 695 ("[C]ourts cannot avoid the
broad discretion conferred by the environmental fee-shifiing provisions").
54. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §2619 (c) (2) (2000). The language found in TSCA
is typical of the "appropriate" statutes:
The court ... may award costs of suit and reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses if
the court determines that such an award is appropriate. Any court, in issuing its decision in an
action brought to review such an order, may award costs of suit and reasonable fees for
attorneys if the court determines that such an award is appropriate.
4
55. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §1540(g)( ) (2001).
56. Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(d) (2001).
57. Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(4) (2001).
58. Public Health Service Act (Title XIV), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d) (2001).
59. Noise Control Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (d) (2001).
60. Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.§ 7604(d) (2001).
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6
B. The "Prevailing or Substantially Prevailing Party" Standard 1

The second fee-shifting standard employed by environmental statutes

is the "prevailing or substantially prevailing party" standard. By
explicitly requiring some degree of success prior to a fee award, this
standard is less discretionary than the "whenever ... appropriate"
standard.6 2 This standard is used in the Federal Water Pollution Control
Act ("Clean Water Act" or "CWA"), 63 as well as in the Solid Waste
Disposal Act ("SWDA"), 64 the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act ("CERCLA"),65 and the 66Emergency
Planning and Community Right to Know Act ("EPCRTKA").
These statutes do not describe what is required in order to "prevail" or
"substantially prevail." More importantly, the statutes do not indicate
whether it is only winning in court that will
constitute "prevailing" or
67

whether other forms of success are relevant.

There is very little legislative history to shed light on the reasons why
environmental statutes have employed two different standards. In
addition, while basic principles of statutory construction suggest that
Congress intends different outcomes when it uses different language,
nothing in the language of the statutes themselves provides guidance on
the degree to which Congress might have intended different outcomes.
Most importantly, the statutes themselves do not explicitly or implicitly
address whether the catalyst theory may be the basis for a fee award.

61. For commentary on the use of and interpretation of the "prevailing party" or "substantially
prevailing party" standard, see Ugalde, supra note 11, at 601-02, 615-17.
62. Despite the fact that the "prevailing party" standard is less discretionary than the
"whenever... appropriate" standard, it has been aptly observed that "[tihe definition of 'prevailing
party' is unclear and has been the subject of significant litigation." Pacold, supra note 22, at 1012.
63. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2000). For a more extensive
discussion of the fee-shifting provisions of the Clean Water Act, see Monica Dias, Note, MorrisSmith v. Moulton Niguel Water District. The Double Standard for Attorney Fees Under the Clean
Water Act, 27 N. KY. L. REV 549 (2000).
64. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e) (2001).
65. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9659(f) (2001).
66. Emergency Planning and Community Right to Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f) (2000). The
attorney fee provisions of EPCRTKA are discussed more fully in Aaron Roblan & Samuel H. Sage,
Steel Company v. Citizens for a Better Environment: The Evisceration of Citizen Suits Under the
Veil ofArticle I11, 12 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 58, 75-77 (1998).
67. In addition, there is little guidance as to whether there was intended to be a substantive
difference between those statutes that require a party to be "prevailing" and those that require a party
to be "substantially prevailing." The plain language of the statute would seem to suggest that these
terms have different meanings, but the precise difference in meaning is unclear.
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III. PRELUDE TO BUCKHANNON
In a series of pre-Buckhannon cases, the Supreme Court and influential
lower courts developed guidelines for the use of the catalyst theory.
While many of these cases arose in contexts other than environmental
law, their holdings framed the way in which the catalyst theory has been
applied in the environmental context. While Buckhannon 's lineage has
already been explored by others, a brief exploration of it is critical for
68
understanding the legal landscape in which Buckhannon arose.
Prior to Buckhannon, the relevant case law in all circuits except the
Fourth 69 was hospitable to the catalyst theory, even absent specific
Congressional authorization.
The catalyst theory could be said to have originated in the Eighth
70
Circuit's 1970 ruling in Parham v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co.,
called by one commentator "the first judicial articulation of the catalyst
theory.'
In Parham, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") alleging that the
defendant's 1967 decision not to employ him constituted actionable
racial discrimination. 72 After the EEOC's intervention 73 the defendant
eventually offered the plaintiff employment. The plaintiff declined the
offer, a decision that the defendant maintained made the plaintiffs
complaint moot and discharged it of any further obligation to
conciliate.74
However, the plaintiff brought suit arguing that the defendant's
policies discriminated against him in particular and against black job
applicants generally. The district court rejected plaintiffs arguments.
The defendant prevailed at trial largely because it was able to introduce
68. The Supreme Court has been frequently called upon to rule on a range of issues pertaining to
attorney fees. An exhaustive examination of this pre-Buckhannon jurisprudence is beyond the scope
of this Article which seeks only to highlight those Supreme Court decisions with direct relevance to
Buckhannon's rejection of the catalyst theory. For a more comprehensive survey of the Supreme
Court's earlier jurisprudence on fee-shifting questions, see Brand, supra note 27, at 316-69.
69. See infra notes 205-25 and accompanying text.
70. Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970). See generally Ugalde,
supra note 11, at 599-600; Hunter, supra note 8, at 196-98; Joel H. Trotter, Note, The Catalyst
Theory of Civil Rights Fee Shifting After Farrar v. Hobby, 80 VA. L. REv. 1429, 1433-37 (1994).
71. Trotter, supra note 70, at 1434.
72. Id.The action was brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a).
73. Specifically, "the EEOC found reasonable cause to believe that the Company had been guilty
of a discriminatory employment practice. The EEOC then attempted to resolve the dispute through
conciliation ... and requested the [defendant] to sign a conciliation agreement." Parham,433 F.2d
at 423.
74. Id.
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"rebuttal evidence showing that it had adopted an affirmative action
75
program in late 1968, which resulted in increased hiring of blacks.,
Thus, because the trial court found that the defendant was not currently
discriminating, and had not previously discriminated
against the plaintiff
76
relief.
awarded
not
was
plaintiff
the
individually,
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit agreed with the trial court that the
plaintiff had failed to prove that he personally suffered discrimination.7 7
However, it also ruled that this failure of the individual claim did not bar
consideration of the class claim. 78 The Eighth Circuit determined that
although there had been past discrimination,
the defendant had
voluntarily changed its policies and practices after 1968 in a way that
was "impressive and salutory. ' 9 The question became whether the
plaintiff should be awarded attorney fees where there was no finding that
he personally had been the victim of discrimination and a finding that the
defendant had voluntarily undertaken policies and practices that would
remedy the past discrimination against others.
The Eighth Circuit answered this question in the affirmative. Finding
that because "this progress followed, not preceded, Parham's complaint
to the EEOC,"80 the court ruled that Parham was entitled to fees as a
"catalyst" because his litigation spurred the defendant to revise its
policies:
[W]e believe Parham's lawsuit acted as a catalyst which prompted the
appellee to take action implementing its own fair employment policies and
seeking compliance with the requirements of Title VII. In this sense,
Parham performed a valuable public service in bringing this action. Having
prevailed in his contentions of racial discrimination against blacks
generally... Parham is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees.
Following Parham, this rationale was followed by all circuits that
confronted this issue 82 with 83the exception of the Fourth Circuit from
which Buckhannon emerged.
75. Id. at 424.
76. Id. at 425.
77. Id. at 428.
78. Id. ("Parham's failure to establish his claim for individual damages will not bar relief for the
class he represents.").
79. Id. at 429 (noting and describing defendant's "good faith efforts, beginning in the middle of
1967 and continuing thereafter, to recruit black employees").
80. Id.
81. Id. at 429-30.
82. See, e.g., Morris v. City of West Palm Beach, 194 F.3d 1203, 1206-07 (11th Cir. 1999);
Payne v. Bd. of Educ., Cleveland City Sch., 88 F.3d 392, 397 (6th Cir. 1996); Kilgour v. City of
Pasadena, 53 F.3d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1995); Marbley v. Bane, 57 F.3d 224, 234-35 (2nd Cir.
1995); Beard v. Teska, 31 F.3d 942, 951 (10th Cir. 1994); Baumgartner v. Harrisburg Hous. Auth.,
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Meanwhile, as the circuit courts were generally following the Parham
approach, the Supreme Court was developing its own fee-shifting
doctrines.
Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society84 was one of the
most significant early cases involving the interplay between
environmental statutes and attorney fees.85 Although the case did not
directly implicate the catalyst theory, it set important groundwork for
fee-shifting jurisprudence. The Supreme Court was called upon to
review a decision granting attorney fees to respondents who had brought
suit to prevent the federal government from issuing permits to build the
trans-Alaska oil pipeline. 86 Plaintiffs alleged that issuing these permits
would violate the Mineral Leasing Act of 192087 and the National

Environmental Policy Act. 88 The litigation was resolved legislatively
when Congress "enacted legislation which amended the Mineral Leasing
Act to allow the granting of the permits sought by Alyeska and declared
that no further action under the NEPA was necessary before construction
of the pipeline could proceed." 89
The two statutes at issue in Alyeska did not contain fee-shifting
provisions. However, the respondents' fee request was based on the
common law "private attorney general" rationale. This would have
allowed a fee award absent statutory authorization if the litigant seeking
fees proved that it "had ensured that the governmental system functioned
21 F.3d 541, 544-45 (3rd Cir. 1994); Little Rock Sch. Dist. v. Pulaski County Special Sch. Dist. #1,
17 F.3d 260, 262 (8th Cir. 1994); Zinn v. Shalala, 35 F.3d 273, 274, 276 (7th Cir. 1994); Paris v.
U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 988 F.2d 236, 238 (1st Cir. 1993); Wooldridge v. Marlene
Indus. Corp., 898 F.2d 1169, 1173-74 (6th Cir. 1990); Grano v. Barry, 783 F.2d 1104, 1108 (D.C.
Cir. 1986); Institutionalized Juveniles v. Sec'y of Pub. Welfare, 758 F.2d 897, 911 (3rd Cir. 1985);
Doe v. Busbee, 684 F.2d 1375, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982); Robinson v. Kimbrough, 652 F.2d 458, 46566 (5th Cir. 1981); Am. Constitutional Party v. Munro, 650 F.2d 184, 187 (9th Cir. 1981); Williams
v. Miller, 620 F.2d 199, 202 (8th Cir. 1980). This listing of cases is not intended to be exhaustive.
Instead, it offers a handful of examples illustrating the widespread pre-Buckhannon acceptance of
the catalyst theory.

83. For a discussion of the Fourth Circuit's contrary approach, see discussion in and
accompanying notes 205-25, infra.
84. Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
85. For further discussion of Alyeska, see Gibson, supra note 9, at 209, P.G. Szczepanski, Note
& Comment, For a Few DollarsLess: Equity Rides Again in the Denial of Section 1988 Attorney's

Fees to a Prevailing Party in Farrar v. Hobby, 5 TEMP. POL. & Civ. RTS. L. REV. 219, 227-31
(1996), McFerren, supra note 8, at 157-59, Frank F. Skillem, Private Environmental Litigation:
Some Problems and Pitfalls, 9 ST. MARY'S L.J. 675, 740-42 (1978), and Brand, supra note 27, at
296-301,303-07.
86. Alyeska, 421 U.S. 241-43.
87. Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, 30 U.S.C. § 185 (amended 2000).
88. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2000).
89. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 244-45.
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properly; and [was] entitled to attorneys' fees lest the great cost of
litigation of this kind.., deter private parties desiring to see the laws
protecting the environment properly enforced." 90
The Alyeska Court declined to allow fee-shifting, ruling that absent a
few narrow common law exceptions, 91 any departure from the American
Rule must come from specific Congressional authorization. The Court
reasoned that "it would be inappropriate for the Judiciary, without
legislative guidance, to reallocate the burdens of litigation in the manner
and to the extent urged....,9

The Court viewed its role narrowly,

deferring to Congress's authority to determine "the circumstances under
which attorneys' fees are to be awarded and the range of discretion of the
courts in making those awards .... 93
Thus, the Court refused to allow fee awards absent specific
Congressional authorization even if an award of fees might be desirable
in a particular case.94 Although Alyeska did not directly involve a
catalyst claim, it is relevant to the debate about catalyst theory. First, it
illustrates a presumption against expanding the scope of fee awards
unless clearly authorized by Congress. It also champions the preeminent
role of Congress in making critical decisions in this regard. Indeed, in
direct response to Alyeska, Congress passed the Civil Rights Attorney's
Fee Awards Act of 1976 ("Fees Act") 95 providing specific legislative
authorization for attorney fees in a broad range of civil rights cases.
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Hanrahanv. Hampton,96 in which
it was asked to construe the meaning of the Fees Act provision awarding
attorney fees to "prevailing parties." This was not an environmental
statute, but Hanrahanwas nevertheless significant because it interpreted
90. Id. at 245-46.
91. See supra text accompanying notes 20-48.
92. Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 247.

93." Id. at 262.
94. As the court reasoned:

We do not purport to assess the merits or demerits of the "American Rule" with respect to the
allowance of attorneys' fees. It has been criticized ... and courts have been urged to find
exceptions to it. It is also apparent from our national experience that the encouragement of
private action to implement public policy has been viewed as desirable in a variety of
circumstances. But the rule followed in our courts with respect to attorneys' fees has survived.
It is deeply rooted in our history and in congressional policy; and it is not for us to invade the
legislature's province by redistributing litigation costs.
Id. at 270-71.
95. Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (amended 2000).
96. Hanrahan v. Hampton, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). See generally Gibson, supra note 9, at 215-16;
McFerren, supra note 8, at 159; Matthew D. Slater, Comment, Civil Rights Attorneys'Fees Awards
in Moot Cases, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 819, 828-30 (1982).
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the term "prevailing party" and said in dicta that the legislative history of
the "prevailing party" test suggested that the catalyst theory was
permissible.97
The question before the Court was whether a party who succeeded in
reversing a directed verdict and winning several discovery motions could
be a "prevailing party." 98 The Court found that this was insufficient to
justify an award as a "prevailing party" 99 because in a situation such as
this "respondents have of course not prevailed on the merits of any of
their claims .... The jury may or may not decide some or all of the
issues in favor of the respondents."' 00
In reaching this conclusion, however, the Court cited with approval
certain aspects of the legislative history of fee-shifting that endorse the
catalyst theory. As the Court noted:
The legislative history of the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of
1976 indicates that a person may in some circumstances be a "prevailing
party" without having obtained a "favorable final judgment following a full
trial on the merits."... Thus, for example, "partiesmay be considered to
have prevailed when they vindicate
10 rights through a consent judgment or
without formally obtaining relief" 1
By citing this legislative history with approval, Hanrahan suggests
that statutes using "prevailing party" language may authorize recovery of
attorney fees by catalysts. This suggests that it was not the catalyst
theory itself that the HanrahanCourt rejected. Instead, the Court merely
took issue with the claim that the plaintiffs had "prevailed" on any
substantive matters.
Following Hanrahan, the Supreme Court's decision in Maher v.
Gagne 102 made it clear that a settlement could be a sufficient basis for
fee-shifting under the "prevailing party" provisions of the Fees Act.103
97. Hanrahan,446 U.S. at 756-58.
98. Id. at 756. More specifically, the respondents had obtained:

(1) the reversal of the District Court's judgment directing verdicts against them, save with
respect to certain of the defendants; (2) the reversal of the District Court's denial of their
motion to discover the identity of an informant; and (3) the direction to the District Court on
remand to consider allowing further discovery, and to conduct a hearing on the respondent's
contention that the conduct of some of the petitioners in response to the trial court's discovery
orders warranted the imposition of sanctions....
Id.
99. Id. at 756.
100. Id. at 758-59.
101.
(1976))
102.
17, and
103.

Id. at 756-57 (quoting H.R. Rep. No 94-1558 at 7 (1976) and S.Rep. No. 94-1011 at 5
(emphasis added).
448 U.S. 122 (1980). For further discussion of Maher, see Gibson, supra note 9, at 216McFerren, supra note 8, at 160.
42 U.S.C. § 1988. The complaint in Maher was based on allegations that Connecticut's Aid

20041

The Catalyst Calamity

The Court strongly endorsed the principle that litigants could recover
fees even absent a judicial ruling in their favor1 ° 4 Although the Court
never used the term "catalyst," its ruling would lend support to an
argument in favor of the catalyst theory. In Maher, the dispute was
resolved when the state amended its controversial regulations, the parties
negotiated a settlement, and the district court "entered a consent
decree."'' 0 5 Attorney fees were awarded, and the petitioner objected
based on the argument that "the respondent
prevailed through a
'06
settlement rather than through litigation."
The Supreme Court, however, found "no merit" 0 7 in this limited view.
Instead, the Court ruled that "[t]he fact that respondent prevailed through
a settlement rather than through litigation does not weaken her claim to
fees"10 8 and that nothing in the "prevailing party" provisions requires that
a fee award be preceded by "full litigation of the issues or .. a judicial
determination that the plaintiffs rights have been violated."' 1 9 Here, the
settlement agreement at issue was not an entirely out-of-court private
arrangement because it received the judicial imprimatur of a consent
decree. Thus, it did not squarely address the Buckhannon problem.
However, it did reject an overly-broad reading of the "prevailing party"
language and is, in that way, instructive. 110
The next time that the Supreme Court had the opportunity to address
fee-shifting issues in a way relevant to Buckhannon was in Hensley v.
to Families with Dependent Children regulations violated the Social Security Act and the Equal
Protection and Due Process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Maher, 448 U.S. at 125. Before
addressing the catalyst question, the Court first considered several constitutional and statutory claims
not relevant to the issue of catalyst recovery. Id. Specifically, the Court considered the argument
that "Congress did not intend to authorize the award of attorney's fees in every type of § 1983
action, but rather limited the court's authority to award fees to cases in which § 1983 is invoked as a
remedy for a constitutional violation or a violation of a federal statute providing for the protection of
civil rights or equal rights." Id. at 128. The Court rejected this argument, finding that there was no
basis for drawing this distinction. Id. The Court was also asked to consider whether a "federal court
is barred by the Eleventh Amendment from awarding fees against a State in a case involving a
purely statutory, non-civil rights claim." Id.at 130. The Court found that it did not need to reach
this argument because "respondent did allege violations of her Fourteenth Amendment due process
and equal protection rights." Id. at 130-31.
104. Id. at 126-27.
105. Id. at 126.
106. Id. at 129. The lower court's decision to award fees can be found at Gagne v. Maher 455
F.Supp. 1344 (D.Conn. 1978).
107. Maher, 448 U.S. at 129.
108. Id.
109. Id. The Court also cited, with approval, S. Rep. No. 94-1011 at 5 (1976), the same source
noted by the Court in Hanrahan.
110. This litigation, obviously, did not involve an environmental statute. However, there is
nothing in it to indicate that the term would be interpreted differently in any other statute.
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Eckerhart. I"'
In Hensley, a complaint was filed on behalf of
involuntarily confined patients at the Forensic Unit of the Fulton State
Hospital against officials of the Forensic Unit and the Missouri Mental
Health Commission. 12 In the complaint, "Count I challenged the
constitutionality of treatment and conditions at the Forensic Unit. Count
II challenged the placement of patients in the [maximum security mental
health facility] without procedural due process. Count III sought
compensation for patients who performed institution-maintaining

labor."'

13

Prior to a judicial ruling on the litigation's merits, a consent decree
resolved Count i." 4 Furthermore, the start of compensation for patients
mooted Count 111.115
Thus, the initial complaint was voluntarily
dismissed. 16 However, a new two-count complaint was filed in its stead.
The new Count I was substantially the same as Count I in the original
action while the new Count II sought damages for the past labor
8
performed by the patients.' 17 Count II was then voluntarily dismissed.''
At a trial on the merits, the district court ruled for the patients on the
9
constitutional claim."
20
Following these proceedings, the respondents filed a request for fees'
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 which authorizes the payment of attorney fees to
111. 461 U.S. 424 (1983). See generally McFerren, supra note 9, at 160; Loring, supranote 8, at
980-81; Jean R. Stemlight, The Supreme Court's Denial of Reasonable Attorney's Fees to
Prevailing Civil Rights Plaintiffs, 17 HARV. REV. LAW & SOC. CHANGE 535, 541-45 (1989-90);
Brand, supra note 27, at 320-21; Bernard P. Codd, Comment, Grossly Excessive Attorney's Fee
Requests Under the Civil Rights Attorney's Fee Awards Act: Should the Entire Fee Request be
Denied? 24 U. BALT. L. REV 149, 152-56 (1994).
112. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 426.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.at426-27.
116. Id. at427.
117. Id. In addition, following this, an additional "amended one-count complaint [was filed]
specifying the conditions that allegedly violated [patients'] constitutional right to treatment"). Id.
118. Id.
119. The lower court's opinion may be found at Eckerhart v. Hensley, 475 F. Supp. 908 (W.D.
Mo. 1979). As described by the Supreme Court, the district court "found constitutional violations in
five of six general areas: physical environment; individual treatment plans; least restrictive
environment; visitation, telephone, and mail privileges; and seclusion and restraint. With respect to
staffing, the sixth general area, the District Court found that the Forensic Unit's staffing levels ...
were minimally adequate." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 427-28.
120. Respondents' request was for $195,000 to $225,000 in attorney fees. In calculating this
amount, it was asserted that respondents' "four attorneys claimed 2,985 hours worked and sought
payment at rates varying from $40 to $65 per hour. This amounted to approximately $150,000.
Respondents also requested that the fee be enhanced by thirty to fifty percent, for a total award of
somewhere between $195,000 and $225,000." Hensley, 461 U.S. at 428.
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"prevailing part[ies.]"' 121 The district court ruled that the respondents
were "prevailing parties" for purposes of §1988, "even though they had
not succeeded on every claim."1 22 Although the district court awarded24
23
less in attorney fees than the amount requested, fees were awarded.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, 25 but the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded. 126
The Court spent much time analyzing how to calculate a reasonable
fee,' 27 acknowledging that "[t]here is no precise rule or formula for
making these determinations.' l2 8 Buckhannon, of course, did not concern
itself with the mathematical calculation of fees. However, several
aspects of the Supreme Court's decision to vacate are relevant to the
catalyst controversy. First, the Court warns that "[a] request for
attorney's fees should not result in a second major litigation."'129 This
concern with judicial efficiency continually resurfaces in discussions
about the catalyst theory. 130 In addition, the Court asserts the primacy of
the district court in making fee determinations.' 3' This confidence in32 the
lower court's ability has spurred significant debate in catalyst cases.
More importantly, the Court established that while a plaintiff need not
prevail on all claims, the degree of success is a "crucial factor"' 133 in

121. Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.
122. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 428.
123. In total, the fee award was set at $133,332.25. More specifically, the district court "reduced
the number of hours claimed by one attorney by thirty percent to account for his inexperience and
failure to keep contemporaneous records. Second, the court declined to adopt an enhancement factor
to increase the award." Id. at 428-29.
124. Id.at428.
125. Eckerhart v. Hensley, 664 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1981).
126. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440.
127. Id. at 433-37 (discussing financial co.oplexities in determining appropriate attorney fee
award).
128. Id. at 436.
129. Id. at 437. A similar sentiment was echoed in Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in which
he called appeals from attorney fee decisions "one of the least socially productive types of litigation
imaginable." Id. at 442 (Brennan, J. dissenting).
130. See infra notes 384-87 and accompanying text.
131. As the court explained:
We reemphasize that the district court has discretion in determining the amount of a fee award.
This is appropriate in view of the district court's superior understanding of the litigation and the
desirability of avoiding frequent appellate review of what essentially are factual matters. It
remains important, however, for the district court to provide a concise but clear explanation of
its reasons for the fee award.
Hensley, 461 U.S. at 437.
132. See infra notes 262-80 and accompanying text.
133. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440. The court goes on to explain that "[w]here the plaintiff has failed
to prevail on a claim that is distinct in all respects from his successful claims, the hours spent on the
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determining the amount of attorney fees to be awarded. This places great
weight on substantive success as a factor in determining fees. Alas,
Hensley did not address the question of where that success must occur to
be relevant in the fee award calculation. Hence, while this case provided
important guidance by establishing that success is relevant in defining
"prevailing," its silence on the question of non-judicial success kept the
134
catalyst theory alive and well.
The Supreme Court then considered the fee-shifting provisions of the
Clean Air Act and its "whenever ...

appropriate" standard for fee-

shifting. The 1983 case Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club 135 began when the
respondent environmental groups challenged the E.P.A.'s promulgation
of sulfur dioxide emission standards. 36 The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia
ruled against the groups, rejecting all their
37
substantive claims.
In spite of this, the Court of Appeals awarded fees to the losing
parties 138 under the "whenever ... appropriate" language of the Clean
Air Act's fee-shifting provision.139 In granting this award, the Court of
Appeals accepted the argument that the broad discretionary language of
"whenever appropriate" authorizes respondents' awards because "despite
their failure to obtain any of the relief they requested, it was
'appropriate' for them to receive fees for their contributions to the goals
140
of the Clean Air Act."'
unsuccessful claim should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee.... [W]here
the plaintiff achieved only limited success, the district court should award only that amount of fees
that is reasonable in relation to the results obtained." Id.
134. This case, like the prior one, did not involve an environmental statute. However, it still
provides some guidance as to the interpretation of "prevailing party" by establishing that success is
crucial in defining "prevailing." Thus, this case is relevant, at a minimum, in interpreting the
environmental statutes that use "prevailing party" language.
135. 463 U.S. 680 (1983). This case has been widely commented on. See generally Klein, supra
note 8, at 122-26; Russell & Gregory, supra note 22, at 339-59; Florio, supra note 41, at 717-19;
Sisk, supra note 41, at 778-83.
136. More specifically, one environmental group asserted that "the standards promulgated by the
EPA were tainted by the agency's ex parte contacts with representatives of private industry" while
the other group claimed that "EPA lacked authority under the Clean Air Act to issue the type of
standards that it did." Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 681.
137. Sierra Club v. Costle, 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
138. See Sierra Club v. Gorsuch, 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Ala. Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 672
F.2d I (D.C. Cir. 1982). The Sierra Club was awarded $45,000 and the Environmental Defense
Fund was awarded $46,000. Id. at 3-5.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 7607 (f).
140. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682. In a Note written shortly before Ruckelshaus was decided, an
author commented on the merits of this argument and the benefits that could be derived from
authorizing fee awards to non-prevailing parties. See Unsuccessful Environmental Litigants, supra
note 51, at 682-96 (arguing that fee awards to unsuccessful environmental plaintiffs may be
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The Supreme Court rejected this reasoning and reversed, ruling that
the fee-shifting provision "requires the conclusion that some success on
the merits be obtained before a party becomes eligible for a fee
award."' 4'a Failure to require at least some success would, in the view of
the Court, mark a "radical departure"'' 42 from prevailing principles. This
case did not concern a catalytic recovery and so does not address the
precise issue raised by Buckhannon. However, the Court's reasoning in
Ruckelshaus is important because it provides guidance for applying the
"whenever... appropriate" standard.
First, the Court laments the fact that the statute is written in a way that
makes it "difficult to draw any meaningful guidance"' 143 from the text
itself. This uncertainty also impairs efforts to determine Congressional
intent with regard to the catalyst theory.
In addition, because of sovereign immunity concerns, the Court asserts
that fee-shifting statutes, as they apply to the government, should be
interpreted narrowly. 44 This notion is significant because the catalyst
theory is often invoked against the government.
More importantly, however, Ruckelshaus addressed the distinction between
the "whenever ...

appropriate"

standard and the "prevailing party"

standard. The Court noted that when adopting the "whenever...
appropriate" standard, Congress was explicitly rejecting the "prevailing
party" standard. 145 At the time that the statute was written, the "prevailing
party" standard was interpreted narrowly. Thus, the Ruckelshaus Court
reasoned that by consciously selecting the "whenever... appropriate"
standard, Congress:meant to expand the class of parties eligible for fee
awards from prevailing parties to partially prevailing parties ....

Congress

intended to eliminate both the restrictive readings of "prevailing party"
adopted in some .. cases ... and the necessity for case-by-case scrutiny by

federal ' courts
into whether plaintiffs prevailed "essentially" on "central
46
issues.

appropriate and beneficial).
141. Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. at 682.
142. Id. at 683. The Court goes on to note that:
[O]rdinary conceptions of just returns reject the idea that a party who wrongly charges someone
with violations of the law should be able to force that defendant to pay the costs of the wholly
unsuccessful suit against it. Before we will conclude Congress abandoned this established
principle. . .- rooted as it is in intuitive notions of fairness and widely manifested in numerous
different contexts-a clear showing that this result was intended is required,
Id.
143. Id. at 685.
144. Id. at 685-86 (warning that "care must be taken not to 'enlarge' § 307(f)'s waiver of
immunity beyond what a fair reading of the language of the section requires').
145. Id.at 687.
146. Id. at 688.
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This did not address catalytic recovery. However, the Court did not
rule out this possibility and instead made a strong case for trial court
discretion. 47 Because Buckhannon did not address a statute employing
the "whenever ...appropriate" standard, Ruckelshaus remains critically
148
important for such cases.
The following year, the Supreme Court decided Marek v. Chesny, 149 a
case involving the complex interrelationship between the term "costs" as
mentioned in Rule 68 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and as
mentioned in §1988 of the Fees Act.150 The Court held that "[tjhe plain
language of Rule 68 and §1988 subjects such fees to the cost-shifting
provisions of Rule 68."''
With the exception of very general
discussions of the goals of fee-shifting,152 none of the legal issues
involved in the catalyst theory were addressed in the opinion. However,
the future significance of Marek lay in the Appendix to Justice Brennan's
dissent. 53 In that Appendix, Justice Brennan compiled a comprehensive
list of federal statutes that contained fee-shifting provisions of various
types. This listing was referenced by the majority opinion in
Buckhannon 154 in the context of noting that fee-shifting provisions were
included in "numerous statutes"' 155 and observing that "[w]e have
interpreted these fee-shifting provisions consistently.' 5 6 This has led to
speculation as to whether the Buckhannon majority intended to
incorporate all the statutes in the Marek Appendix by reference. If this is
147. Justice Stevens, in his Ruckelshaus dissent, elaborates more fully on the degree to which he
believes the deference to the trial court should be expanded. He asserts that "Congress ...carefully
explained in the legislative history that it intended to give the court of appeals discretionary authority
to award fees and costs to a broader category of parties." Id. at 694 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
148. See Florio, supra note 41, at 718-19 ("Although Ruckelshaus specifically applied to the
CAA, that reasoning has been applied to all statutes that use the 'appropriate' standard.").
149. 473 U.S. 1 (1985). For further discussion of Marek, see generally Sherman, supra note 26,
at 1877-79.
150. 42 U.S.C. § 1988
151. Marek, 473 U.S. at 11. More specifically, Rule 68 does not allow a litigant to recover costs

incurred after rejecting a settlement offer when the ultimate disposition of the case results in a less
beneficial outcome than the settlement offer would have provided. Id. at 10-13. However, §1988

however, authorizes the awarding of attorney fees to prevailing parties. Id. at 10.
152. See, e.g., id. at 10 (noting that "[t]here is no evidence.., that Congress, in considering §
1988, had any thought that civil rights claims were to be on any different footing from other civil

claims....

Indeed, Congress made clear its concern that civil rights plaintiffs not be penalized

for... settling their cases out of court."); id.at I1 ("Section 1988 encourages plaintiffs to bring
meritorious civil rights suits.").
153. Id. at 43-51 (Brennan, J.,dissenting) (Appendix).
154. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.

155. Id. at 602.
156. Id. at 603 n.4.
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true, then the scope of Buckhannon would extend far beyond its initial
boundaries.
Several years later, the Court confronted the catalyst question more
directly in Hewitt v. Helms.1 57 In Hewitt, a former inmate claimed his
treatment in prison violated the Due Process Clause1 58 and sought
attorney fees under the "prevailing party" language of §1988 of the Fees
1 59
Act. Before the suit was resolved, the inmate was released on parole.
He brought an action for fees based on several grounds, including the
catalyst theory. He argued that while his case was pending, the
Pennsylvania Bureau of Corrections changed its policies in a way that
would remedy some of the problems about which he complained.1 60 He
claimed that his suit "was a 'catalyst ' "1 61 for the prison reforms, entitling
him to "prevailing party" status
The Court held that it "need not decide the circumstances, if any, under
which this 'catalyst' theory could justify a fee award under §1988,
because even if [the former inmate] can demonstrate a clear causal link
between his lawsuit and the State's amendment of its regulations,' 6 2 he
63
had been released prior to the amendments. Hence, no redress was his.
However, in dicta the Court appeared to be favorably disposed to the
catalyst theory. Specifically, Justice Scalia wrote:
It is settled law, of course, that relief need not be judicially decreed in order
to justify a fee award under §1988. A lawsuit sometimes produces
voluntary action by the defendant that affords the plaintiff all or some of
the relief he sought through a judgment-e.g., a monetary settlement or a
change in conduct that redresses the plaintiffs grievances. When that
occurs, the plaintiff is deemed to have prevailed even despite the absence
of a formal judgment in his favor.164

157. 482 U.S. 755 (1987). See generally Gibson, supra note 9, at 218-19; McFerren, supra note
8, at 161-62; Loring, supra note 8, at 981; Shub, supra note 9, at 715-17; Stemlight, supra note 111,
at 546-47; Trotter, supranote 70, at 1437-38; Lowery, supra note 9, at 1447-51.

158. Specifically, the former inmate complained that he "was placed in administrative
segregation ...pending an investigation into his possible involvement in [a] disturbance .... [He]
alleg[ed] that the lack of a prompt hearing on his misconduct charges and his conviction for
misconduct on the basis of uncorroborated hearsay testimony violated his rights to due process."
Hewitt, 482 U.S. at 757.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 759.
161. Id.

162. Id. at 763.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 760-61.

The Court goes on to explain, "If the defendant, under the pressure of the

lawsuit, pays over a money claim before the judicial judgment is pronounced, the plaintiff has
'prevailed' in his suit because he has obtained the substance of what he sought." Id. at 761.
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This was mere dicta since resolution of the catalyst question was not
essential to resolving Hewitt. However, Hewitt provides a strong procatalyst perspective from the Justice who wrote the strongly anti-catalyst
concurrence in Buckhannon.
Following on the heels of Hewitt, the Supreme Court was required to
apply the Hewitt standards in Rhodes v. Stewart.'65 In Rhodes, two
prisoners filed suit "alleging violations of their First and Fourteenth
Amendment rights by officials who refused them permission to subscribe
to a magazine." '166 They won a judgment in their favor. However, by the
time they succeeded in their litigation, the case had been mooted by the
67
death of one of the petitioners and the release of the other.'
Nevertheless, the district court awarded fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §
1988, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed. 168
However, the Supreme Court reversed. While acknowledging that the
petitioners had won a declaratory judgment that resulted in "modification
of prison policies on magazine subscriptions,' 69 it held that this did not
justify a fee award because "[t]he case was moot before judgment
issued,"' 170 and "[ijn the absence of relief, a party cannot meet the
threshold requirement of § 1988 that he prevail.''
This was not directly focused on a catalyst claim because a judicial
verdict had been reached. However, the Court reaffirmed its reluctance
to award fees in cases that had become moot. Because a defendant's
decision to grant the relief sought or the parties' decision to settle renders
a case moot after Rhodes, the catalyst theory was the only possible way
to recover fees after relief had been obtained.
In the 1989 Texas State Teachers Association v. GarlandIndependent
School District172 decision, the Court had to define "prevailing party" for
purposes of §1988 of the Fees Act. The petitioners in the litigation
asserted that the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of teachers were
violated by the school district whose regulation "prohibits employee
organizations access to school facilities during school hours and
165. Rhodes v. Stewart, 488 U.S. 1 (1988).
166. Id. at2.

167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.at 4.
170. Id.
171. Id.
See
172. Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782 (1989).
generally Averill, supra note 27, at 2263-68; Gibson, supra note 9, at 220-2 1; Loring, supra note 8,
at 982; Lowery, supra note 9, at 1452-53; McFerren, supra note 8, at 163-64; Sternlight, supra note
111, at 579-81; Trotter, supra note 70, at 1438-39.
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proscribes the use of school 17mail
and internal communications systems
3

by employee organizations.'
The district court rejected all of the petitioner's claims except the
claim that the regulation requiring a principal's approval of teacher
1 74
meetings with union representatives was unconstitutionally vague.
The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the prohibition
on giving "union representatives access to school facilities during school
hours" was constitutionally permissible. 175 However, unlike the district
court, the Fifth Circuit found constitutional objections to prohibiting
teachers from discussing union organization among themselves during
the school day, limiting teachers' speech about union activities during
the school day, and banning teachers' use of "internal mail and billboard
facilities" to communicate about union activities. 76 The Supreme Court
affirmed the decision of the Fifth Circuit on the constitutional merits of
177
the case.
The question that returned to the Supreme Court was whether the
petitioners were entitled to attorney fees for their success on some
aspects of their claim even though they failed on others. Both the district
court and the Fifth Circuit denied fees, reasoning that while the
petitioners were victorious on some issues, they were not "prevailing
parties" on the question of whether union representatives could
communicate with them during school hours.17 8 Because the courts
believed that this was the central issue in the litigation, they denied a fee
award.
However, the Supreme Court reversed and rejected the "central issue"
test as the benchmark for measuring a litigant's status as a "prevailing
party.' ' 179 Instead, it ruled that:
The touchstone of the prevailing party inquiry must be the alteration of the
legal relationship of the parties in a manner which Congress sought to
promote in the fee statute. Where such a change has occurred, the degree

173.
174.
exercise
175.
1985).

Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 489 U.S. at 785.
Id. at 786. Specifically, the regulation provided no parameters to restrict the principal's
of discretion.
Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 777 F. 2d 1046, 1050-53 (5th Cir.

176. Id.at 1054-55.

177. The Supreme Court's opinion on the constitutional merits of the case may be found at
Garland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Texas State Teachers Ass'n, 479 U.S. 801 (1986).
178. Texas State Teachers Ass "n,
489 U.S. at 787-88.
179. Id. at 790.
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of the plaintiff's overall success goes to the reasonableness of the award...
180
not to the availability of a fee award vel non.
This still did not address catalytic recovery. Nevertheless, Texas State
Teachers Ass 'n contributes to the Buckhannon lineage by its holding and
dicta lending both indirect support and indirect opposition to the catalyst
theory. On the one hand, the Court's ruling advocates a broad view of
"prevailing party" by suggesting that the Court should be guided by the
objective of awarding fees to successful petitioners who "have ...served
the 'private attorney general' role which Congress intended to promote in
enacting § 1988.,,181 This suggests that catalytic recovery would be
favored in that it too advances litigants' ability to serve as private
attorneys general.
In contrast, the Court's ruling used the phrase "alteration of the legal
relationship" without describing what it meant and what would qualify as
a change in legal relationship sufficient to confer "prevailing party"
status. The opinion also used language such as "[p]etitioners obtained'' a3
8
judgment," ' 82 "[t]hey prevailed on a significant issue in the litigation,
and "[a] prevailing party must be one who has succeeded on any
significant claim ... either pendente lite or at the conclusion of the
litigation.' 84 This emphasis on litigation does not bode well for the
catalyst theory. In addition, the opinion raised concern about having
"unstable threshold[s] to fee eligibility"'' 85 on the grounds that this would
"ensur[e] that the fee application will spawn a second litigation of
significant dimension."'' 86 If catalytic recovery moves away from a
bright line rule, it might be condemned under this same rationale.
However, because Texas State Teachers' Ass 'n did not have to confront
that question, it provides conflicting guidance.
In 1992, the Court moved closer to the catalyst question when it
decided Farrar v. Hobby.' 87 Farrar caught the attention of many
commentators, 188 one of whom noted that Farrar "redefined the

180. Id. at 792-93.
181. ld.at 793.

182. Id.
183.
184.
185.
186.

Id.
Id. at 791.
Id.
Id.

187. Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103 (1992).
188. See generally, Lowery, supra note 9 passim; Laura E. Flenniken, Comment, No More Plain
Meaning: Farrar v. Hobby, 71 DENV. U.L. REV. 477 (1994); Gibson, supra note 9, at 221-23;
Trotter, supra note 70; Annino, supra note 9, at 11-12; Szczepanski, supra note 85; McFerren, supra
note 8, at 164-66; Ugalde, supra note 11, at 602-03; Loring, supra note 8, at 983-85; Shub, supra
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prevailing party inquiry and altered the landscape of civil rights feeshifting.' 89 The petitioners in Farraroperated Artesia Hall, a home for
troubled youth. Respondents were government officials who attempted
to close Artesia Hall after alleged difficulties at the facility, including the
death of a student. 90 Petitioner brought an action alleging "deprivation
of liberty and property without due process by means of conspiracy and
malicious prosecution aimed at closing Artesia Hall."' 9 1
The Fifth Circuit found that while the petitioners had not proven an
"actual deprivation of a constitutional right,"' 92 they were entitled to a
nominal award of one dollar because of the jury's verdict that they had
been deprived of a civil right. 93 The district court then granted the fee
request under §1988 of the Fees Act. However, the Fifth Circuit
reversed, reasoning that because the nominal award was so dramatically
sought,
disproportionate to the $17 million in damages that was initially
194
the petitioner was not a "prevailing party" in any real sense.
The Supreme Court held that a party who obtains only nominal relief
is still a "prevailing party" because such a judgment, although small,
"modifies the defendant's behavior for the plaintiffs benefit by forcing
the defendant to pay an amount of money he otherwise would not
pay.
Yet, at the same time that the Court held that mere nominal
damages should not preclude "prevailing party" status, it also held that
because the damages were so small in this particular case, the
"reasonable" attorney fee payable to the prevailing party was no fee at
all. 196 Thus, the Court's view was that while a nominal award is not per
se inconsistent with being a "prevailing party," it would not be
reasonable to order fees for an insignificant award.

note 9, at 719-21; Pacold, supra note 22, at 1012-14; Hunter, supra note 8, at 202-03; Averill,
supra note 27, at2268-72.
189. Trotter, supra note 70, at 1430. Indeed, in a context directly relevant to Buckhannon, one
commentator feared that the Farrarruling "cast a shadow" over catalyst jurisprudence.
supra note 9, at 1468.
190. Farrar,506 U.S. at 105-06.
191. Id. at 106.

Lowery,

192. Id.
at107.
and constitutional merits of the case may be
193. Id. The lower court's opinion on the civil
found at Farrar v.Cain, 756 F.2d 1148 (5th Cir. 1985).
194. The Fifth Circuit's opinion denying fees may be found at Estate of Farrar v. Cain, 941 F.2d
1311 (5th Cir. 1991).
195. Farrar,506 U.S. at 113.
196. Id. at 115.
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Farrarthus illustrates the Court's continuing ambivalence toward the
recovery of attorney fees when the nature of the victory does not fall
squarely within the bounds of a clear and substantial judicial victory.
Particularly relevant for the catalyst debate is dicta in Farrarthat in
order to be a prevailing party for purposes of §1988, a "plaintiff must
obtain an enforceable judgment against the defendant from whom fees
are sought ... or comparable relief through a consent decree or

settlement. Whatever relief the plaintiff secures must directly benefit
him at the time of the judgment or settlement."' 97 This phrase was not
explained, though it identifies the very issue at the heart of catalyst
litigation. The Court lists three actions that may be the basis for
"prevailing party" status: an enforceable judgment, a consent decree, and
a settlement.198 However, it does not clearly define
these terms or
99
articulate whether its list is illustrative or exhaustive.'
The Supreme Court's final significant fee-shifting case prior to
Buckhannon was an environmental case and thus, it is particularly
instructive for understanding the climate in which Buckhannon was
decided. 200
In Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental
20
Services, decided in 2000, the Supreme Court considered a claim for
197. Id.at Il1 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
198. Id.
199. It did, however, generate speculation as to the future of catalyst theory. See, e.g., Averill,
supra note 27, at 2274 ("The fact that the issue of catalyst theory's viability was not before the
Farrar Court provides strong support for the conclusion that the Court had no intention of
eliminating it.").
200. In 1994, the Supreme Court decided Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809
(1994), an action for attorneys' fees brought pursuant to CERCLA. Specifically, petitioners sought
to recover attorney fees for three legal activities: "(1) the identification of other potentially
responsible parties ... including the Air Force, that were liable for the cleanup; (2) preparation and
negotiation of its agreement with the EPA; and (3) the prosecution of [the attorney fee] litigation."
Id.at 812. Petitioners argued that these were legitimate response costs under CERCLA §§ 107 and
113. The Court declined to award the fees. However, this case is not relevant to the fee-shifting
debate because the basis for the Court's holding in Key Tronic is its view that "neither §107 nor
§113 expressly calls for the recovery of attorneys fees by the prevailing party." Id. at 817. Because
this case involved determining the permissible scope of response costs rather than interpreting
"prevailing party," it is not particularly pertinent to Buckhannon 's lineage.
201. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000). For further
discussion of the implications of this case, see generally Joseph T. Phillips, Comment, Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: Impact, Outcomes, and the Future Viability of
Environmental Citizen Suits, 68 U. CtN. L. REV. 1281 (2000), Kristen M. Shults, Friends of the
Earth v. Laidlaw Environmental Services: A Resounding Victory for Environmentalists, Its
Implications on Future JusticiabilityDecisions, and Resolution of Issues on Remand, 89 GEO. L. J.
1001 (2001), Jonathan H. Adler, Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21' Century: From
Lujan to Laidlaw and Beyond: Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection 12 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39 (2001), and A.H. Barnett & Timothy D. Terrell,
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Water Act which authorizes feefees brought pursuant to the Clean
202
party."
"prevailing
a
for
shifting
In this litigation, Friends of the Earth ("FOE") sued defendant for
alleged violations of its National Pollution Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit. After the litigation commenced, the defendant
achieved "substantial compliance with the terms of its discharge
permit. 20 3 Nevertheless, the district court fined the defendant $405,800
in civil penalties. 204 However, because Laidlaw had come into
compliance with the permit terms, the district court gave FOE no
injunctive relief. On appeal the Fourth Circuit vacated the order of civil
penalties and ruled that FOE was not entitled to attorney fees because
defendant's compliance
with the terms of the permit rendered the
20 5
litigation moot.

The Supreme Court reversed. After a lengthy discussion of standing
While
issues, 206th
the Cor
Court turned to the question of mootness.
acknowledging that "citizen plaintiffs lack standing to seek civil
penalties for wholly past violations,, 20 7 the Supreme Court also
acknowledged that before the case would be moot, it must be "absolutely
clear that Laidlaw's permit violations could not reasonably be expected
to recur."20 8 Because that issue had not been addressed, the Supreme
Court remanded.20 9
At the end of its opinion, the Court came tantalizingly close to
addressing the catalyst question. FOE had argued that it was entitled to
attorney fees as a "catalyst" if its litigation brought about the desired
result-in this case, the defendant's voluntary compliance with its
NPDES permit. The Supreme Court acknowledged that its earlier
decision in Farrarhad created confusion in the circuits as to the status of
the catalyst rule.210 In addition, it acknowledged that Farrar"involved

Economic Observations on Citizen-Suit Provisions of Environmental Legislation, 12 DUKE ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y F. 1, 1 - 3, 30 (2001).
202. Clean Air Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2001).
203. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 173.
204. Id.;
see also id.at 178.

205. Id.at 173-74. The Fourth Circuit's opinion may be found at Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.
Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 149 F.3d 303 (4th Cir. 1998).

206. Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 180-189. These standing issues are not relevant to the
citizen suit question.
207. Id.at 189.
208. Id. at 193.
209. Id.at 194.

210. Id.at 194-95 (reviewing treatment of Farrarby various circuit courts of appeal).
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no catalytic effect"' 211 and left the catalyst question open. In spite of this,
the Court determined that because the lower court still had to grapple
with questions of mootness and substance, "it would be premature ... for
us to address the continuing validity of the catalyst theory. 2 12 Thus, the
Supreme Court saved the catalyst question for another day. That "other
day" would come the following year when it faced Buckhannon.
Before turning to Buckhannon itself, the Fourth Circuit's decision in S1 & S-2 by and through P-1 & P-2 v. State Board of Education2 13 bears
brief discussion because it was the only significant pre-Buckhannon
opinion that squarely rejected the catalyst theory. By doing so and
creating a circuit split, S-1 & S-2 set the stage for Buckhannon. The S-1
& S-2 plaintiffs were parents who brought a §1983 action against school
officials 214 alleging that officials had violated the Education of the
Handicapped Act ("EHA")2 1 5 "by refusing to authorize hearing officers
to decide tuition reimbursement claims and to order reimbursement in
appropriate cases.

2 16

The parents sought tuition reimbursement as well

217
as "injunctive and declaratory relief."
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs
218
with respect to their requests for declaratory and injunctive relief.
While the defendants were appealing this ruling, the plaintiffs and one of
the defendants, the Asheboro City Board of Education, reached a
settlement agreement with respect to the tuition reimbursement.
Specifically, they agreed that "the City Board would pay the parents'
tuition expenses for their children and also pay plaintiffs' attorneys'

fees." 219 Although the plaintiffs did not dismiss their claims against the

two defendants who were not a party to this settlement, a panel of the
Fourth Circuit held that further litigation was mooted because the

211. Id. at 194.
212. Id. at 195.
213. S-1 & S-2 by & through P-I & P-2 v. State Bd. of Educ. of N. Carolina, 21 F.3d 49 (4th Cir.
1994). For a fuller discussion of S-I & S-2, see Averill, supra note 27, passim; Szczepanski, supra
note 85, at 239-41, Stanley, supra note 8, at 377-79, Loring, supra note 8, at 984-86, and Trotter,
supra note 70, at 1445-46.
214. Specifically, the named defendants were the Asheboro City Board of Education, the State
Board of Education of North Carolina, and C.D. Spangler, Jr., the Chairman of the State Board. S-I
& S-2, 21 F.3d at 50.
215. Education of Individuals with Disabilities Act, 20 U.S.C. §1400 etseq.
216. S-1 &S-2,21 F.3d at 50.
217. Id.
218. This district court opinion may be found at S-I& S-2 by & through P-I & P-2 v. Spangler,
650 F.Supp. 1427 (M.D.N.C. 1986).
219. S-I & S-2, 21 F.3d at 50.
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the tuition reimbursement that the
settlement agreement 22provided
0
plaintiffs were seeking.
Several years later, North Carolina "enact[ed] legislation giving
administrative law judges the authority to make binding decisions,
subject to appeal, regarding a child's special education needs., 22 1 This
was a legislative resolution to the issue that had ignited the litigation.
Plaintiffs thus sought recovery of fees from the state defendants. The trial
court granted, and a panel of the Fourth Circuit upheld, the award of fees
against the two state defendants.222 However, the Fourth Circuit en banc
reversed. Overruling its earlier precedent in Bonnes v. Long,223 the
Fourth Circuit rejected the catalyst theory. It held that for purposes of 42
U.S.C. §1988, a litigant:
may not be a "prevailing party"... except by virtue of having obtained an
enforceable judgment, consent decree, or settlement giving some of the
legal relief sought. ... The fact that a lawsuit may operate as a catalyst for

conduct can't suffice to establish
post-litigation changes in a defendant's
224
plaintiff as a prevailing party."
When the Fourth Circuit put itself at odds with its sister circuits in S-1
& S-2, it laid the groundwork for Buckhannon which would compel the
Supreme Court to address the catalyst question head-on.22 5

IV.

BUCKHANNON ANALYSIS

Although the relatively straightforward Buckhannon case "began as a
claim for reasonable accommodation, [it] ended as a debate over the

220. See S-I v. Spangler, 832 F.2d 294 (4th Cir. 1987).
221. S-1 & S-2, 21 F. 3d at 51. The relevant legislation is at 1990 N.C. Sess. Laws 1058 (1990).
222. See S-1 & S-2 v. State Board of Educ., 6 F.3d 160 (4th Cir. 1993).
223. Bonnes v. Long, 599 F.2d 1316 (4th Cir. 1979). Interestingly, the Fourth Circuit's Bonnes
decision was, until S-1 & S-2, a clear unambiguous statement in favor of the rationale behind the
catalyst theory:
That civil rights litigation ends in a consent judgement does not preclude an attorney's fee
award under § 1988 .... [T]he legislative history indicates that Congress intended that a plaintiff
who obtained its objective through a consent judgment could be a "prevailing party" within the
meaning of the statute.... Any other construction wouldfrustratethe basic rationale of §1988:
that enforcement of civil rights legislation can best be achieved by encouraging the public to
act as private attorneysgeneral.
id. at 1318 (emphasis added).
224. S-1 & S-2, 21 F.3d at 51.
225. The Buckhannon Court pointed out that, technically, this was a case of first impression for
the Supreme Court, noting: "We have never had occasion to decide whether the term 'prevailing
party' allows an award of fees under the 'catalyst theory.' ... [T]here is language in our cases
supporting both petitioners and respondents, and last Term we observed that it was an open question
here." Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603 n5.
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meaning of prevailing party. 226 The substantive background to the
Buckhannon dispute is simple. West Virginia's code required that
assisted living facilities house only residents who were capable of "selfpreservation., 227 The state defined capacity for self-preservation as the
ability to escape "from situations involving imminent danger, such as
fire., 228 The petitioner, Buckhannon Board and Care Home, operated an
assisted living facility. 229 However, because several residents of the
home were not able to meet the self-preservation requirement,
Buckhannon received "cease and desist orders requiring the closure of its
residential care facilities within 30 days. 230
In response, Buckhannon filed suit 23 1 against West Virginia, arguing
that the self-preservation rule violated the Fair Housing Act
Amendments of 1988 ("FHAA") 232 as well as the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA").23 3 Petitioner sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, as well as monetary damages, a claim that was quickly
relinquished.234
While the case was pending, but while the parties were still doing pretrial discovery, West Virginia enacted legislation to end the "selfpreservation" rule. 235 This legislation effectively granted the petitioner
the relief requested. The statute had "eliminated the allegedly offensive
provisions and.., there was no indication that the West Virginia
Legislature would repeal the amendments." 236 Thus, the District Court
for Northern District of West Virginia granted the respondents' motion to
dismiss the suit as moot.
The petitioners then requested attorney fees under the provisions of the
FHAA and the ADA that authorize recovery of such fees by "prevailing
parties. '' 237 Although it was the legislature and not the court that had
226.
227.
228.
229.

Gibson, supra note 9, at 212.
W. VA. CODE §§ 16-5H-1, 16-5H-2 (1998).
Id.;see also W. VA. CODE ST. R. § 14.07(l) (1995).
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 600.

230. Id.
231. This suit was brought on behalf of Buckhannon and "other similarly situated homes" as well
as on behalf of the affected residents. Id.
232. 102 Stat. 1619, 42 U.S.C. § 3601-31.
233. 104 Stat. 327,42 U.S.C. § 12101 etseq.
234. Buckannon, 532 U.S. at 601; see also id.at n. I (indicating that the complaint for monetary

damages was abandoned on January 2, 1998, less than three months after the suit was commenced).
235. See S. 627, 1 1998 W. Va. Acts 983-86 (amending relevant regulations); H.R. 4200, 11 1998
W. Va. Acts 1198-99 (amending relevant statute).
236. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.

237. See 42 U.S.C. § 3613(c)(2) (providing that under the FHAA "the court, in its discretion may
allow the prevailing party. . . a reasonable attorney's fees and costs"); 42 U.S.C. § 12205 (providing
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handed the petitioners their victory, the petitioners "argued that they
were entitled to attorney's fees under the 'catalyst theory' which posits
that a plaintiff is a 'prevailing party' if it achieved the desired result
because the8 lawsuit brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's
conduct.,

23

Unfortunately for the petitioners, they were located in the Fourth
Circuit, the only Circuit that had rejected the catalyst theory. Thus, the
district court 2 3 9 denied their fee request and the Court of Appeals
affirmed. 240 The Supreme Court granted certiorarito clarify the precise
role, if any, that the catalyst theory should continue to play to
compensate plaintiffs who achieve their objectives by means other than a
court victory.
In a majority opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist, the Court
acknowledged the tradition of the "American Rule" as well as Congress'
decision to create statutory exceptions to the American Rule by
"authoriz[ing] the award of attorney's fees to the 'prevailing party' in
numerous statutes.,, 24

However, when it came to the question of fee-

shifting for "catalysts," the Court declined to expand the meaning of
"prevailing party." It ruled that "the 'catalyst theory' is not a permissible
242
basis for the award of attorneys fees under the FHAA... and ADA.
changed the status quo everywhere except in the
This conclusion
243
Fourth Circuit.

The majority relied on several lines of reasoning. The

that under the ADA, "the court..., in its discretion may allow the prevailing party... a reasonable
attorney's fee, including litigation expenses, and costs").
238. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 601.
239. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Res., 19 F.Supp.
2d 567 (N.D. W. Va. 1998).
240. Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dept. of Health and Human Res., 203 F.3d
819 (4th Cir. 2000).
241. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 602. As examples of such fee-shifting statutes involving
"prevailing parties," the Court noted the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 259, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e5(k), the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1975, 89 Stat. 402, 42 U.S.C. § 1973 1(e), and the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, 90 Stat. 2641, 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Buckhannon, 532
U.S. at 602-03. In addition, Buckhannon appeared to incorporate by reference the appendix to
Justice Brennan's dissenting opinion in Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43-51 (1985) in which
numerous federal fee-shifting provisions were listed.
242. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
243. The fairly widespread popularity of the catalyst theory was noted by many observers who
correctly saw in Buckhannon a significant departure from prior practice. See, e.g., Miller, supra note
9, at 1347 (noting that "[u]ntil recently, courts had interpreted prevailing party to include those who
brought about a voluntary change in the defendant's conduct even though they did not obtain
judicially sanctioned relief"); id at 1352 (noting that before Buckhannon, "[a]lthough the Supreme
Court never had specifically ruled on whether the catalysts qualified as prevailing parties, an
overwhelming majority of the federal courts of appeals recognized the theory's viability"); Gibson,
supra note 9, at 221 ("Although the Supreme Court never directly confronted the catalyst theory
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Court began by attempting to define "prevailing party." Declaring
"prevailing party" to be "a legal term of art, 244 the Court relied on

BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, which defined a "prevailing party" as "[a]
party in whose favor a judgment is rendered, regardless of the amount of
damages awarded., 245 The Court noted approvingly "that a 246
'prevailing
party' is one who has been awarded some relief by the court.,
The Court acknowledged that the simple case in which a plaintiff is
"awarded some relief by the courts" could be an adequate basis for being
considered a prevailing party. 2 47 In addition to these "enforceable
judgments on the merits," 248 the majority was also content to authorize

attorney fees in situations involving a "settlement agreement enforced
through a consent decree. 2 49 In these circumstances, even though "a
consent decree does not always include an admission of liability by thz

defendant," both involve a "court-ordered 'chang[e]250 [in] the legal
relationship between [the plaintiff] and the defendant.'

By restricting the definition of "prevail" to only these two clear cases,
the Court focused on whether the relief attained by the allegedly
prevailing plaintiff was relief that changed the formal legal relationship
squarely until Buckhannon, the Court had refined and tacitly accepted its three basic tenets."); Klein,
supra note 8, at 140 (calling Buckhannon "a major deviation from established circuit court
precedent"); Loring, supra note 8, at 974 (observing that Buckhannon "was... surprising because it
overruled several decades of established attorney fee theory and contradicted congressional intent");
John W. Perry, Supreme Court Rules in Martin, Penry, and Buckhannon Cases, 25 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 517, 518 (July-August 2001) (describing Buckhannon as having
"struck down the rationale used in a long line of cases"); Deborah M. Weissman, Law as Largess:
Shifting Paradigms of Law for the Poor,44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 737, 781-82 (2002) (criticizing
Buckhannon decision, alleging that it "repudiated the holdings of all other circuit courts that had
considered the issue and discarded previous statutory interpretations that had recognized the 'catalyst
theory' as consistent with legislative meaning and purpose"); Coyle, supra note 8, at Al ("The
catalyst theory has been recognized by federal courts for at least 30 years. Until [Buckhannon]
among the nine federal circuits to have considered the question, the 4 h Circuit stood alone in its
rejection of the theory."); Hanson, supra note 9, at 539 (observing that "[u]ntil Buckhannon ... the
Fourth Circuit was alone in interpreting Farraras rejecting the catalyst theory").
244. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
245. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1145 (7f' ed. 1999), quoted in Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
For an interesting historical discussion ofjudicial reliance on dictionaries and the dangers inherent in
that practice, see Rick Sonpal, Note, Old Dictionariesand New Textualities, 71 FORDHAM L. REV.
2177 (2003). A fascinating compilation of the judiciary's recent use of dictionaries can be found in
Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Remains a Fortress: An Update, 5
GREEN BAG 2d 51 (2001).

246. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 603.
247. Id.
248. Id.at 604.
249. Id.

250. Id. (quoting Texas State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 792-93
(1989)).
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between plaintiff and defendant. Indeed, "the bright line the Buckhannon
25
Court draws is between judicial relief and any other type of relief.",
Once this bright line was drawn, the catalyst theory could not survive. In
catalyst cases, while the plaintiff does "win" some or all of what was
sought, this success does not involve any "alteration in the legal
relationship of the parties. 252 Hence in the majority's view, such a
successful petitioner could not be considered "prevailing."
The majority analogized the petitioner's claim to three other
circumstances in which attorney fees should not be awarded: (1) cases in
which "the plaintiff has secured the reversal of a directed verdict;, 253 (2)
cases in which the plaintiff has "acquired a judicial pronouncement that
the defendant has violated the Constitution unaccompanied by 'judicial
relief;"' 25 4 and (3) cases in which there was a "nonjudicial 'alteration of
actual circumstances.' 25 5 By choosing to analogize catalyst victories to
these three situations rather than to judicial decisions on the merits, the
Court eliminated any legal basis for awarding fees in catalyst cases.
In reaching its conclusion, the majority advanced three policy
justifications for its restrictive approach. First, the Court reasoned that
the arguments based on the legislative history of the meaning of
"prevailing party" were "at best ambiguous as to the availability of the
'catalyst theory' for awarding attorney's fees. 256 Given that the
awarding of attorney fees represents a departure from the American
Rule, the Court believed that this should be construed narrowly and
allowed only
when the legislative intent to do so was unambiguous and
7
explicit.

25

' 8 and "unsupported by
Second, the Court dismissed as "speculative"25
259
any empirical evidence,
arguments that the catalyst theory would be
necessary "to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting an action
before judgment in order to avoid an award of attorney's fees, 260 or to
avoid "deter[ring] plaintiffs with meritorious but expensive cases from

251. Babich, supra note 1l, at 10,137.
252. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 605.

253. Id. at 605-06.
254.
255.
256.
257.

Id. at 606 (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 482 U.S. 755, 760 (1987)) (emphasis added).
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 606 (citation omitted).
Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 607-08.
Id.

258. Id. at 608.
259. Id. The Court suggested that useful empirical data would include evidence as to "whether
the number of suits brought in the Fourth Circuit has declined, in relation to other Circuits, since the
decision in S-1 & S-2." Id.
260. Id.
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bringing suit." 261 The Court did not claim that rejecting the catalyst
theory would never affect litigation behavior in either of these ways.
However, it did not base its judgment on these predicted outcomes.
Finally, the Court was deeply concerned about the impact that the
catalyst theory might have on judicial efficiency. The Court expressed
confidence that the district courts were capable of analyzing claims for
catalyst relief. At the same time, it warned that this would be
administratively difficult, fact-specific, and time-consuming.262
Ultimately, the majority did not take a position on these concerns.
Although this litigation was aptly described as "brimming with
considerable, and.., conflicting policy concerns, 263 the Court did not
base its opinion on them. It ruled more narrowly that "[g]iven the clear
meaning of 'prevailing party' in the fee-shifting statutes, we need not
determine which way these various policy arguments cut. ' ' 264 Perhaps
more importantly, the majority gave no indication that these policy
arguments would cast any persuasive light on the intent of Congress with
regard to how "prevailing party" should be interpreted.
A concurrence by Justice Scalia 265 affirmed in stronger terms than the
majority opinion that "prevailing party" is a legal term of art.266 In
addition, Justice Scalia addressed a number of the policy concerns more
forcefully than the majority. In response to the claim that catalysts
should be awarded fees because extra-judicial resolution of the case is
evidence that the case had merit, Justice Scalia warned:
[A]n award of attorney's fees when the merits of the plaintiffs case remain
unresolved-when, for all one knows, the defendant only 'abandon[ed] the
fray' because the cost of litigation-either financial or in terms of public
relations-would be too great.... I doubt it was greater strength in
financial resources, or superiority in media manipulation rather than
superiority in legal merit, that Congress intended to reward.26F
In addition, Justice Scalia's concurrence minimized the risk of
defendants intentionally mooting cases by "slink[ing] away on the eve of
judgment., 268
While acknowledging this possibility, he drew a
261. Id.
262. Id. at 609.
263. Hunter, supra note 8, at 186.
264. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 610.
265. For further discussion of Justice Scalia's concurrence, see generally Hunter, supra note 8, at
209-10.
266. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 615 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Words that have acquired a
specialized meaning in the legal context must be accorded their legal meaning.").
267. Id. at 617.
268. Id. at618.
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distinction between the unfairness that would result from requiring the
plaintiff in this situation from having to follow the default rule on feerecovery (i.e., the American Rule) and the result in a situation where the
exception to the default rule was unjustly imposed on a defendant. He
concluded that the latter was the less desirable of two imperfect
alternatives.26 9
Justice Scalia restated the desirability of erring on the side of a narrow
reading. While acknowledging that such a narrow reading may result in
some unfairness, he reasoned that some bright lines must be drawn. He
argued that absent clear Congressional justification for drawing the line
elsewhere, it should be drawn to eliminate the catalyst theory.27 °
However, a dissenting opinion by Justice Ginsburg271 raised concerns
about the negative impact of abolishing the catalyst theory. Justice
Ginsburg warned that to do so "allows a defendant to escape a statutory
obligation to pay a plaintiffs counsel fees, even though the suit's merit
led the defendant to abandon the fray, to switch rather than fight on, to
accord plaintiff sooner rather than later the principal redress sought in the
complaint. 27 2
In addition, the dissent painted a gloomy picture of the impact
Buckhannon would have on citizen litigation generally. The dissent
warned that by rejecting the catalyst theory, the majority would "impede
access to court for the less well-heeled, and shrink the incentive
Congress created for the enforcement of federal law by private attorneys
general. 2 73
After identifying the impact on individuals and on the litigation
process, Justice Ginsberg's dissent proposed that the desirable rule would
be that a party prevails "when she achieves, by instituting litigation, the
practical relief sought in her complaint,, 274 regardless of whether
litigation was the means for achieving that result.275 In adopting this

269. Id. ("There is all the difference in the world between a rule that denies the extraordinary
boon of attorney's fees to some plaintiffs who are no less 'deserving' of them than others who
receive them, and a rule that causes the law to be the very instrument of wrong-exacting the
payment of attorney's fees to the extortionist.").
270. Id. at 620 ("There must be a cutoff of seemingly equivalent entitlements to fees--either the
failure to file suit in time or the failure to obtain a judgment in time. The term 'prevailing party'
suggests the latter rather than the former. One does not prevail in a suit that is never determined.").
271. For further discussion of Justice Ginsberg's dissent, see generally Hunter, supra note 8, at
210-13.
272. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting).
273. ld. at 623.
274. Id. at 634.
275. In further discussion, the dissent argued that "where the ultimate goal is not an arbiter's
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rule, the dissent rejected several of the policy concerns raised by the
majority. The dissent argued that the "catalyst rule may lead defendants
promptly to comply with the law's requirements [since] one who knows
noncompliance will be expensive might be encouraged to conform
his
276
conduct to the legal requirements before litigation is threatened.,
The dissent was also less concerned with the impact that the catalyst
rule would have on judicial efficiency. It reasoned that not only were the
lower courts capable of applying the catalyst rule efficiently, but their
work, in fact, already involved making similar judgments. 277 The dissent
was confident that the lower courts were capable of screening out the
potential nuisance suits that the majority believed could be encouraged
by the catalyst theory.278
In addition to these concerns, the dissent disagreed with the majority's
belief that the plain meaning of the term "prevailing party" ruled out the
use of the catalyst theory. Instead of looking to the dictionary definition
of "prevailing party," the dissent argued that the majority should have
looked to the meaning given to the term by the vast majority of circuit
courts. z79 In the dissent's reasoning, the fact that so many circuits had
allowed the catalyst theory meant, at the very least, that the meaning was
not as clear as the majority believed. 8
V. THE AFTERMATH OF BUCKHANNON AND ENVIRONMENTAL
BACKLASH

Buckhannon was described as a case that "will probably become
known as the most significant attorney's fees decision of the
generation., 281 Although Buckhannon did not involve the construction of
approval, but a favorable alteration of actual circumstances, a formal declaration is not essential."
Id.at 633.
276. Id. at 639.
277. Id. ("As to the burden on the court, is it not the norm for the judge to whom the case has
been assigned to resolve fee disputes ... thereby clearing the case from the calendar?").
278. Id. at 640 ("Congress assigned responsibility for awarding fees not to automatons unable to
recognize extortionists, but to judges expected and instructed to exercise 'discretion' ....So
viewed, the catalyst rule provided no berth for nuisance suits.").
279. Id.at 643:
The Court states that the term "prevailing party" in fee-shifting statutes has an "accepted
meaning." If that is so, the "accepted meaning" is not the one the Court today announces. It is,
instead, the meaning accepted by every Court of Appeals to address the catalyst issue before
our 1987 decision in Hewitt. .. and disavowed since then only by the Fourth Circuit....
280. Id.
281. Klein, supra note 8, at 100. For an excellent review of judicial responses to Buckhannon
and the case's progeny to date, see Klein, supra note 8, passim. See also Stanley, supra note 8, at
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an environmental statute, its ruling is "clearly relevant to environmental
litigators. 282 Predictably it sparked the attention of practitioners in the
field.28 3 Although an expansive reading of Buckhannon is not necessarily
mandated, 284 commentators have warned that Buckhannon will be
read
285
broadly and have a significant impact on environmental litigation.
The first post-Buckhannon issue circuit courts have had to confront is
whether the holding-which applied only to the "prevailing party"
provisions of the FHAA and the ADA-should apply to other feeshifting statutes that use that same language. In the two years since
Buckhannon, this question has been resoundingly answered in the
affirmative as "nearly every court that has required a prevailing party as

408 (predicting that Buckhannon "will have far reaching effects on litigants as they prepare to battle
over violations under fee-shifting statutes"); Coyle, supra note 8, at Al (quoting Professor John
Eccheverria who warned that Buckhannon will have a "profound adverse effect on the economics of
public interest litigation ....It will increase the risk that thousands of hours of legal time invested in
a case will never be reimbursed even if the litigation in fact is successful and accomplished its
objective."); Supreme Court Rejects "'CatalystTheory" as Basis ForAttorney's Fees. 23 No. 12
ASBESTOS L1TIG. REP. 10, June 12, 2001 (predicting that Buckhannon "could affect attorneys
practicing in many fields"); Barbara K. Bucholtz, Gestalt Flips by An Acrobatic Supreme Court and
the Business-Related Cases on its 2000-2001 Docket, 37 TULSA L. REv. 305, 326 (2001) (calling
Buckhannon "one of the most important cases" of the Supreme Court's 2000-2001 term and noting
that "[i]ts undoubtedly far-reaching consequences have yet to be assessed").
282. Babich, supra note 11, at 10,137. See also McFerren, supra note 8, at 176 ("The ability to
recover attorney's fees is critical to environmental litigation because such suits require abundant
resources. The litigation is often complex and involves considerable research and qualified
experts."); Ugalde, supra note 11, at 592 (predicting that Buckhannon "has far-reaching implications
in the area of environmental litigation, where public interest groups bring the majority of lawsuits
under citizen suit provisions"); Id. at 608 (warning that Buckhannon "has the potential to curtail
significantly environmental citizen suits"); Loring, supra note 8, at 974 ("A permanent rejection of
the catalyst theory would dramatically chill potential vindication of civil and environmental
rights."); Brusslan, supra note 8, at 1349 (predicting that Buckhannon "will have a chilling effect on
the filing of citizen suits and will likely reduce both corporate and government compliance with
environmental laws").
283. See discussion in note 282, supra.
284. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 1362 (noting that Buckhannon "does not mandate its
application to all fee-shifting statutes that authorize an award to prevailing parties"); Klein, supra
note 8, passim (discussing differences in statutory language among fee-shifting statutes that may
justify different interpretations).
285. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 1347 ("The narrower definition of prevailing party
embraced by the Buckhannon Court has serious implications, particularly concerning civil rights and
the possibility of its extension to other federal statutes."); Margaret Graham Tebo, Fee-Shifting
Fallout, 89 A.B.A. JOURNAL 54, 54 (July 2003) (quoting comment of plaintiff's lawyer William
Franz who fears that Buckhannon "effectively guts the [Americans With Disabilities Act] and other
civil rights statutes, while technically not overturning them. Without the fee provisions, the statutes
will continue to exist, but they'll have no teeth."); id. at 56 (noting that some observers fear that
Buckhannon 's impact "has effectively been to declaw a number of civil rights and similar statutes
that use the prevailing party language").
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a prerequisite to fee recovery has applied Buckhannon's judicial
imprimaturtest to reject catalyst claims. 286
To date, courts have consistently rejected the catalyst theory as the
basis for fee awards under myriad federal statutes that employ
"prevailing party" language. In representative decisions from the First
Circuit,287 the Second Circuit, 288 the

Third

Circuit, 289

the

Fourth

286. Loring, supra note 8, at 993. See also id.at 993-94 ("Although Buckhannon explicitly
rejected the catalyst theory only in the FHAA and ADA contexts, courts have extrapolated its
holding to nearly every other fee-shifting statute that refers to a prevailing party"); Lemer, supra
note 9, at 394 (observing that "the Circuit Courts of Appeals have applied the Buckhannon definition
of 'prevailing party' to a wide array of statutes.").
287. See, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 279 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting use of the catalyst
theory to recover attorney's fees under the "prevailing party" language of the Fees Act because
"[a]lthough we approved the catalyst theory in the past.., we are constrained to follow the
[Buckhannon] Court's broad directive and join several of our sister circuits in concluding that the
catalyst theory may no longer be used to award attorney's fees"); New England Reg'l Council of
Carpenters v. Kinton, 284 F.3d 9, 30 (1st Cir. 2002) (rejecting use of the catalyst theory in attorney's
fee action brought pursuant to the Fees Act because Buckhannon "consigned the catalyst theory to
the scrap heap" and the voluntary decision of Massport to revise its objectionable policies did not
constitute a "judicially sanctioned challenged change in the legal relationship of the parties" (quoting
Buckhannon) as required by Buckhannon). For further discussion of these cases, see generally Tebo,
supra note 285, at 59 (discussing Richardson).
288. See, e.g., Union of Needletrades, Indus. & Textile Employees, AFL-CIO v. United States
INS, 336 F.3d 200, 207 (2nd Cir. 2003) (rejecting use of catalyst theory to award attorney fees for
actions brought pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act, finding that while the plaintiff "may
have accomplished the objective it sought to achieve by initiating this FOIA action, its failure to
secure either a judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decree renders it ineligible for an
award of attorney's fees under Buckhannon"); J.C. v. Reg'l Sch. Dist. 10, Bd. of Educ., 278 F.3d
119 (2nd Cir. 2002) (denying catalyst theory as a basis for recovery under the prevailing party
provisions of the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act and the Rehabilitation Act because
these provisions are governed by Buckhannon's reasoning); New York State Fed'n of Taxi Drivers,
Inc. v. Westchester County Taxi & Limousine Comm., 272 F.3d 154, 158-59 (2nd Cir. 2001)
(rejecting use of catalyst theory as a basis for fee awards under § 1988, finding that "[d]espite the
fact that the holding in Buckhannon applied to the FHAA and ADA, it is clear that the Supreme
Court intends the reasoning of the case to apply to § 1988 as well. ....Because the Federation's
lawsuit did not result in a judicially sanctioned change in the legal relationship of the parties, the
Federation is not a prevailing party .. "). For further discussion of these cases, see generally
Attorney's Fees, 26 MENTAL & PHYSICAL L. REP. 194 (2002) (discussing JC.), Court Ordered
Relief is Prerequisiteto Award of Attorneys' Fees Under FOIA, U.S. LAW WEEK, August 5, 2003, at
1054 (analyzing Union ofNeedletrades), Lerner, supra note 9, at 394-397, and Hanson, supra note
9, at 521-23 (discussing J. C.).
289. See, e.g., John T. v. Delaware County Intermediate Unit, 318 F.3d 545, 556 (3rd Cir. 2003)
(reasoning that Buckhannon "applies to attorney's fee claims brought under the [Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act]" and, thus, plaintiff's preliminary injunction, the contempt order
assessed against the defendant, and the out of court negotiation of an individual assessment plan do
not make plaintiff a "prevailing party" within the strictures of Buckhannon;); A.P. Boyd, Inc. v.
Newark Pub. Sch., 44 Fed Appx. 569, 573 (3rd Cir. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff's claims for attorney
fees under § 1988 on the grounds that the case was moot, and "[a]ppellants' application for
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293
Circuit,2 90 the Fifth Circuit, 29 1 the Sixth Circuit,292 the Seventh Circuit,
the Eighth Circuit, 294 the Ninth Circuit,295 the Tenth Circuit,296 the
attorneys' fees ...

rests entirely on the catalyst theory....

We reject the ...

argument that the

catalyst theory is alive and well in this judicial circuit. Indeed, it is moribund").
290. See, e.g., Smyth v. Rivero, 282 F.3d 268, 285 (4th Cir. 2002) (rejecting use of catalyst
theory as a basis for attorney fee recovery brought under § 1988, and concluding that "the judicial
approval and oversight identified by the Supreme Court as involved in consent decrees are lacking
where, as here, a settlement agreement.., is neither incorporated explicitly in the terms of the
district court's dismissal order nor the subject of a provision retaining jurisdiction"). See generally
Klein, supra note 8, at 135-37 (discussing Smyth); Attorney's Fees, Prevailing Party, Settlement
Agreement, 17 No. 4 FED. LITIGATOR 100 (April 2002) (discussing Smyth and its limited view of
settlement agreements as the basis for fee awards).
291. See, e.g., Johnson v. Rodriguez, 260 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (following Buckhannon and
reversing attorney fee award to catalyst plaintiffs under "prevailing party" language of 28 U.S.C §
1988).
292. See, e.g., Chambers v. Ohio Dep't. of Human Servs., 273 F.3d 690 (6th Cir. 2001) (ruling
that Buckhannon prevents the use of the catalyst theory to recover fee awards under the Civil Rights
Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976); Ken-N.K., Inc. v. Vernon Township, 18 Fed. Appx. 319, 328
(6th Cir. 2001) (ruling that where township repealed ordinance shortly after conclusion of legal
proceedings, plaintiffs Constitutional challenge to the ordinance was moot and Buckhannon would
bar plaintiffs recovery of attorney's fees under § 1988 because "Buckhannon held that only an
enforceable judgment on the merits or a court-ordered consent decrees can serve as the basis for
prevailing party status"). See generally Attorneys Fees, supranote 288, at 194-95.
293. See, e.g., Federation of Advertising Industry Representatives, Inc. v. Chicago, 326 F.3d 924,
932 (7th Cir. 2003) (denying attorney fees claimed pursuant to the "prevailing party" provisions of §
1988, noting that the Buckhannon court "rejected as a basis for awarding attorney's fees the 'catalyst
theory'... [and] held that the term 'prevailing party,' as used in various federal statutes, includes
only those parties who have obtained a 'judicially sanctioned change' in the legal relationship of the
parties"); Johnson v. ITT Aerospace/Communications Div. of ITT Indus., Inc.,
272 F.3d 498 (7th
Cir. 2001) (relying on Buckhannon to reject an employee's claim for attorney fees under Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act, based on the theory that his suit was the catalyst for an employer's change in
policy). See also Crabill v. Trans Union, L.L.C., 259 F.3d 662, 667 (7th Cir. 2001) (denying
attorney's fees claimed pursuant to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and ruling that although the facts
involved did not give rise to a catalyst case, "[t]he significance of the Buckhannon decision for our
case lies. . . in its insistence that a plaintiff must obtain formal judicial relief, and not merely
'success,' in order to be deemed a prevailing or successful party under any attorneys' fee provision
comparable to the civil rights attorneys' fee statute").
294. See, e.g., Christina A. v. Bloomberg, 315 F.3d 990, 993 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding that in an
action for fees under § 1988, a private settlement agreement would not be enough to satisfy the
Buckhannon requirements because Buckhannon "makes it clear that a party prevails only if it
receives either an enforceable judgment on the merits or a consent decree .... A private settlement
agreement is not enough.... [C]onsent decrees are distinguishable from private settlements by the
means of enforcement.").
295. See, e.g., Perez-Arellano v. Smith, 279 F.3d 791, 794 (9th Cir. 2002) (rejecting use of the
catalyst theory to award fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act and reasoning that "the Supreme
Court's express rule of decision sweeps more broadly and its reasoning is persuasively applicable to
an award of attorney's fees under the [Equal Access to Justice Act]"); Bennett v. Yoshina, 259 F.3d
1097, 1100 (9th Cir. 2001) (rejecting the use of the catalyst theory to award fees under the Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, and declaring that "[tihere can be no doubt that the
Court's analysis in Buckhannon applies to statutes other than the two at issue in that case"); Oro
Vaca, Inc. v. Norton, 55 Fed. Appx. 433 , 436 (9th Cit. 2003) (ruling that Buckhannon applies to fee
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Federal Circuit,2 97 and the District of Columbia Circuit,298the circuits
have felt constrained to follow the strictures of Buckhannon in many
statutory contexts other than the FHAA and the ADA. Likewise,
numerous district courts facing this question have reached similar
conclusions.299
requests under the Equal Access to Justice Act, and because a temporary restraining order was the
only legal relief won by plaintiffs, this "did not alter the legal relationship between the parties" and,
thus, plaintiff was not a "prevailing party"). For further discussion of these cases, see generally
Wenkart, supra note 9, at 441-42, (discussing Perez-Arellano) and Buckhannon Applies to EAJA, 17
No. 4 FED. LITIGATOR 101 (April 2002) (discussing Perez-Arellano).
296. See, e.g., Griffin v. Steelteck, Inc., 261 F.3d 1026, 1029 (10th Cir. 2001) (affirming lower
court's denial of attorney fees to plaintiff in Americans with Disabilities Act litigation because
Buckhannon held "that a plaintiff who has failed to secure a judgment on the merits or by courtordered consent decree in an ADA suit is not entitled to attorney's fees even if the pursuit of
litigation has caused a desired and voluntary change in the defendant's conduct").
297. Maddalino v. Principi, 37 Fed. Appx. 512, (Fed. Cir. 2002) (ruling that Buckhannon
prevents the use of the catalyst theory to recover fee awards under the "prevailing party" provisions
of the Equal Access to Justice Act); Brickwood Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 288 F.3d 1371,
1379 (Fed. Cir. 2002) cert. denied 537 U.S. 1106 (2003) (reversing lower court opinion allowing use
of the catalyst theory for claims made pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act and finding that,
despite difference between the language and legislative history in the EAJA as contrasted to the
statutes at issue in Buckhannon, "we reject the [lower court's] analysis that the text or the legislative
history of the EAJA compels a reading or construction of the term 'prevailing party' different from
other federal fee-shifting statutes and thus conclude that [Buckhannon's] construction of that
term... applies with equal force and effect to the EAJA"); Sacco v. DOJ, 317 F.3d 1384, 1386
(Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding that a preliminary decision by an administrative law judge that causes a
federal agency to take action that moots plaintiffs claim does not make plaintiff a "prevailing party"
under 5 U.S.C. § 7701(g)(1) because Buckhannon applies to this fee-shifting provision and
"preliminary conclusions... neither establish judicial imprimatur nor constitute a court-ordered
change in the legal relationship of the parties to permit an award"); Vaughn v. Principi, 336 F.3d
1351; 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting use of catalyst theory as a basis for recovery under the Equal
Access to Justice Act where there were no "judgments on the merits or consent decrees or similar
results that qualify as prevailing.") . For further discussion of the Brickwood Contractors decision,
see generally Miller, supra note 9, at 1359-60, Klein, supra note 8, at 112-14, Loring, supra note 8,
at 996-98, 1004-05, Cases and Recent Developments, 12 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 135, 142-44 (2002),
Mary D. Fan, Note, Textual Imagination, Ill YALE L. J. 1251 (2002); EAJA "PrevailingParty"
Requires Judgement or Consent Decree, Mere Corrective Action Not Enough, FederalCircuit Says,
19 Gov'T. CONTRACTOR 191 (May 15, 2002), and High Court Denies Review of "Catalyst Theory"
Case, 16 No. 24 ANDREWS Gov'T. CONT. LITIG. REP.6 (March 28, 2003).
298. See, e.g., Oil, Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v. Dep't of Energy, 288
F.3d 452, 457 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (holding that Buckhannon governs, and therefore precludes using the
catalyst theory to satisfy the "prevailing party" requirement of the Government in the Sunshine Act
and the Freedom of Information Act where a court approves litigants' final status report as "merely a
formality"); Thomas v. Nat'l Sci. Found., 330 F.3d 486 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding that, pursuant to
Buckhannon, plaintiffs were not "prevailing parties" for purposes of the fee-shifting provisions of
the Equal Access to Justice Act when they won only a preliminary injunction and partial summary
judgment).
299. See, e.g., Sileikis v. Perryman, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12737 (N.D. 11. 2001) (denying fees
under catalyst theory for action brought pursuant to the "prevailing party" provisions of the Equal
Access to Justice Act); Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga.
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2003) (finding that Buckhannon barred recovery as a catalyst under the "prevailing party" language
of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 264 F.Supp. 2d 65, 72
(D. Mass. 2003) (finding that Buckhannon barred recovery as a catalyst under the "prevailing party"
language of the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act because it "interprets Buckhannon to
mean that, unless Congress specifically and clearly indicates its approval of the catalyst theory in a
given context, the catalyst theory should not be used to justify a fee recovery in statutes that
generally provide fees to 'prevailing parties'); Edwards v. Barnhart, 238 F. Supp. 2d 645 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (noting that Buckhannon's holding rejects catalyst theory as a basis for recovering attorney
fees under "prevailing party" language of the Equal Access to Justice Act even though this was not
the statute in question in Buckhannon); Laprade v. Blackrock Fin. Mgmt., Inc., 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 24418, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting the shareholder's use of catalyst theory to obtain fees
because, although plaintiff claimed that "her class action precipitated the defendants' decision to
abandon the proposed mergers," the Buckhannon decision "rejected the catalyst theory as a basis for
awarding fees"); Abiodun v. McElroy, 2002 U.S. Dist LEXIS 3519 *2 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting
use of the catalyst theory to obtain attorney fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act since,
although Buckhannon technically applied to different federal statutes, "the opinion leaves no doubt
at all that it governs the interpretation of the broad array of similarly worded federal statutes"); P.O.
v. Greenwich Bd. of Educ., 210 F. Supp. 2d 76, 84-85 (D. Conn. 2002) (rejecting plaintiff's efforts
to use the catalyst theory to prevail on fee claim under "prevailing party" language of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act and finding that "in rejecting the catalyst theory, the [Buckhannon]
court held that, to be a prevailing party, one must either secure a judgment on the merits or be a party
to a settlement agreement that is expressly enforced by the court through a consent decree .... [T]he
record indicates that the parties reached an interim agreement outside of the due process
hearing...."); Roberson v. Giuliani, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2750, *8 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (using the
Buckhannon holding to deny use of the catalyst theo'y to award fees under § 1988 because
Buckhannon required an alteration in the parties' legal relationship in order to be a "prevailing
party" and "there is neither an enforceable judgment on the merits nor a court-ordered consent
decree. There is, instead, a private agreement .. ");
J.S. & M.S. v. Ramapo Cent. Sch. Dist., 165 F.
Supp. 2d 570, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting catalyst theory as a basis for recovering fees as a
"prevailing party" under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act because "this Court must
apply Buckhannon to the case at bar"); Alcocer v. INS, 2001 U.S. LEXIS 20543, *8 (N.D. Tex.
2001) (ruling that Buckhannon bars plaintiffs' request for fees under the catalyst theory because
"[t]he [District] Court did not grant any relief in the lawsuit that changed the legal relationship
between the parties. Plaintiffs did not obtain an enforceable judgment on the merits or a settlement
agreement enforceable through a court-ordered consent decree. The INS adjusted Mr. Alcocer's
status, but... [p]laintiffs did not prevail in the lawsuit in any plausible sense."); Dorfsman v. Law
Sch. Admissions Council, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24044, *15 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (denying settling
plaintiff's claim for attorney fees because "[u]nder Buckhannon, private settlement agreements do
not confer prevailing party status"); Adams v. District of Columbia, 231 F. Supp. 2d 52, 55 (D.D.C.
2002) (denying plaintiffs request for attorney fees under "prevailing party" language of IDEA
because "a settlement agreement ...prior to a due process hearing, does not have the necessary
'judicial impumatur' required by Buckhannon"); Akinseye v. District of Columbia, 193 F. Supp. 2d
134, 140 (D.D.C. 2002) (reluctantly denying plaintiff's fee claim because "Buckhannon seems to
leave no room to side-step the Court's conclusion that for a settlement agreement to elevate a
plaintiff to the status of a prevailing party, it must bring about the 'material alteration of the legal
relationship of the parties"') (quoting Buckhannon); Landers v. Dept. of the Air Force, 257 F. Supp.
2d 1011, 1012 (S.D. Ohio 2003) (holding that in fee claim made pursuant to FOIA, while "[i]t could
not be questioned that this lawsuit was the catalyst which led to the disclosure of the documents, the
production of which the Plaintiff had requested," Buckhannon required the holding that "the Plaintiff
is not entitled to recover his attorney's fees, since he obtained no relief from this Court"); Jose Luis
R. v. Joliet Township High Sch. Dist. 204, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20916, *7-*9 (N.D. Ill. 2002)
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Occasionally, there have been exceptions such as Barrios v. California
InterscholasticFederation,30 a ruling described as one that "appears to
be out of step with Buckhannon and.., other circuits." 30 1 In Barrios, the
court acknowledged that Buckhannon invalidated the catalyst theory as a
basis for claiming attorney's fees under the Americans with Disabilities
Act.30 2 Nevertheless, it found that a settlement agreement could be the
basis for classification as a "prevailing party. 30 3 In arriving at this

(denying plaintiffs' request for attorney fees under IDEA because, although their mediation
agreement was "read into the record before the hearing officer," this was inadequate under
Buckhannon because "[w]ithout court approval or sanction, the agreement was simply a private
settlement agreement" and "[p]rivate settlement agreements do not confer prevailing party status");
Kossov v. Perryman, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7944, *7- *8 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (holding that in requests
for fees made pursuant to EAJA, plaintiff could not be a prevailing party even if his litigation was
the catalyst for INS action because, in Buckhannon, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that the catalyst
theory alone is not enough for a plaintiff to be a prevailing party"); Gomes v. Trs. & President of the
Univ. of Me., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14668, *14-*15 (D. Me. 2003) (citing Buckhannon for the
proposition that to be a "prevailing party" one must have "secured a court-ordered, material
alteration of the parties' legal relationship"); Doe v. Boston Pub. Sch., 264 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (D.
Mass. 2003) (denying fees to plaintiff who successfully settled a case brought under IDEA,
explaining "this Court interprets Buckhannon to mean that, unless Congress specifically and clearly
indicates its approval of the catalyst theory in a given context, the catalyst theory should not be used
to justify a fee recovery in statutes that generally provide fees to 'prevailing parties'); Chambers v.
Time Warner, Inc., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15444, *8-*10 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (rejecting claim for fees
brought under the fee-shifting provisions of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §505 when there was a
voluntary withdrawal of claims because "this was a voluntary act [that) did not involve any judicial
determination" and "the Supreme Court in Buckhannon expressly rejected the 'catalyst theory');
Sonii v. Gen. Elec., 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9701, *20-*21 (N.D. Ill. 2003) (ruling that where parties
entered into a private settlement agreement, fees could not be awarded because "[t]his court cannot
conclude that a private settlement agreement, without more, sufficiently alters the parties' legal
relationship to satisfy Buckhannon .... [T]here must be more to constitute a court-ordered change
in the parties' legal relationship").
In addition, in Bublitz v. E.l. DuPont de Nemours, & Co. 224 F. Supp. 2d. 1234 (S.D. Iowa 2002),
the district court expanded the scope of Buckhannon to bar fee-shifting in common fund cases. The
court reasoned that:
One would be hard pressed.., to be able to say that there is any public policy reason to allow
the catalyst theory to apply to the common fund doctrine.... The Court, therefore, sees no way
around the conclusion that Buckhannon foreclosed the use of the catalyst theory in the common
fund doctrine.
Id. at 1242.
This set of cases is by no means exhaustive but is, instead, representative of the trends emerging in
post-Buckhannon litigation. See generally Miller, supra note 9, at 1356-56 (discussing Sileikis); id.
at 1357-58 (discussing Alcocer); Hanson, supra note 9, at 541-43 (discussing J.S.).
300. Barrios v. Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n, 277 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002), cert. denied sub nom,
Cal. Interscholastic Fed'n v. Barrios, 537 U.S. 820 (2002). See generally Wenkart, supra note 9, at
442-45; Hanson, supranote 9, at 550-51.
301. Wenkart, supra note 9, at 445.
302. Barrios, 277 F.3d at 1134 n.5.
303. Id.
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conclusion, the Ninth Circuit took a critical view of reading Buckhannon
expansively:
While dictum in Buckhannon suggests that a plaintiff "prevails" only when
he or she receives a favorable judgment on the merits or enters into a courtsupervised consent decrees, we are not bound by that dictum....
Moreover, the parties, in their settlement, agreed that the district court
would retain jurisdiction over the issue of attorney fees, thus providing
sufficient
judicial oversight to justify an award of attorney's fees and
30 4
costs.

The Ninth Circuit relied heavily on Barrios in deciding RichardS. v.
Department of Developmental Services.30 5 on similarly broad grounds.
Similarly, on the district court level, the 2002 Johnson v. District of
Columbia30 6 decision resisted strict application of Buckhannon. In
Johnson, plaintiff parents sought attorney fees after they had resolved
their IDEA claim by settlement. 30 7 The court opined that:
[Buckhannon] did not... resolve the issue of whether a plaintiff who
enters a private settlement agreement could be considered a prevailing
party, but did arguably express skepticism that such a private settlement
could alter the legal relationship between the parties ...[S]ome courts have

extracted from this skepticism a directive to bar attorney's fees under any
statute including the "prevailing party" language absent a judgement or
court-ordered consent decree30....
[T]his court declines to extend the
8

holding in Buckhannon so far.
The D.C. Circuit's reasoning was based primarily on its view that "a
private settlement does alter the legal relationship of the parties in a real
and substantial manner ' 30 9 because a settlement is enforceable by a court.
In addition, the D.C. Circuit cited Barrios with approval 310 and reasoned
that this broad reading of Buckhannon was necessary to achieve IDEA
policy.

3 11

In spite of these anomalies, most circuit courts are consistent in
applying Buckhannon to a wide range of statutes that use the "prevailing
party" standard for fee-shifting. Thus, it seems likely that catalyst

304. Id.
305. Richard S. v. Dep't of Developmental Serv. of Cal., 317 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2003)
(involving claims for attorney' fees under the Civil Rights Attorney Fees Act and the Americans
with Disabilities Act).
306. Johnson v. District of Columbia, 190 F. Supp. 2d 34 (D.D.C. 2002). For further discussion
of Johnson, see Klein, supra note 8, at 138-40, and Lerner, supra note 9, at 397-99.
307. Johnson, 190 F. Supp. at 43-44.
308. Id. at 44-45.
309. Id.
at 45.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 45-46.
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recovery is no longer available as the justification for attorney's fees for
environmental statutes employing the "prevailing" or "substantially
prevailing" language. 3t 2 In Kasza v. Whitman, 3 13 for example, the Ninth
Circuit-in spite of its willingness in Barrios to depart further from
Buckhannon than other circuits-recently held that, in the RCRA
context, Buckhannon's strictures bar recovery of fees in an action
"predicated" upon the catalyst theory.314 The Kasza court reasoned that
because RCRA is a "prevailing party" statute like those at issue in
Buckhannon, a similar outcome was required.315
However, there are two areas in which the applicability of Buckhannon
is not entirely clear, and judicial uncertainty in these two areas clouds the
"bright line" rule that Buckhannon attempted to, and initially appeared to
establish. First, there are a number of cases in which the circuit courts316
312. See supranotes 285-99.
313. Kasza v. Whitman, 325 F.3d 1178 (9th Cir. 2003).
314. Id. at 1180. The court noted that the plaintiff"is not a 'prevailing party' (and thus cannot be
a substantially 'prevailing party') because she did not gain by judgment or consent decree a material
alteration of the legal relationship of the parties." Id. (emphasis in original). Indeed, this impact of
Buckhannon has been a source of particular concern for environmental litigants. See, e.g., Coyle,
supra note 8, at Al (quoting Jim Hecher, environmental enforcement director at Trial Lawyers for
Public Justice, who warns "there is a lot of litigation under RCRA so [Buckhannon] is a blow");
Southwest Center for Biological Diversity v. McGee, 31 Fed. Appx. 362 (9th Cir. 2002).
315. Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e).
316. See, e.g., Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States, 336 F.3d 1360,
1366 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that, in the context of a remand to an administrative agency, a
plaintiff may be a "prevailing party" under Buckhannon "where the plaintiff secures a remand
requiring further agency proceedings because of alleged error by the agency ... (1) without regard to
the outcome of the agency proceedings where there has been no retention of jurisdiction by the
court, or (2) when successful in the remand proceedings where there has been a retention of
jurisdiction."); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 313 F.3d 246, 250 (5th Cir. 2002) (citing Buckhannon
with approval and allowing fee award under the "prevailing party" language of § 1988 only after
ruling that a "district court's ultimate vacation of the offending provisions of the order is the
functional equivalent of an enforceable judgment..." and thus meets the requirement that the
parties' legal relationship was changed); Util. Automation 2000, Inc. v. Choctawhatchee Elec.
Coop., 298 F.3d 1238, 1248 (11 th Cir. 2002) (finding that under Buckhannon, a Rule 68 offer of
judgment may entitle a litigant to prevailing party status because while "[a]dmittedly, an offer of
judgment falls somewhere between a consent decree and the minimalist 'catalyst theory' the court
rejected in Buckhannon," in this instance "an accepted offer has the 'necessary judicial imprimatur'
of the court . . . in the crucial sense that it is an enforceable judgment against the defendant."); Am.
Disability Ass'n v. Chmielarz, 289 F.3d 1315, 1320 (1lth Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that
Buckhannon "invalidated the 'catalyst theory' but allowing plaintiffs to be deemed "prevailing
parties" for purposes of the Americans with Disabilities Act because "if the district court either
incorporates the terms of... the settlement into its final order of dismissal or expressly retains
jurisdiction to enforce a settlement, it may thereafter enforce the terms of the parties' agreement,"
thus establishing the "change in the legal relationship of the parties" mandated by Buckhannon);
Labotest, Inc. v. Bonta, 297 F.3d 892, 895 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that while Buckhannon applies to
fee actions brought under § 1988, and while Buckhannon held "a plaintiff could no longer recover
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and the district courts 3 17 have allowed an award of attorney fees pursuant
to "prevailing party" statutes by construing Buckhannon's mandated
fees merely because the lawsuit may have played a role in bringing about the desired result,"
plaintiff in this case was a "prevailing party" because "[tihe court's incorporation of the first
stipulation into its final order, and its order approving the settlement agreement are the necessary
judicial imprimatur"); Walker v. City of Mesquite, 313 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that
Buckhannon bars the use of catalyst theory for attorney fee recovery, but allowing recovery where
plaintiff "not only secured the reversal of the declaratory judgment but also achieved a partial
vacation of the remedial order and the ultimate revision of that order in the district court.");
Truesdell v. Phila. Hous. Auth., 290 F.3d 159, 165 (3d Cir. 2002) (acknowledging that Buckhannon
invalidated the catalyst theory, but held that plaintiff was a "prevailing party" for purposes of § 1988
because plaintiff had achieved a memorandum and order that "(I) contains mandatory language...,
(2) is entitled 'Order,' and (3) bears the signature of the District Court judge, not the parties'
counsel."). For further discussion of these cases, see generally Tebo, supra note 285, at 59
(discussing various ways in which circuit courts have narrowed Buckhannon 's scope), and Hanson,
supra note 9, at 549-554 (discussing attempts of courts to restrict Buckhannon's reach in the IDEA
context).
317. See, e.g., Vanke v. Block, 2002 WL 1836305, at *5 (C.D. Cal. 2002) (citing Buckhannon
with approval and allowing fee award under the "prevailing party" language of §1988 because a
preliminary injunction that causes the defendants to provide the relief sought meets the Buckhannon
requirement that there be a change in legal relationship because "the judicial imprimatur was
stamped on an injunction that led to an alteration of actual circumstances."); Aynes v. Space Guard
Prods., 201 F.R.D. 445, 450-51 (S.D. Ind. 2001) (citing Buckhannon with approval, and allowing
the award of fees under the "prevailing party" language of the Americans With Disabilities Act only
after a finding that an offer ofjudgement "caused a material alteration of the legal relationship of the
parties" as required by Buckhannon); Lynom v. Widnall, 222 F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 2002) (citing
Buckhannon with approval and allowing the award of fees under the "prevailing party" language of
the Equal Access to Justice Act because the Court's remand of plaintiffs APA claim was judicial
relief sufficient to give rise to a change in the parties' legal relationship); Lazarus v. County of
Sullivan, 269 F. Supp. 2d 419, 422-23 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing Buckhannon, but allowing recovery
of fees under the Americans With Disabilities Act, based on a finding that "obtaining a consent
decree implicitly 'creates' the material alteration necessary for finding [plaintiff] the prevailing
party"); Yassky v. Kings County Democratic County Comm., 259 F. Supp. 2d 210, 214-15
(E.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that while Buckhannon is applicable to § 1988 actions, plaintiffs were
prevailing parties because the lawsuit was not mooted by defendant's voluntary repeal of an
objectionable rule); M.S. v. New York City Bd. of Educ., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220, at *10
(S.D.N.Y. 2002) (allowing plaintiffs to recover fees under the Individuals With Disabilities
Education Act's "prevailing party" provisions because the parties "agreement was read into the
record in front of the hearing officer. The hearing officer was asked to, and did, affirm a
settlement." This was found to "alter the legal relationship between the parties" as required by
Buckhannon); L.C. v. Waterbury Bd. of Educ., 2002 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 6079, at *9-17 (D. Conn.
2002) (finding that, post-Buckhannon, a party may recover fees under the "prevailing party"
language of the Individuals With Disabilities Education Act if a party prevailed at a due process or
administrative hearing that could change the legal relationship between the parties); Thompson v.
United States Dep't of Hous. And Urban Dev., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23875, *12 n.9 (D. Md.
2002) (allowing plaintiff to recover attorney fees because "[a]s explained in Buckhannon... a
consent decree, although not always including a defendant's admission of liability, satisfies the
prevailing party test"); Nat'l Coalition for Students with Disabilities v. Bush, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1272,
1279 (N.D. Fla. 2001) (finding plaintiff could be a "prevailing party" pursuant to Buckhannon
because the federal court retained jurisdiction to enforce the parties' settlement agreement. Thus,
"[I]n substance, if not in name, the order and judgment entered in the case at bar constitute a consent
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"change in the parties' legal relationship" in a broad way that finds such
a change in a fairly wide range of factual circumstances. The typical
pattern for these cases is to begin by citing Buckhannon with respect for
its interpretation of "prevailing party" to exclude catalytic recovery. The
courts then deny that they would rely on the catalyst theory to allow a fee
award. Instead, these opinions search the facts of the individual cases
diligently, looking for something that could be construed as a judicial
imprimatur. In doing so, these courts have been successful in
circumventing Buckhannon by avoiding the catalyst theory because a
judicial remedy of some sort existed. The courts then base their fee
awards on their finding of such a judicial remedy rather than on the
discredited catalyst theory itself
The implication of these cases in the environmental context is that this
reasoning has the potential to offer a measure of relief by suggesting
scenarios in which the requisite judicial intervention may be found in
circumstances other than the paradigmatic judicial victory on the
merits. 318 In theory, a successful litigant may be able to strategically
sidestep Buckhannon's strictures by doing such things as winning a
preliminary injunction on a significant issue, 319 securing a remand to an
administrative agency, 32 involving a hearing officer in formalizing a
or getting a private settlement agreement
settlement agreement,32' 322
formalized in a court order.

decree, not a mere private settlement"); Reed v. Shenandoah Mem'l. Hosp., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
14867, at *10-11 (D.Neb. 2002) (allowing plaintiffs claim for fees pursuant to ERISA after plaintiff
obtained a favorable settlement because, through that settlement, plaintiff "obtained all the relief she
sought. The settlement agreement in this case is the functional equivalent of a consent decree-although it does not include an admission of liability, it is a court-ordered change in the relationship
between the parties.").
318. This strategy is discussed more fully in Attorneys' Fees - Freedom of Information Act"SubstantiallyPrevailed," 17 No. 7 FED. LITIGATOR 180, 181 (July 2002):
Post - Buckhannon, there is little question that eligibility for attorneys' fees under statutes
authorizing fee recovery by prevailing parties is dependent on obtaining judicially sanctioned
relief. What is less clear is whether relief must take the form of a final judgment on the merits
or a court-ordered consent decree. Buckhannon says that these result in a "material alteration of
the legal relationship of the parties" necessary for a fee award. What it doesn't say, explicitly
anyway, is that they are the only two forms of relief that can result in eligibility for a fee
award... An argument can ...be made that other forms of relief qualify-and it may succeed.
319. See, e.g., Vanke, 2002 WL 1836305, rev'd, 77 Fed. Appx. 943 (9th Cir. 2003).
320. See, e.g., Former Employees of Motorola Ceramic Prods. v. United States, 336 F.3d 1360
(Fed. Cir. 2003).
32 1. See, e.g., MS., 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22220.
322. See, e.g., American DisabilityAss 'n, 289 F.3d at 1320.
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For example, in Environmental ProtectionInformation Center, Inc. v.
Pacific Lumber Co.,323 the Northern District of California found that
resort to the catalyst theory was not necessary in this Endangered Species
Act case because there was a "court-ordered TRO and... preliminary
injunction ' 324 that stopped the defendant's logging activities. These were
deemed sufficient to constitute "a court-ordered change in the
relationship between the parties' 325 as mandated by Buckhannon.
However, such mechanisms may not always be easy to achieve
because the defendant may not be cooperative, or the facts of a
particular case may not lend themselves to these techniques.
In addition, relying on the hope that a particular court may fashion
such a detour around Buckhannon is very risky. While courts have been
surprisingly uniform in finding that Buckhannon invalidates the catalyst
theory in "prevailing party" statutes, they have been far less unanimous
in defining these very fact-specific cases that circumvent Buckhannon.
Unfortunately, the wide variety of judicial actions involved in these cases
suggests that a second generation of post-Buckhannon litigation may be
arising to ascertain the precise types of judicial action needed to
constitute a true change in legal relationship as required by Buckhannon.
This uncertainty is clearly illustrated in a recent decision by the Seventh
Circuit, in T.D. v. La Grange School District No. 102326 There, the
Seventh Circuit held that Buckhannon applies to claims made under the
"prevailing party" fee-shifting provisions of the Individuals With
Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"). 327 Once this determination was
made, the court decided that a settlement agreement was insufficient to
make the plaintiffs a "prevailing party. ' 328 This not only reversed the

323. Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 229 F. Supp. 2d 993 (N.D. Cal. 2002).

324. Id.
at 1004.
325. Id. As discussed below in notes 329-61, infra, the court also reasoned that Buckhannon did
not even apply to the Endangered Species Act because the Endangered Species Act employs the

"whenever... appropriate" standard as its test for fee awards rather than "prevailing party." Id. at
1003-05.
h
326. T.D. v. La Grange School District No. 102, 349 F.3d 469 (7" Cir. 2003). For further
discussion, see generally Buckhannon Precludes Fee Award Tied to Parent-SchoolIDEA Settlement,
U.S.L.W. Dec. 2, 2002, at 1323.
327. Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, 20, U.S.C. §1415 (i) (3)(B).
328. See TD., 349 F.3d at 479, reasoning that:

The settlement agreement in this case does not bear any of the marks of a consent decree. It is
not embodied in a court order or judgment, it does not bear the district court judge's signature,
and the district court has no continuing jurisdiction to enforce the agreement. Rather, it was

merely a private settlement agreement between the parties. T.D. argues that because the district
court was actively involved in the settlement negotiations, having conducted a settlement
conference in his chambers and made certain settlement suggestions, that we should find that
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lower court's contrary decision, 329 but it also seemed to conflict with the
later part of the T.D. opinion that did confer "prevailing party" status for
the plaintiff's success in a proceeding in which a hearing officer partially
granted T.D. requests for reimbursement., 330 This ambivalence as to the

types of non-judicial remedies that may confer "prevailing party" status
illustrates the risks inherent in relying on this theory for a fee award.
Indeed, the district court for the northern district of Georgia has observed
that there is already "a circuit split whether Buckhannon limits prevailing
party status to outcomes embodied in consent decrees or judgments. 3 3'
Hence, while this approach may offer some hope to environmental
litigants, its widespread availability is unclear and the likelihood of
success is uncertain.332

However, there is a second set of post-Buckhannon cases that may be
more important in assessing Buckhannon's impact on environmental
litigation. These cases address whether Buckhannon's strictures apply to
those statutes that use the "whenever... appropriate" standard instead of
"prevailing party" language. The "whenever... appropriate" standard
was not used in the statutes at issue in Buckhannon. However, its
prevalence in environmental statutes makes it critical to assess the impact
Buckhannon has had on fee recovery pursuant to these statutes.
This inquiry has been the focus of most post-Buckhannon
commentary. 333 Thus far, the results of litigation under statutes using the
there was sufficient 'judicial imprimatur' on the settlement to confer 'prevailing party' status.
Mere involvement in the settlement, however, is not enough. There must be some official
judicial approval of the settlement and some level of continuing judicial oversight. Therefore,
we find that the settlement agreement in this case did not confer 'prevailing party' status upon
T.D.
329. The lower court's opinion may be found at T.D. v. La Grange School Dist. No. 102, 222 F.
Supp. 2d 1062, 1065 (N.D. Il1. 2002) (allowing award of attorney fees in IDEA settlement case
because "there exist critical distinctions in the text and structure of the IDEA ...that persuade me
that the Court's ruling in Buckhannon was not meant to extend to the IDEA").
330. T.D.; 349 F. 3d at 479. A full analysis of the applicability of Buckhannon to the IDEA,
written prior to the Circuit Court's ruling in T.D., may be found in Lerner, supra note 9.
331. Matthew V. v. DeKalb County Sch. Sys., 244 F. Supp. 2d 1331 (N.D. Ga. 2003).
332. For an excellent discussion of a number of these difficulties, see generally Bart Forsyth,
Preliminary Impumaturs: PrevailingParty Status Based on PreliminaryInjunctions, 60 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 927 (2003). In his article, Mr. Forsyth discusses the difficulties inherent in determining
whether there is a sufficient "judicial imprimateur" in various procedural scenarios to justify
conferring "prevailing party" status on fee-seeking litigants. Although the discussion focuses
primarily on the problems particular to preliminary injunctions, the concerns he raises have more
widespread implications.
333. See, e.g., Ugalde, supra note 11,at 608 ("The impact of the rejection of the catalyst theory
depends on whether the lower courts interpret the Buckhannon holding as limited to fee-shifting
statutes that employ the prevailing party language, or whether it applies to fee-shifting provisions
that incorporate the appropriate standard as well.").
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"whenever... appropriate" standard are different from the results
obtained by litigation brought under "prevailing party" statutes. PostBuckhannon
litigation-particularly
environmental
litigationinterpreting this standard has allowed the continued use of the catalyst
theory. This is because, "[i]n contrast to the statutes construed in
Buckhannon, numerous federal environmental statutes authorize federal
district courts to award costs and attorney's fees 'whenever the court
determines such award is appropriate.' These words are not equivalent
to 'prevailing.' 334 In light of this distinction, it has been argued that it is
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club335-and not Buckhannon-that should
govern cases involving environmental statutes that use this
formulation.33 6
Several recent cases illustrate the way in which Buckhannon's
influence has been held at bay for significant environmental statutes.
The Tenth Circuit reached this conclusion in dicta when it decided
Centerfor BiologicalDiversity v. Norton.337 In this case, the plaintiffs
filed suit to require the Secretary of the Interior to take final action listing
the Arkansas River shiner as an endangered or threatened species under
the ESA.33 8 After long delays,339 the Secretary took the action requested
334. Jim Hecker & Ruth Ann Weidel, 'Catalyst Theory 'for Fee Awards in Environmental Suits
Survives 'Buckhannon,' 32 ENV'T. RPTR. 1797 (Sept. 14, 2001) ("[Tlhe fee standard in
environmental citizen suit provisions differs significantly from that in the Buckhannon case. Since
all environmental statutes allow awards to be made 'whenever... appropriate,' all such citizen suit
fee provisions contain a broader fee entitlement standard than that enunciated in Buckhannon."). See
also Zinn, supranote 41, at 166 (predicting that "the Court's heavy reliance on the prevailing party'
formulation in § 1988 means that, under the broader terms of the environmental statutes,
Buckhannon need not bar fee awards for less than complete success or even where the plaintiff only
precipitates non-judicially-sanctioned action").
335. For a discussion of Ruckelshaus, see supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text.
336. Id; see also Conservation Law Found., Inc. v. Evans, 2003 WL 1559940 at *1, n.l (D.
Mass. 2003) ("In the wake of Buckhannon, the Courts of Appeal have chosen to view statutory fee
shifting schemes, like those of the Endangered Species Act, which contain the 'whenever
appropriate' language as governed by the Ruckelshaus standard."); Coyle, supra note 8, at Al
(predicting that "[ejnvironmental litigators will continue to pursue awards based on the catalyst
theory under fee provisions in 17 statutes that don't use the 'prevailing party' standard but allow
awards if 'appropriate').
337. Center for Biological Diversity v. Norton, 262 F.3d 1077, 1080 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001). For
further discussion of Centerfor Biological Diversity, see generally Ugalde supra note 11, at 614-15,
and Loring, supra note 8, at 996.
338. Centerfor Biological Diversity, 262 F.3d at 1078.
339. These delays were, to a large extent, beyond the control of the Secretary. On April 10,
1995-almost 4 months before the Secretary's final designation was due-Congress imposed a
moratorium that "prohibited the Secretary from making final determinations that a species was
threatened or endangered."
Id. at 1079 (citing Emergency Supplemental Appropriations &
Recessions for the Dept. of Defense to Preserve and Enhance Military Readiness Act of 1995, Pub.
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by the plaintiffs, 340 thus mooting the lawsuit. 34' However, the plaintiffs
sought attorney fees, claiming that their litigation was the catalyst for the
* 342
Secretary's action.
The court did not have to reach the issue of whether Buckhannon
would apply to the ESA because it found that the plaintiffs actions were
not catalytic. 343 However, the court distinguished Buckhannon in a
footnote, indicating that Buckhannon would be inapplicable to the ESA
because the ESA employs the "whenever... appropriate" standard.
Center for Biological Diversity never actually addressed the question
head-on because "the basis of the Court's conclusion in Buckhannon is
not applicable in this case. Because neither party raises the issue, we
decline to address the continued applicability of the catalyst test to fee
requests brought pursuant to statutes that do not contain a 'prevailing
party' requirement." 344 Hence, although the holding in Center for
345
Biological Diversity never had to address the catalyst question directly,
its dicta indicates a willingness to distinguish Buckhannon from
environmental statutes that employ the less restrictive "whenever...
appropriate" standard.
More importantly, in Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of
Volusia County,346 the Eleventh Circuit held that Buckhannon "does not
L. No. 104-6, 109 Stat. 73, 86). This moratorium was lifted on April 26, 1997, but by that time the
backlog of proposed listings prevented the secretary from acting quickly on the shiner proposal. Id.
340. The shiner, ultimately, was listed as a threatened species on November 23, 1998. Id. at
1080.
341. Id. As a result, "on December 7, 1998, the parties entered into a Joint Stipulation of
Dismissal." Id.
342. Id. at 1081-82.
343. Id. at 1083 ("[T]he district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that the
Center's lawsuit was not a catalyst for final agency action on the shiner.").
344. Id. at 1080 n.2.
345. In another Tenth Circuit opinion, the court also came close to ruling on, but did not need to
decide the question of whether Buckhannon's abandonment of the catalyst theory applied to the
"whenever... appropriate" language of the Clean Water Act's fee-shifting provisions. In Amigos
Bravos v, EPA, 324 F.3d 1166 (10th Cir. 2003), the Tenth Circuit did not have to decide the
question of whether the catalyst theory would apply to a Clean Water Act fee-recovery action
because it held that the plaintiff did not meet the requirements for a catalytic recovery even if it were
to be allowed. ld. at 1175. See also 10h Circuit Foils Green Groups' Bidfor Attorney Fees, 23 No.
18 ANDREWS HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIG. REP. 7 (April 25, 2003) (analyzing outcome in Amigos
Bravos).
346. Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of Volusia County, 307 F.3d 1318 (11 th Cir.
2002); see also Julie V. Mayfield, Environmental Law, 54 MERCER L. REV. 1467, 1479-85 (2003)
(reviewing factual background to, and 1 P Circuit's reasoning in Loggerhead Turtle); Attorney's
Fees- "Catalyst Theory"-EndangeredSpecies Act, 17 No. 11 FED. LITIGATOR 285 (Nov. 2002)
(noting that Loggerhead Turtle supports an argument that the catalyst theory "remains a viable basis
for awarding fees under statutes authorizing fee recovery whenever. . . 'appropriate'); Jennifer A.
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prohibit use of the catalyst test as a basis for awarding attorney's fees
and costs under the whenever appropriate fee-shifting provision of the
Endangered Species Act., 347 In Loggerhead Turtle, the plaintiffs sued
the county, claiming that county actions constituted a "taking" of
endangered turtles in direct violation of the Endangered Species Act
("ESA").348 While the suit was pending, the defendant voluntarily
adopted protective ordinances to address some of the alleged harm to the
turtles. 349 The plaintiffs then moved for attorney fees based on their
beliefs that "their suit was the catalyst for improved protection of sea
turtles., 350 The district court awarded the fees requested, based on the
catalyst theory.35 1
The defendants objected. First, they argued that, as a factual matter,
"the Turtles failed to achieve their goal of a declaratory judgment, that
enactment of [the ordinances] was not motivated by the Turtle's suit,
that... the claim.., was not colorable, and that the Turtle's suit had
failed to contribute to the goals of the ESA. 3 52
More importantly for this discussion, the defendants also argued that
the Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon precluded the award of
attorney fees to the plaintiffs since, even if all the factual arguments were
resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, Buckhannon disallowed the catalyst
theory for recovery. This was an important test of the post-Buckhannon
viability of the catalyst theory. In deciding that the plaintiffs should
receive fees, the Eleventh Circuit outlined the analysis that would be
echoed by other courts addressing Buckhannon's applicability to
environmental statutes.
Mogy, Recent Developments in Environmental Law, 16 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 231, 239-42 (2002)
(describing the impact of Loggerhead Turtle on ESA litigation).
347. Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d. at 1327.
348. More specifically, the plaintiffs alleged that:
during sea turtle nesting season, (1) the County permitted limited vehicular access to its
beaches, and (2) the County's ordinance restricting artificial beachfront lighting was ineffective
in preventing takes, because it both failed to prevent disorientation and mis-orientation of sea
turtle hatchlings, and exempted certain municipalities within the County altogether.
Id. at 1320.
349. These ordinances provided for "more stringent beachfront lighting regulations." Id.
350. Id. at 1321.
351. In its decision, the district court found:
that the Turtles' 'goal in bringing suit was to afford greater protection to endangered sea turtles
nesting on the County's beaches, and that the County's adoption of more stringent lighting
ordinances afforded such protection and materially altered the parties' legal relationship. The
court further found that the Turtles' suit was the primary impetus for the adoption of the new
ordinances, and that the Turtles' claims were objectively reasonable.
Id. at 1321-22.
352. Id. at 1321.
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First, the Eleventh Circuit ruled that because Buckhannon dealt with
catalyst awards where statutes authorized fees to be paid to "prevailing
parties," it was not applicable in the ESA context because the ESA
allowed the awarding of fees "whenever the court determines such award
is appropriate." 353 By drawing this distinction, the Eleventh Circuit
argued for a narrow reading of Buckhannon. This interpretation was
bolstered by the Eleventh Circuit's three-part reasoning that (i) "there is
clear evidence that Congress intended that a plaintiff whose suit furthers
the goals of a 'whenever. . . appropriate' statute be entitled to recover
attorney fees;" 35 4 (ii) that the Buckhannon opinion "expressly addressed
only the meaning of 'prevailing

party" '355 and never mentioned

Ruckelshaus, the landmark "whenever... appropriate" case; 356 and,
finally, (iii) that the ESA provides for equitable relief only. Therefore,
the court concluded that failing to allow for the catalyst rule would
"cripple the citizen suit provision of the Endangered Species Act., 357
Loggerhead Turtle illustrates that it is possible to distinguish
Buckhannon's narrow interpretation of the catalyst theory and find it
inapplicable to many environmental statutes. 358 This development

353. Id. at 1322-23 (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)).
354. Loggerhead Turtle, 307 F.3d at 1325. The court conceded that there was nothing in the
legislative history of the ESA to "elucidate Congress's choice of the 'whenever... appropriate'
standard," Id. However, the court drew an analogy to the legislative history found for the identical
provision in the Clean Air Act. In the Senate Report for that Act, it was written:
[Iln bringing legitimate actions under this section citizens would be performing a public service
and in such instances the courts should award costs of litigation to such party. This should
extend to plaintiffs in actions which result in successful abatement but do not reach a verdict.
For instance, if as a result of a citizen proceeding and before a verdict is issued, a defendant
abated a violation, the court may award litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in
prosecutingsuch actions.
307 F.3d. at 1325 (quoting S. Rep. No 91-1196, at 38 (1970)) (emphasis added).
355. LoggerheadTurtle, 307 F.3d at 1326.
356. Id. The Loggerhead Turtle opinion also mentions that it was Justice Rehnquist who wrote
both the Ruckelshaus and Buckhannon opinions. Id. at n. 12. This would seem to suggest that the
Ruckelshaus decision was not implicated by the Buckhannon ruling.
357. Id.at 1327.
358. Indeed, the arguments made in the brief of the plaintiff/appellees in Loggerhead Turtle is
typical of those arguments that favor taking "wherever... appropriate" cases out of the ambit of
Buckhannon. They argued:
[T]he catalyst theory should be held as a matter of law to be an appropriate standard that can be
used by a trial court in determining whether to award attorneys' fees to a plaintiff who partially
prevailed in a citizen suit under the ESA, because under the catalyst theory attorneys' fees only
are awarded to a plaintiff who significantly contributes to the public interest by causing the
dependent to change his or her conduct to conform to the purposes and goals of the Act.
Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellees at 28, Loggerhead Turtle v. The County Council of Volusia County,
307 F.3d 1318 ( 1"' Cir. 2002) (No. 01-12164-BB).
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captured the attention of commentators and raised the hopes of
litigators.3 59
Following on the heels of Loggerhead Turtle was Sierra Club v.
Environmental Protection Agency, 360 in which the District of Columbia
Circuit ruled that Buckhannon would not bar fee awards for catalysts
under the "wherever ... appropriate" language of the Clean Air Act.
The plaintiffs in Sierra Club brought action against the EPA challenging
the EPA rulings that granted extensions of interim approvals for state and
local permit programs. 36 1 After the action was filed, the parties reached a
settlement whereby the EPA agreed to "grant no further interim approval
extensions., 362 The parties also agreed that they would seek a joint
settlement if the EPA had met its obligations under the agreement.36 3
The EPA did so, and the case was dismissed at the request of both
parties.
After the case was dismissed, the plaintiffs sought attorney fees under
the "whenever ...

appropriate" language of the Clean Air Act.364

Plaintiffs argued that "their role as a catalyst in halting the EPA's
practice of serially extending interim approvals makes a fee award
'appropriate.' 365 While acknowledging that neither Ruckelshaus nor
Buckhannon was directly applicable, the D.C. Circuit nevertheless
decided that the Ruckelshaus approach was the correct one to followparticularly in light of the fact that Buckhannon never mentioned or
overruled Ruckelshaus. Although Ruckelshaus did not involve a catalyst,
in its interpretation of the legislative history it reasoned that "Congress
did in fact authorize fee awards under section 307(f) for [catalyst
359. For further discussion of Loggerhead Turtle, see generally Klein, supra note 8, at 126-27.
See also Tebo, supranote 285, at 56 (noting more generally that "[s]ome circuit courts ... have read
Buckhannon narrowly, allowing fees in envirrnmental and other cases"); Buckhannon Did Not
Eliminate Catalyst Theory in Environmental Cases, U.S. LAW WEEK, October 8, 2002 at 1207
(reporting that, after Loggerhead Turtle "[tlhe catalyst theory remains a viable basis for awarding
attorneys' fees to plaintiffs in citizen suits under the Endangered Species Act and similarly worded
environmental statutes"); Mayfield, supra note 346, at 1485 (noting that the ESA "has a broader
standard for fee-shifting" than the statute at issue in Buckhannon and, thus, the eleventh circuit
correctly employed the catalyst theory "[l]argely on the basis of this statutory difference").
360. Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2003); Sierra Club is discussed more fully in
Tebo, supra note 285, at 58, Green Groups May Recover Attorney Fees in CAA Case, D.C. Circuit
Rules, 23 No. 17 ANDREWS HAZARDOUS WASTE LITIG. REP. 4 (April 11, 2003), and Buckhannon
Did Not Eliminate Catalyst Theory in Environmental Cases, U.S. LAW WEEK, March 25, 2003 at

1573.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Sierra Club, 322 F.3d at 718-20.
Id. at 720.
Id.
Id
Id. at 721.
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suits.] '366 The Sierra Club court adopted this view. It also rejected the
EPA's policy arguments that such an approach would lead 36to8
36 7
inconsistency among statutes and generate additional judicial labor.
Once the court found that the catalyst theory was still available to
litigants under those statutes using the "whenever... appropriate"
standard, it found that the Sierra Club plaintiffs met the requirements for
being catalysts. Thus, it upheld the fee award.
The E.P.A. recently, but unsuccessfully, petitioned the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari in Sierra Club to consider the question as to whether
the catalyst theory should continue to be permitted in those cases
involving the awarding of fees under the "whenever ...appropriate"
standard. 369 In its petition for certiorari,the E.P.A. correctly identified
the current urgency for "crucial and needed guidance respecting the
prerequisites for obtaining attorney's fee awards under numerous federal
statutes. 370 The petitioners sought to have the Supreme Court declare,
371
definitively, how Buckhannon and Ruckleshaus are to be reconciled
and to treat "whenever ...appropriate" cases under the same standard.
This dilemma illustrates the current difficulty confronting the circuit
courts that adjudicate this issue.
Similarly, among the district courts that have addressed this question,
the catalyst theory retains its viability for environmental statutes that
employ the "whenever
...appropriate" standard as opposed to the
"prevailing party" test.372

366. Id.at 723.
367. Id. at 726 (acknowledging that although this would create a "patchwork" among statutes,
"[i]t
was Congress that created the 'patchwork').
368. Id.(reasoning that Congress was well within its authority to delegate decisions about fee
awards to the courts),
369. Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2003), petitionfor cert. filed, 72 U.S.L.W.
3269 (Oct. 3, 2003) (No. 03-509).
370. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 11,Sierra Club v. EPA, 322 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2003)
(No. 03-509). Petitioners also urged the Court to consider the administrative difficulties that would
arise if the catalyst theory continued to be used in "whenever ...appropriate" cases. They warned
that this, "would spawn the same administrative difficulties that the court envisioned in
Buckhannon ...this case illustrates the debatable questions of relief and causation that the catalyst
test would pose in the case of out-of-control settlements." Id. at 18-19. In addition, petitioners
feared that "the court of appeals" decision is likely to generate wasteful litigation, not only in the
District of Columbia Circuit, but also in each of the other circuits where the issue of catalyst-based
fees against the government under "when appropriate" fee-shifting provisions remains an open
question. Id. at 21.
371. Id.
372. See, e.g., Southwest Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Carroll, 182 F. Supp 2d 944 (C.D. Cal.
2001) (holding that Buckhannon does not apply to "whenever... appropriate" statutes and, thus,
does not preclude award of fees using the catalyst theory for fee claims brought pursuant to the
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Thus, in the two years since Buckhannon, there have been judicial
attempts to clarify its precise contours, and litigants' attempts to define
those contours narrowly or broadly as suits their interests. This is
particularly significant in the environmental context.
Although the Supreme Court chose not to re-enter the fray in Sierra
Club, it is likely that similar requests for such review will recur.
However, continued Supreme Court and judicial intervention in this area
is not likely to be as productive as Congressional leadership in this area
of conflict.
VI. TOWARD A LEGISLATIVE SOLUTION TO THE CATALYST PROBLEM

On its face, the Buckhannon decision is a fair and logical reading of
the statutory provisions. Fee-shifting provisions mark a departure from
the long-standing American Rule and, thus, Buckhannon's conservative
approach "prevents courts from straying from the 'American Rule'
without a clear congressional mandate., 373 This is particularly important
for areas in which suits against the government are prevalent because
courts must respect sovereign immunity by declining to expand
Congressional waivers of it too broadly.374

ESA). The court reasoned that "because the 'whenever... appropriate' language of the ESA is
distinguishable on its face from the 'prevailing party' language of the [statutes at issue in
Buckhannon], this court is reluctant to extend the Buckhannon holding to the fee provisions of the
ESA." Id. at 947. The court elaborated:
[Allthough the Buckhannon Court extended its holding to attorney fee provisions in other civil
rights statutes, it did not address the interpretation of the 'whenever ... appropriate' language
of the ESA or other environmental statutes ....
Given the Court's increased reliance on the
plain meaning of the specific language used by Congress in its statutes, and the lack of any
mention of the ESA or other environmental statutes in Buckhannon, we are disinclined to
extend the Court's interpretation to language that is dissimilar on its face.
Id. at 948. See also Envtl. Prot. Info. Ctr., Inc. v. Pac. Lumber Co., 229 F. Supp. 993, 1003 (N. D.
Cal. 2002) (declining to find that the Endangered Species Act was affected by Buckhannon because
"[w]hile Buckhannon's application is broad, it is not universal. Both the EAJA and the civil rights
statutes identified in Buckhannon provide for attorneys' fees to prevailing parties," and "[iun
contrast, the ESA does not limit fees to prevailing parties, but gives courts broad discretion to award
attorneys' fees 'whenever the court determines such award is appropriate,"' and "[tlhis is a 'less
stringent standard"') (citations omitted); Conservation Law Found. v. Evans, 2003 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 5566, 3n.1 (D. Mass 2003) (noting that "[in the wake of Buckhannon, the Courts of Appeal
have chosen to view statutory fee shifting schemes, like that of the Endangered Species Act, which
contain 'whenever appropriate' language as governed by the Ruckelshaus standard").
373. Kelly, supra note 9, at 371 (also noting that the Buckhannon Court "preferr[ed] ... to avoid
straying from the 'American Rule' for attorney fees without explicit instructions from Congress").
374. See, e.g., Babich, supra note 11, at 10,137 (noting the Supreme Court's "ongoing affection
for the common-law doctrine of sovereign immunity," an affection that causes it to "read[]
provisions for federal liability narrowly").

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 29:1

In addition, all litigants can benefit from the predictability of a brightline rule in fee matters. 375 Arguably, Buckhannon attempted to move
courts towards a bright-line rule by removing any ambiguity as to the
availability of the catalyst rule for "prevailing parties." Unfortunately, as
the prior section explored, Buckhannon has not resulted in an end to all
catalyst litigation. Instead, it has generated a new generation of litigation
to test the limits of its holding.3 76 Nevertheless, it is likely that there
would have been far more litigation had Buckhannon been decided in
favor of broad catalytic recovery.There is a value in greater clarity that
goes a long distance in recommending a more draconian judicial
approach over one that creates nuanced ambiguity.
Furthermore, the legislative histories of the "prevailing party" phrases
are notoriously sparse. Thus, the interpretation of the Buckhannon
court-although at odds with the vast majority of circuit court
precedents-is a logical one. The Court's reliance on dictionary
definitions is not unreasonable if there is legitimate debate as to what a
statutory term meant. Congress could have given "prevailing" a
particular definition, but since it did not do so with precision, the Court's
approach to solving the problem is well within a range of legitimate
choices.
However, as the cases discussed above illustrate, in the postBuckhannon world of fee-shifting litigation, three trends seem to be
emerging in the environmental context as well as in analogous areas of
law. First, it is clear that, with very isolated exceptions, any
environmental statute that employs the "prevailing party" standard will
be subject to the holding of Buckhannon even though the opinion itself
involved only the FHAA and the ADA. Second, if an environmental
litigant is able to secure some tangential form of judicial intervention in
the resolution of the dispute, a court may deem this intervention
sufficient to circumvent the catalyst theory entirely. Thus, if the
resolution of the case can be tailored in such a way that it arguably
involves some judicial imprimatur, a court could be persuaded to grant
attorney fees without invoking the catalyst theory. Third, and most
importantly, if the environmental statute uses "whenever... appropriate"
language, it is safe to assume that Buckhannon will not apply and, if the
375. See, e.g., Tebo, supra note 285, at 56 (noting that some observers believe that "Buckhannon
has accomplished what the Court set out to do: Provide greater predictability for defendants as they
weigh whether to offer a settlement," and "knowing whether they will have to pay the plaintiffs
attorney fees allows defendants to predict and limit costs, thereby encouraging settlements that give
the plaintiff what it seeks at a cost acceptable to the defendant").
376. See supra Section V.

2004]

The Catalyst Calamity

requirements for recovery as a catalyst are otherwise met, fees will be
awarded under the catalyst theory.
This is a deeply problematic regime for environmental litigation.
Regardless of whether one favors or opposes the catalyst theory, this
complex web of litigation is troubling.
The most disturbing aspect of the post-Buckhannon landscape is that it
has given rise to two vastly different standards for allocating fees.377
While Congress's use of different language indicates that it likely
intended different treatment of "prevailing party" cases and
"whenever... appropriate" cases, the gulf between these two standards
is growing. As environmental advocates have succeeded in convincing
courts to apply Buckhannon narrowly in cases such as Sierra Club and
Loggerhead Turtle, the availability of the catalyst theory is now
automatically barred in one set of environmental statutes and yet still
viable in another.
It is true that "Congress... created [a] 'patchwork'" 378of fee-shifting
standards with differing meanings. However, results may be growing
more divergent than Congress intended.379 If, at the time Congress chose
to use different language in its varied fee-shifting statutes, the catalyst
theory was allowed under both types of statutes, it is logical to conclude
that this was not one of the disparities that Congress intended to create.
Congress might have chosen greater uniformity in its statutory language
had it known that the terms it chose would have such vastly different
impacts for catalytic recovery. However, since such a disparity in
interpretation did not exist at the time Congress created divergent feerecovery standards, Congress never had the opportunity to decide
whether the catalyst theory should be permissibly applied to fee claims
under both statutory standards, under only one, or under neither.
Because it has not already done so, Congress- and not the Courtshould affirmatively decide whether the wide divergence in treatment of
the statutes that has followed Buckhannon is truly what it intended.

377. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note, at 20 (arguing that "the single most
important attorney's fee issue that has arisen in Buckhannon 's wake" is the question as to "whether
the catalyst theory remains available under the 'when appropriate' statutes").
378. Sierra Club, 322 F.3d 718, 726 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
379. As one commentator has noted, "the Buckhannon decision inevitably results in an illogical
and unjustifiable inconsistency in the enforcement of federal environmental laws." Ugalde, supra
note 11, at 608-09. See also Hecker & Weidel, supra note 334, at 1797 (describing the impacts of
Buckhannon on differently worded statutes, claiming "Buckhannon did not signal the death knell of
the 'catalyst' test under all federal statutes," and "[t]hat test still survives under the citizen suit
provisions of federal environmental statutes").
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Congressional guidance regarding citizen suit provisions in
environmental statutes was vague before Buckhannon and continues to
be so. When interpreting "prevailing parties," courts have had "[t]heir
path lighted only by sparse congressional guidance."38 This is
particularly problematic in the environmental context. While there are
significant benefits to fee-shifting rules that allow some deference to the
judgment of the district courts,38 l it should not be unfettered. Without
clear guidance from Congress, the potential for unfair inconsistencies is
exacerbated and widely divergent results may be invited.
The availability vel non of the catalyst theory is not the only ambiguity
that exists in the fee-shifting statutes. As the discussion in Section III
illustrates, Congress has left many voids in its fee-shifting legislation to
be filled by the courts. This is not the best way of ensuring that
Congress' true goals and intentions are achieved with any consistency
between various statutes and among different courts. Vastly different
380. Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 457; see also Russell & Gregory, supra note 22, at 310
("Although the appropriate standard by its terminology differs significantly from other fee-shifting
provisions, many of which explicitly authorize awards only to 'prevailing' litigants, Congress
provided little guidance for federal courts to use in deciding the appropriateness of an award of
fees."); Trotter, supra note 70, at 1436 (observing that "[t]he specific standards of catalytic recovery
were never fixed"); Flenniken, supra note 188, at 488 (lamenting that "[t]he lack of specificity in
most fee-shifting statutes creates additional problems"); Wright, supra note 34, at 1228 (observing
that fee-shifting statutes "provide no guidelines to aid a court in reaching its discretionary decision to
award fees"); Zinn, supra note_41, at 164 (describing environmental fee-shifting statutes as
"typically expansive" provisions that "give courts broad latitude to mold litigants' incentives");
Boyer & Meidinger, supra note I, at 851 (lamenting that the citizen suit provisions in environmental
statutes "provide little guidance ... for determining what fee levels are 'reasonable' and when it is
'appropriate' to award them").
381. See, e.g., Gibson, supra note 9, at 223 (contrasting the pre-Buckhannon era in which "prior
holdings allowed the lower courts a great deal of latitude in their discretion to award fees where
appropriate" to the post-Buckhannon era that "altered the ability of courts to exercise such
discretion"); id. (criticizing the way in which Buckhannon "removed equitable remedies from the
hands of highly qualified judges"); McFerren, supra note 8, at 171 (observing that the Buckhannon
ruling "replaces district court discretion in determining awards with a rigid per se rule"); Loring,
supra note 8, at 992 (arguing that by abandoning the catalyst theory on the basis that fees may be
inappropriately awarded by the lower courts, "the [Buckhannon] majority's opinion impugned their
abilities accurately to screen out meritless claims filed for nuisance value"); Leading Cases, supra
note 8, at 457 (criticizing Buckhannon for "transform[ing] an equitable device most effective when
applied on a case-by-case basis into a rigid formality open to abuse"); id. at 462 ("Buckhannon 's
contribution to prevailing party jurisprudence stems from its wholesale rejection of lower court
discretion in favor of a procedural, bright-line rule."); id. at 466 ("[D]istrict court discretion in
awarding and setting fees is likely to be a superior approach. Not only can a careful judicial eye
squelch defendant gaming, but with the particulars of cases at their disposal, district court judges are
simply better equipped to advance congressional goals when determining whether a party has
prevailed."); Brand, supra note 27, at 315-16 (arguing that "Congress clearly intended that the
determination of entitlement to and the amount of a statutory fee be left to the sound discretion of the
district court").
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outcomes on fee awards can easily lead to different levels of enforcement
of various statutes. A lack of clear guidance can only lead to an
inefficient and wasteful increase in attorney fee litigation. 38 2

It is

Congress' responsibility to provide clear guidance to the courts to avoid
these ills.
Perhaps after careful consideration and analysis, Congress may intend
to retain the post-Buckhannon regime that has emerged and to endorse a
system in which catalytic recoveries are no longer permitted pursuant to
the "prevailing party" statutes but are explicitly endorsed in those
statutes that use the "whenever ... appropriate" language. There seems
to be no sound rationale for Congress to do so. However, this judgment
is one Congress should make after careful consideration of all the policy
implications of such a plan and with a full understanding of the ways in
which these two tests are now interpreted.
Perhaps most importantly, the Supreme Court's ruling in Buckhannon
did not include a full and fact-based analysis of all the policy
implications of allowing or disallowing the catalyst theory. Indeed, the
majority opinion identified a number of policy concerns but refused to
delve into them or base its decision on them. 383 The Court's primary
tasks were to resolve the dispute between the parties before it and to
interpret the relevant statute as part of that dispute resolution. While it is
beneficial for a court to be guided by the policy considerations that
underlie the statutes it interprets, the judicial branch is not as wellequipped or well-suited as the legislature to incorporate policy concerns
into its deliberations.
The debate over the desirability of the catalyst theory in fee-shifting
has launched speculation and concerns about a variety of policy issues
that require the consideration of a legislative decision-maker. Most
notably, courts and commentators have asked or should now be asking:

382. Indeed, one commentator has determined that there are "more reported decisions on
attorneys fees than on any other aspect of the citizen suit sections." MILLER, supra note 1, at 97.
Mr. Miller goes on to theorize that:
The excessive amount of litigation under the more recent fee shifting statutes is undoubtedly
another factor in the somewhat negative judicial attitude toward fee petitions ....
The
excessive litigation has been caused, to some degree, by the abandonment of the more
traditional "prevailing party" criteria for fee awards in favor of the novel "when appropriate"
standard. This is augmented by Congressional failure, under both standards, to establish clear
criteria for determining the amount of attorney fees.
Id.
383. See supra notes 263-70 and accompanying text.
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1. If the catalyst theory is allowed, what is the best way to define
''success" in the catalyst context?
It is clearly more difficult to define success in the catalyst context than
it is the judicial context, 38 4 and consistency in defining its meaning is

critically important to ensuring that there is fair predictability in fee
awards. Yet, when there is a non-judicial solution to a problem, it
becomes difficult for courts to determine if the litigation was, indeed, the
"catalyst" for a successful outcome. Any legislative solution to the
catalyst problem must consider this and define success in a way that will
ensure an optimal level of predictability. Moreover, the legislation must
clarify who bears the burden of proof on this question.
2. What effect will the rule on catalyst recovery have on the willingness
of parties to settle their cases?
Commentators are divided on the question of whether abandoning
Buckhannon reviving the catalyst theory will provide parties with
positive 3 85 or negative 3 86 incentives to settle. The legislation must assess
384. For a thoughtful analysis highlighting the difficulties in defining success, see Klein, supra
note 8, at 131, positing that:
As can be inferred from Buckhannon, there are four broad categories of successful plaintiff
outcomes. In order of the strength of the plaintiffs legal victory, they are as follows:
(1)A favorable judicial order on the merits
(2) The procuring of a consent decree
(3) Contracting for a private settlement
(4) A defendant's voluntary cessation of the offensive action without a legal obligation to do so.
385. See supra note 27; see also Ugalde, supra note 11, at 614 (warning that the Buckhannon
approach "results in a decrease of private settlements, which consequently means an increase in
prolonged litigation and overcrowded court dockets"); Shults, supra note 201, at 1042 (warning that
"to reduce docket congestion parties should be encouraged to reach settlement agreements without
fear of losing an award for attorney's fees"); Hanson, supra note 9, at 521 (arguing that
"Buckhannon ...discourages the early resolution of disputes," and "[s]ince Buckhannon requires a
court-ordered judgment or consent decree for prevailing party status, plaintiffs are less likely to seek
settlement, instead choosing to persevere to judgment to obtain reimbursement of their attorneys'
fees"); Loring, supra note 8, at 1003 (theorizing that if the catalyst theory were upheld, "defendants
faced with the possibility of exorbitant trial fees would surely rather expose themselves to the
possibility of a much smaller catalyst theory liability by altering their behavior during the case," and
"[thus, defendants who weighed the alternatives would discover that they would suffer less liability
if they altered their behavior toward the plaintiff as early as possible"); Babich, supra note 11, at
10,137 (arguing that Buckhannon's rejection of the catalyst theory "will... reduce settlement
options and therefore increase costs for both plaintiffs and defendants of litigating and settling
citizen enforcement and judicial review actions under statutes that provide for payment of attorney
fees under the 'prevailing party' standard"); Miller, supra note 9, at 1354 (noting that the
Buckhannon court was "troubled by the potential disincentive that the catalyst theory might create
for a defendant to change its conduct voluntarily"); Richard Talbot Seymour, Recent Decisions on
Monetary Relief SG016 ALI-ABA 1081, 1140 (2001) ("If a case is not found to be moot, and the
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which impact is more likely-and which is more desirable as a matter of
policy.
3. What impact, if any, will eliminating the catalyst rule have on the
substance of settlement agreements and the provisions for which
plaintiffs and defendants will negotiate most aggressively?
One commentator has expressed concern that, without the catalyst
theory "plaintiffs will likely refuse to agree to settlements that do not
result in the judicial imprimatur or the needed attorney fees. The main
impact will be to develop complex settlement agreements and to impose
extra litigation fees that do not benefit either the plaintiff or the
defendant.,

387

It is undeniable that changing the catalyst theory will

change the contours of private agreements. Potentially, it can also have
an impact on the role(s) played by judges in the settlement process.388
The legislature must carefully consider whether this is good or bad.
4. Are there particular considerations in circumstances where the
litigation is not solely brought for or settled for monetary damages
but only declaratory or injunctive relief?
Many environmental cases seek injunctive relief, particularly when
they are suits brought against the government and the remedy sought

plaintiff later procures an enforceable judgment, the court may of course award attorney's fees.
Given this possibility, a defendant has a strong incentive to enter a settlement agreement, where it
can negotiate attorney's fees and costs.").
386. See, e.g., Tebo, supra note 285, at 57 (suggesting that some pre-Buckhannon defendants
might have been less likely to settle because settling would provide no advantage in attorney's fee
litigation).
387. Stanley, supranote 8, at 398.
388. An interesting discussion of judges' roles in mediating settlements may be found in Marc
Galanter, The Emergence of the Judge as a Mediator in Civil Cases, JUDICATURE, Feb.-Mar. 1986 at
257-62. Professor Galanter observes that greater participation in settlements is becoming a more
important part of a judge's function. Professor Galanter also discussed this issue, in more detail, in
Marc Galanter, ".... A Settlement Judge, not a Trial Judge": Judicial Mediation in the United
States, 12 J. LAW. & SOC. I (1985). Here, he notes that most disputes that come to the courts are
resolved without a decision imposed by the court. Id. It is interesting to speculate as to whether the
judicial imprimatur required by Buckhannon will lead to an increase in judges' role in this mediation
and settlement negotiation process. More recently, Professor Galanter and Mia Cahill elaborated on
this question in Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, "'Most Cases Settle": Judicial Promotion and
Regulationof Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REv. 1339 (1994). In this piece, Galanter and Cahill explore
the role of the judiciary in settlements and evaluate the merits of settlement as a method of dispute
resolution. They also challenge readers to avoid the oversimplistic view that settlement is always to
be preferred over litigation.
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cannot include monetary damages. These are much more easily mooted
than other types of cases, and thus raise particular fears.38 9
5. What effect will eliminating the catalyst rule have on the incentives of
defendants to moot cases deliberately on the eve of judgment to
avoid paying fees?
Many observers fear that this practice will increase. 390 As explained by

one, "[p]laintiffs attorneys say that [barring catalytic recovery] gives
389. See Hodges & Scherer, supra note 9, at 439 (predicting that, in the analogous ADA
scenario, the demise of the catalyst theory will have a lesser impact on those cases brought for
monetary damages rather than injunctive relief because when an action "seek[s] money damages...
a pre-trial settlement normally will provide funds for "attorney's" fees, either as part of the
settlement agreement or through the retainer agreement between the attorney and client.");
McFerren, supra note 8, at 174 ("While... a change in conduct will not moot a claim for
compensatory relief, many civil rights, and particularly environmental claims, do not seek
compensatory relief. Equitable relief is often the only remedy sought because damages are either not
available under the given statute, or the plaintiff is simply more interested in stopping the
defendant's wrongful conduct than in receiving monetary compensation."); Stanley, supra note 8, at
396-97 ("Those particularly harmed are plaintiffs enforcing several environmental fee-shifting
statutes where damages are not recoverable and only injunctive relief is available."). Indeed, one
commentator notes that"attorneys that Buckhannon affects trial strategies by creating an incentive
for plaintiffs to seek damages in addition to injunctive relief so that a defendant cannot unilaterally
moot an action." Forsyth, supra note, at 938.
390. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 8, at 120 ("[T]he Buckhannon court cast aside concerns that
mischievous defendants would be encouraged to unilaterally moot an action on the steps of the
courthouse. Without statistical proof that Buckhannon has indeed led to such action, the Court is
sure to remain steadfast in this argument."); Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors to
Civil Rights Litigants, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 537, 547 (2003) (warning that a result of Buckhannon
will be "that a defendant can preclude a deserving plaintiff from recovering attorney fees simply by
changing policies before a verdict"); Miller, supra note 9, at 1370 (discussing the "incentive that
defendants have to moot a case unilaterally at the last minute in order to avoid attorney's fees");
Tebo, supra note 285, at 57 (warning that after Buckhannon, "defendants can effectively wait until
it's clear that they might lose the case and then make an eleventh hour settlement offer"); Gibson,
supra note 9, at 229-30 (criticizing Buckhannon and warning that its "formalistic requirement of a
'judicial imprimatur' completely hinders pragmatic, reasonable analyses of the behavior of the
parties in mooted cases"); McFerren, supra note 8, at 173 (expressing fear that "elimination of
catalytic recovery gives defendants a significant advantage because voluntary action by the
defendant will often render a case moot" and observing, more cynically, that "[a] defendant now has
incentive to strategically prolong litigation, depleting the plaintiffs resources. If the defendant
complies before a decision on the merits is rendered, he can avoid paying attorney's fees."); Ugalde,
supra note 11, at 609 ("A defendant... may prolong litigation for years and then comply at its
convenience. The defendant will avoid an award of attorney fees as long as the compliance occurred
prior to resolution by the courts. Ifa citizen group brings an action with a high likelihood of success
it ironically will result in prompting the defendant to cease its behavior, thereby negating any chance
of a fee award."); "Say Goodbye, '"
supra note 8, at 184 (predicting that the "[d]emise of the catalyst
theory will have the most pronounced effect in civil rights and environmental actions for equitable or
declaratory relief, since a voluntary change of conduct by the defendant is likely to moot the case");
Belfer, supra note 8, at 278 (warning that Buckhannon "will probably encourage defendants to
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defendants an incentive to drive litigation along, requiring plaintiffs
counsel to expend significant resources and then, at the eleventh hour
when plaintiffs appear likely to prevail, unilaterally change their policies
to moot the litigation and award a fee award., 391 Others argue that this
is, practically speaking, unlikely to happen because "[d]efense attorneys
contend that.. .no defendant would want to expend the money or time to
drop the case just before trial in order to be relieved of the possible
obligation to pay the plaintiff's attorney fees. '392 Thus far, there has

voluntarily change their conduct to satisfy plaintiffs before trial"); Stanley, supra note 8, at 395
("[D]efendants who are violating a civil rights law have an incentive to string out the litigation, and
when a plaintiff appears likely to prevail just before trial, the defendant can unilaterally change their
policies and moot the lawsuit to avoid a fee award."); Gibson, supra note 9, at 226 (claiming that the
"Buckhannon majority dismissed without much consideration the concerns that defendants would
moot cases"); Funk, supra note 8, at 12 ("A defendant may now drag out the litigation as long as
possible and then comply before a decision on the merits and avoid attorney's fees."); David Luban,
Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest Lawyers, 91 CAL. L. REV.
209, 243 (2003) (fearing that in a post-Buckhannon climate, "a vindictive defendant can throw in the
towel on the eve of judgment to stop the onset of fee shifting, after the plaintiff and plaintiffs
counsel have accrued years of expenses" and "Buckhannon thus creates another silencing doctrine
by discouraging plaintiff's lawyers from litigating expensive suits that previously held the allure of
recouping costs through fee shifting"); Mahusky et al., supra note 9, at 41 ("At any point in
litigation, even at the time of trial, defendants arguably now have the ability to moot plaintiffs'
claims by simply volunteering to provide the relief requested. In so doing, they can escape
responsibility for an award of fees and costs.").
For an analysis of the impact of mootness on fee awards written nearly two decades prior to
Buckhannon, see Slater, supranote 96.
391. Coyle, supra note 8, at Al.
392. Stanley, supra note 8, at 395; see also Weber, supra note 9, at 278 (noting that the
Buckhannon court "discounted predictions by the plaintiffs that defendants would intentionally moot
cases to avoid fees and hence diminish the incentives for civil rights litigation, noting that no
empirical evidence had emerged from the Fourth Circuit to support those results"); Kelly, supra note
9, at 373 ("Most likely, the fear of a defendant running up excessive fees is improbable."); Miller,
supranote 9, at 1354 (noting that the Buckhannon court "dismissed the idea that the catalyst theory
was necessary to prevent defendants from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment in order to
avoid paying attorney fees"); Supreme Court Update, supra note 8, at 45 (noting that the
Buckhannon Court found "[t]he argument that the catalyst theory is necessary to prevent defendants
from unilaterally mooting an action before judgment in order to avoid paying attorney's fees is
speculative and unsupported by evidence"); Coyle, supra note 8, at Al (describing the view of
Maryland's Solicitor General that it is "highly unlikely" that the Buckhannon rule will lead to
deliberate mooting or manipulation by the defense); Barnett & Terrell, supra note 201, at 14:
[V]iolators incur heavy legal costs for continuing their defense. 'Holding out' is costly, and the
defendant will settle when the marginal reduction in the settlement value from continuing to
defend is equal to the marginal cost of continuing litigation. Second, environmental advocacy
groups, unlike violators, receive positive returns from continuing litigation.... [E]nvironmental
advocacy groups enjoy a legal advantage over defendants that gives them greater bargaining
power in settlement negotiations. Violators do not tend to be 'repeat players' to the extent of
continually litigating environmental advocacy groups, and face much higher legal expenses
since they do not have the benefit of low-cost public-interest attorney.
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been little empirical data to prove the validity of either of these theories.
This could be extremely valuable information for Congress to compile
before enshrining either view in statute.
6. Will the demise of the catalyst
theory spawn a feared "increase in
393
litigation"?
mootness
Plaintiffs who cannot recover under the catalyst theory may attempt to
keep their cases "alive" by proving that objectionable conduct may
recur. 394 This may make a fee award possible. Before crafting a rule, it
is critical to determine how likely this is to happen, and whether there are
safeguards that could be implemented to prevent this from occurring in
inappropriate circumstances.
7. What impact will the rules on catalytic recovery have on the
willingness of would-be litigants to seek non-judicial remedies prior
to bringing litigation?
If it is true that "[t]he purpose of attorney fees pursuant to fee-shifting
statutes was not to privilege judicial determinations, 39 5 then it is
important to consider whether the catalyst theory unduly affords this
privilege to litigation since it is not available when a suit has not been
filed, but the remedy sought is, nevertheless, achieved.
8. What is the true impact of the catalyst theory-or its absence-on
judicial efficiency?
Environmental litigation is extraordinarily expensive and complex,
largely due to "the technological problems involved and the need for
396
expert witnesses, extensive discovery proceedings, and lengthy trials.,
Thus, it is important to consider whether allowing catalyst recoveries
will generate additional judicial burdens because of the difficulties
393.

Ashton, supra note 8, at 968; see also id. at 975 ("Plaintiffs seeking to recover attorney's

fees will turn to exceptions to mootness doctrine to avoid the negative effects of the catalyst theory's
rejection.").
394. Id. at 981-96 (discussing mootness issues with regard to voluntary cessation); Trotter, supra

note 70, at 1450-53 (exploring scope of and limitations on mootness doctrine in voluntary cessation
cases).
395. Weissman, supra note 243, at 782; see also Suits, supra note 201, at 1042 ("[T]he catalyst
theory recognizes the true meaning of 'prevailing party' because parties do not file lawsuits just to
win in court, rather they file suits to change a defendant's behavior or to receive compensation.").
396. Skillern, supra note 85, at 739; see also Zinn, supra note 41, at 139 ("Environmental
litigation is notoriously complex, requiring extensive and detailed discovery and heavy reliance on
expert witnesses, and is therefore expensive.").
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inherent in proving a causal connection between plaintiffs litigation and
the desired achievement.
9. Will the catalyst theory encourage additional litigation or will it
advance judicial efficiency by giving litigants encouragement to
settle?
Allowing the catalyst theory will undeniably require judicial fee
determinations in a number of cases that previously did not need to be
considered.397 However, if the availability of the catalyst theory
encourages settlement, then there might be a "decrease in litigation that
results from allowing the catalyst theory, 398 which will offset any
additional judicial proceedings required to determine whether a given
lawsuit truly was the catalyst for a change in the defendant's conduct. 9
397. See, e.g., Arkush, supra note 9, at 148 (discussing Buckhannon Court's fear that
"uncertainty over causation could lead to increased litigation over fees"); Babich, supra note 11, at
10,137 (discussing the desire for "easily administrable rules that minimize the risk of burdensome
satellite litigation about fees and costs"); Gibson, supra note 9, at 226 (discussing fear of the
Buckhannon majority that having district courts review catalyst cases would be "too burdensome and
not readily administered"); Trotter, supra note 70, at 1440 (warning that "catalyst theory probably
generates more superfluous litigation than it avoids, considering the vast amounts of secondary
litigation that have resulted from the inherently vague standards of catalytic recovery"); Florio,
supra note 41, at 719 ("One of the major drawbacks to the attorneys' fees provisions is the resulting
time spent litigating over attorney' fees for cases already decided on the merits. Courts generally
dislike the amount of time spent litigating over attorney's fees for cases that have already been
decided on the merits."); id. at 712 (arguing, generally, that generous fee-shifting can lead to
efficient allocation of judicial resources because "[I]egitimate citizen suits have been encouraged by
the attorney's fees provision included in the statute, while at the same time frivolous suits have been
discouraged by the fear of fees being awarded to prevailing defendants..."). Indeed, long before
Buckhannon discredited the catalyst theory, one commentator described attorney fee litigation as "a
virtually interminable morass." Stemlight, supra note 11,at 588.
398. Miller, supra note 9, at 1371.
399. See, e.g., id.at 1370 (arguing that failure to allow the catalyst theory "would discourage
informal settlement and increase litigation, which is inefficient," and "[i]nstead of settling a case out
of court with its opponent, a party may be compelled to continue with litigation-consuming judicial
resources and increasing costs-in order to recover attorney's fees"); id. at 1370-71 ("While courts
undoubtedly will have to decide whether a party qualifies as a catalyst if it is to recover... the
catalyst determination is no different than the numerous other determinations that a court makes on a
regular basis."); McFerren, supra note 8, at 174 ("[W]here the defendant is unwilling to include
attorney's fees in the settlement agreement, or where the settlement agreement requires
relinquishment of all monetary claims, the plaintiff will be forced to push on-rather than settle-in
an effort to secure fees."); Dunn, supra note 11,at 200 (predicting that Buckhannon "will diminish
the use of out-of-court settlements and greatly increase the use of consent decrees, which will add
costs and impose burdens for the parties
and the judiciary"); Stanley, supra note 8, at 396 (predicting
that after Buckhannon, "[r]esources will be spent on additional hearings over settlements, consent
decrees, dismissals, and other collateral issues involving attorney fees and, therefore, eliminate
anything saved by the rejection of the catalyst theory and its hearings"); Ugalde, supra note 11, at
608 (warning that Buckhannon "has stripped litigants of the incentive to enter into private settlement
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10. What will be the true impact of the catalyst theory's demise--or
revival--on the ability of interested attorneys to remain in the field
of environmental citizen suit litigation?
One of the key rationales for fee-shifting generally is to compensate
attorneys who do public interest work, often for clients unable to pay
their fees. 400 If the loss of the catalyst theory reduces the opportunity for
attorneys to recover fees, it is important to consider whether this will so
affect the financial position of environmental litigators that many will be
unable to continue to work in the field.40 1
agreements, which will likely result in prolonged litigation and a reduction in the deterrence of
defendants' wrongful conduct").
Indeed, more broadly, commentators have questioned whether environmental citizen suit
provisions are written in such a way as to achieve the optimal level of litigation. See, e.g., Zinn,
supra note 41, at 137 ("The very reasons that citizen suits can be helpful can make them harmful.
The citizen suit provisions create incentives to litigate fiercely, but none to encourage citizen
plaintiffs to pick their battles to achieve socially optimal enforcement."). For a discussion of the
impact of various fee-shifting regimes on litigants' incentives to settle, see generally T.Rowe, supra
note 22, at 154-70.
400. See Brand, supra note 27, at 296 ("Fee-shifting statutes that allow prevailing plaintiffs to
recover fees from the defendant provide the primary inducement for attorneys to take civil rights
cases."); Miller, supra note 9, at 1370 ("Fee shifting has been used to encourage and allow attorneys
to undertake complex civil rights and environmental cases when plaintiffs otherwise would be
unable to afford to pay them."); Forsyth, supra note, at 938 ("Civil rights litigants fear that
Buckhannon's narrow definition of a prevailing party and elimination of the catalyst theory
eviscerates the 'private attorney general' model and threatens the ability of public interest groups to
bring suits that are complex and expensive."); Tebo, supra note 285, at 57 (fearing that "attorneys
cannot afford to gamble on whether they will get paid); King & Plater, supra note 34 (reviewing
economic aspects of environmental litigation).
401. See Annino, supra note 9, at 11 (fearing that, in the analogous civil rights area, "because of
the [post-Buckhannon] risk of not being awarded attorney's fees, many private attorneys, small law
firms, and nonprofit advocacy groups may choose not to represent plaintiffs making claims under
these civil rights laws," and "[t]his is likely to result in the denial of access to justice to the neediest
members of our society"); Gibson, supra note 9, at 207 (noting that in the analogous context of civil
rights litigation, the Buckhannon court's "rigid definition of 'prevailing party' and its firm denial of
the catalyst theory. . . sharply restrict the ability of plaintiff's attorney to bring future civil rights
enforcement actions"); id. at 235 (claiming that Buckhannon "makes it far more difficult for future
plaintiffs and their attorneys to enforce individual freedoms under federal civil rights legislation");
McFerren, supra note 8, at 175 ("In the absence of the catalyst rule... attorneys are now less
inclined to take a strong case because a defendant, faced with the likelihood of losing, is liable to
change her conduct and leave the attorney without fees. Attorneys will now be less likely to take a
case in which fee-shifting is the primary source of compensation."); Ugalde, supra note 11,at 592
("Public interest groups are historically underfunded and may be unable to continue vigorous private
enforcement efforts as a result of the Supreme Court's decision."); id. at 610 ("Environmental
litigation is extremely costly .... It is inevitable, therefore, that environmental groups will exhibit
reluctance to bring suit when faced with the prospect of expending hundreds or thousands of hours
and dollars for litigation with little chance of financial return."); Funk, supra note 8, at 12 ("Cashpoor plaintiffs attorneys are likely to be disinclined to bring litigation in which a defendant may
force them to incur significant litigation expenses that may not be reimbursed if the defendant
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11. Will the absence of the catalyst theory mean that only the strongest
cases will be filed?
It is claimed that:
Citizen groups are often motivated by factors other
than simply claiming victory, such as the political,
media-related, and symbolic ramifications of litigation.
The initiation of a lawsuit may be a strategic decision
intended to garner publicity and to prompt political or
agency action in a situation where the adjudication
process would be unsuccessful. Thus, discouraging
citizen groups from initiating all but the surest of
victorious lawsuits will thwart these equally important
purposes of citizen group litigation.4 °2
Legislative decision-makers must determine whether this is an accurate
assessment, determine the positive and negative impact of the catalyst
theory on these activities, and decide whether these are desirable reasons
to use the litigation process that should be rewarded or encouraged.
All of these policy questions demand a vigorous, dispassionate, factual
inquiry that has, thus far, not been done.40 3 The courts are not well
complies before judgement."); Weissman, supra note 243, at 783 ("Buckhannon reflects a deepening
hostility toward poor people who rely on fee-shifting statutes and the lawyers who represent them.");
Tebo, supra note 285, at 57 (arguing that attorneys have a conflict of interest in advising clients on
settlement offers if settlement offer makes it less likely that attorneys will obtain fees); Shults, supra
note 201, at 1042 (warning that "without a catalyst theory, attorneys will be reluctant to bring
environmental cases"). See also Sternlight, supra note 111, at 592-98 (describing ways for
attorneys who rely on fee awards to protect their financial interest).
402. Ugalde, supra note 11,at 609-10. See also Karlan, supra note 1,at 206 (warning that "the
absence of statory fees might skew attorneys' selecting of cases: they might concentrate on cases
involving the possibility of large damages awards and the attendant contingent fee, and forego cases
which involve only equitable relief or where the right, while important, is not easily translated into a
large damages award for the named plaintiff').
403. See Hunter, supra note 8, at 205-06 (criticizing Buckhannon on the grounds that "[m]any of
the policy arguments articulated by both the majority and the dissent are somewhat overstated and
deserve criticism"); Flenniken, supra note 188, at 489 ("Unfortunately, little hard data exists upon
which to base sound conclusions about the efficacy of existing fee-shifting statutes.... The lack of
information creates an impenetrable barrier to intelligent discussion."); Greve, supra note 3, at 376
("[W]e lack solid empirical data concerning the effects of citizen enforcement."); Vargo, supra note
22, at 1619 (lamenting that "[m]ost analyses of competing fee-shifting systems have been based on
theory and supposition"); Sherman, supra note 26, at 1869 ("The incentives created by fee shifting
have been the subject of considerable analysis but limited empirical research."); Keith N. Hylton,
Fee Shifting and Incentives to Comply with the Law, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1069, 1071 (1993) ("Not a
shred of empirical evidence on the compliance effects of alternative fee shifting rules exists,
however, and it is unlikely that it ever will, given the cost of the required experiments."). For an
excellent discussion of the practical question raised by attorney fee provisions in the civil rights
context, see generally Julie Davies, Federal Civil Rights Practice in the 1990's: The Dichotomy

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 29:1

equipped to do so, and further Supreme Court clarifications, if any will
not and cannot resolve all of the ambiquities. Each of these questions
can get mired in political posturing. Facts may quickly be tainted with
partisan "spin" as the supporters and opponents of the catalyst theory
assert their conflicting positions.4 °4 However, full and fair inquiry into
these logistical questions is an appropriate role for Congress and one that
it should undertake as part of a careful, considered response to
Buckhannon and its progeny.
Additionally, the Buckhannon controversy can be a catalyst for
Congress to consider the broader implications of fee-shifting and citizen
suits in the environmental context. 40 5 Presently, many of the
environmental citizen suit fee-shifting provisions are approaching middle
age. By most accounts, the original policy behind fee-shifting statutes
was to encourage private parties to enforce public laws and to provide an
incentive for them to do so. 40 6 While the use of citizen suits generally,
Between Reality and Theory, 48 HASTINGs L.J. 197 (1997) (providing empirical evidence on the
impact of attorney fee law on civil rights practice). Many of the issues raised by Professor Davies
warrant further exploration in the environmental context before sound rules can be developed and
existing rules can be refined. In addition, Hylton, supra, offers a useful law and economics
perspective that compares the impact of various fee-shifting rules on litigant conduct.
404. In addition, even if the question of allowing fees is resolved, there will still be significant
issues to be addressed-many of them quite political-with regard to the permissible or desirable
amount of those fees. See Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 33 explaining:
Setting the level of fees ... raises questions which go to the heart of the reasons for awarding
fees. Just how much litigation do we want to stimulate? How can fee levels be set so that
lawyers will accept the right cases as indicated by their probability of success, cost of litigation,
likely benefits, or other criteria? Did (and should) Congress wish to create incentives of equal
power for litigation under each of the many statutes it has equipped with attorney fee
provisions? When it set out to encourage litigation under these statutes, did it mean to take
resources away from more traditional litigation, or to increase the share of our gross national
product that goes to financing lawyers and their activities?
405. In the view of at least one commentator, Congress' attitude toward environmental citizen
suits generally has been an ambivalent one. See Greve, supra note 3, at 342 ("Notwithstanding its
frequent endorsement of citizen suits, Congress views private (environmental) law enforcement with
a vague sense of suspicion and discomfort."). If Professor Greve's observation is correct, the need
for Congress to reconsider this question becomes more urgent.
406. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 1349 (arguing that fee-shifting is "used to encourage
litigation that is considered beneficial to society .... Fee-shifting promotes suits by citizens and,
thus, helps them act as 'private attorneys general."'); Brand, supranote 27, at 312 ("Congress should
encourage citizens to go to court in private suits to vindicate its policies and protect their rights.")
(citation omitted); Stanley, supra note 8, at 392 (noting that Congress "premised fee-shifting statutes
on the appreciation that a plaintiff brings an action not for himself alone but also as a 'private
attorney general' in vindicating a policy that Congress considered of the highest priority, and that
has left much of the policing powers to private individuals"); Ugalde, supra note 11,at 594
("Congress included fee-shifting provisions in many environmental statutes in order to encourage
citizen suits."); id. at 595 ("Congress found the encouragement of citizen participation to be of
particular importance for environmental litigation because citizens involved in such litigation are
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and the fee-shifting provisions more specifically, are not viewed by all in
an entirely favorable light,40 7 it is difficult to deny that "[o]ver the last
thirty years, citizen litigation has played a key role in the development of
environmental law, 40 8 and it is unlikely that this will change.40 9

acting to further the public interest."); Leading Cases, supra note 8, at 457 (noting that fee-shifting
statutes were "designed to augment plaintiffs' incentives to litigate"); Russell & Gregory, supra note
22, at 326-27 (noting that "[t]he complex and technical nature of environmental litigation makes it
expensive to prosecute, and citizen plaintiffs must face groups with vast financial resources");
Berger, supra note 24, at 306 ("Although for many of the statutory attorney's fee provisions little
legislative history exists, it is clear from the legislative history available that the fundamental
purpose of these provisions is to encourage full enforcement of the substantive rights to which they
are attached"); Nicyper, supra note 22, at 783 (claiming that the purpose of the citizen suit
provisions was "[t]o encourage socially beneficial litigation."); Florio, supra note 41, at 720-21
("Citizens who bring suit to enforce environmental statutes normally do so on behalf of the
community and not typically for personal gain. Because of this, there are few incentives for citizens
to bring suit, and many disincentives.").
For an interesting, but counterintuitive, perspective on this question, see Theodore Eisenberg &
Stewart Schwab, The Reality of ConstitutionalTort Litigation, 72 CORNELL L. REv. 641, 689 (1987)
(citing empirical evidence that "challenges the notion that fee awards drive constitutional tort
litigation. One would expect that a system under which only prevailing plaintiffs recover fees would
lead to more cases and more awards. Contrary to this expectation, the Fees Award Statute has not
generated a burst of civil rights litigation.")
407. See, e.g., Barnett & Terrell, supra note 201, at 9 ("[E]nvironmental law is written in such a
way that a cartel of environmental advocacy groups is formed and maintained through citizen
suits."); id. at 10 ("[P]rivate enforcers of environmental law are unresponsive to political pressures,
and have no reason to avoid exceeding the optimal level of enforcement. Because private enforcers
may go after every type of offense ... they may over-enforce the law, diverting too many resources
from other uses. While politicians or state bureaucrats who implement or enforce laws detrimental
to the community would suffer loss of position or funding, private interest groups may lobby ... or
file citizen suits without paying the same price."); id. at 18 ("Whether or not it was the intent of
Congress, it seems clear that citizen suits do create financial incentives for extensive litigation and
for cooperation and collusion among environmental advocacy groups."); Adler, supra note 201, at
58 ("Environmental citizen suits facilitate and encourage litigation over paperwork violations and
permit exceedences, which may or may not impact environmental quality" and "the priorities of
environmental litigation outfits and individual citizen-suit plaintiffs will not always align with the
public's interest in greater environmental protection."); Greve, supra note 3, passim (providing
critical perspectives on citizen enforcement); Zinn, supra note 41, at 143-44 ("Critics have branded
citizen suits as legal extortion, in which citizen plaintiffs angle to collect attorney's fees or SEP
funds for marginal or baseless claims.").
408. Babich, supra note 11, at 10,137; see also Russell & Gregory, supra note 22, at 323
(arguing that citizen suit provisions "reflect a congressional finding that the proper and effective
implementation of national environmental policy requires citizen participation"); Florio, supra note
41, at 709 ("[C]itizen enforcement is one of the primary means of enforcing environmental
legislation.").
409. See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33 (2002) ("Private
resources and vigilance may well be needed to protect the environment. Virtually every expert who
has examined the issue of environmental enforcement has concluded that public resources will never
be adequate to do so.").
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However, this may be a good point in time for Congress to reflect on
the role played by citizen suits, to consider the ways in which feeshifting and the catalyst theory advance or detract from that goal, and to
see whether there are any broader changes that should be made to the
fee-shifting regime as a whole. 410 The consideration of the catalyst
question is an excellent starting point for such an inquiry, and one that
should invite greater Congressional contemplation on the broader
accomplishments of the citizen suit regime.
Two particular policies seem worthy of Congressional reconsideration.

First:
[d]espite the fact that all of the fee-shifting provisions of the major
environmental statutes are written in neutral terms, making no distinction
between prevailing plaintiffs and successful defendants, courts almost
always award fees to successful plaintiffs and almost never to prevailing
defendants. This decidedly uneven result derives from policy reasons and
is supported by the legislative history .... 411
However, this is worth further examination as some critics see a
benefit in allowing two-way fee-shifting.4 12 This has never been the
approach taken by the courts or the legislature, but Congress may find

410. Indeed, as has been observed, "[t]he debate over catalyst theory and fee awards in the civil
rights context is but one small part of a more general dialogue concerning fee awards that has taken
place over two centuries of American jurisprudence." Averill, supra note 27, at 2251. As long as
thirty years ago, in fact, some commentators were calling for such a holistic review. See King &
Plater, supra note 34 ("The American no-fee rule is today justly coming under fire for its policy and
technical peculiarities. A general change or revision of the rule, however, would require a careful,
comprehensive reevaluation of the whole question of litigation costs.").
411. Dunn, supra note I1, at 199; see also AXLINE, supra note 1, at 8-33 ("In considering cost
awards sought by prevailing parties against non-prevailing citizens in citizen suits, courts usually
exercise their discretion to deny such costs, in light of the citizen's role as private attorneys general
in such suits."); Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 30 ("Fee statutes have almost invariably been onesided, holding out the prospect of fees to one class of litigants.., while denying it to the other.").
This general disparity that limits the circumstances in which prevailing defendants may recover fees
is articulated, in the civil rights context, in Christianburg Garment Co. v. E.E.O.C., 434 U.S. 412
(1978). This case and its impact is explored more fully in Richard M. Stephens, The Fees Stop
Here: Statutory Purposes Limit Awards to Defendants, 36 DEPAUL L. REV. 489, 494-514 (1987),
Dias, supra note 63, passim; and Florio, supra note 41, at 722-32. See also Dunn, supra note 11, at
199 ("The courts have thrown prevailing defendants a bone by giving them the ability to recoup fees
if they can establish the plaintiff's suit was frivolous or brought solely to harass. The bone has no
meat.").
In the analysis of at least one commentator, this one-sided approach "gives added emphasis to the
'access to the courts' rationale for the rule." Sherman, supra note 26, at 1865; see also id. at 1866
(noting that in the context of fee-shifting provision in statutes, "the 'access to the courts' concern
underlies the departure from the American Rule in most attorney's fee-shifting statutes, serving as an
exception that actually reinforces the pro-plaintiff rationale of the American Rule").
412. See generally Florio, supra note 41, passim (arguing that principles of equity should govern
any fee awards made to defendants).
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some benefit in examining the presumptions that underlie the one-sided
regime of fee-shifting. The connections to the catalyst debate are clear.
A change in the fee-shifting structure that would allow either party to
make a claim for attorney fees would change the incentives of both
parties to litigate and to terminate litigation. While departure from the
plaintiffs-only regime seems unlikely at this time, it would be wise for
Congress to consider the impact that the entrenched one-sided rule has
on the desirability of reviving or expanding the catalyst theory.
Second, the environmental fee-shifting statutes and case law make no
significant distinctions between applying the catalyst theory to a private
party defendant versus a government agency or actor. A typical
environmental fee-shifting statute allows the commencement of a citizen
suit "against any person (including (A) the United States, and (B) any
other governmental instrumentality or agency) .... ,413 Environmental
citizen suits are often brought against the government.1 4 Yet, the policy
considerations underlying and the remedies sought in a suit against a
governmental defendant may differ from those involved when the
defendant is a private party.4 15 Indeed, as one commentator has
observed:
[T]he United States has made itself amenable to suit in the environmental
context in two separate capacities. First, citizens may challenge the
government in its capacity as a regulator.... Second, citizens may
challenge the government in its capacity as a polluter or an actor whose
conduct threatens the environment.
This reality may mandate different policy considerations 4 17 such as the
impact of the available resources of the government,4 1 8 the possible
413. Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619 (a) (1).
414. See MILLER, supra note 1, at 10 (observing that although "the citizen suit was conceived
and designed to allow private enforcement of the law against polluting violators, until recently its
most celebrated uses were against EPA for its failures to implement the environmental statutes in a
timely and complete manner").
415. See, e.g., Bucy, supranote 409, at 36:
In the suits against regulatory officials, plaintiffs generally seek injunctions requiring the
officials to take certain action, such as like [sic] declaring specific acts to be violations of
environmental statutes, holding hearings, adopting alternative methods for computing
permissible water discharges, revising national ambient air quality standards, or promulgating
water quality standards.
416. Sisk, supra note 41, at 776-77.
417. This point has also been raised by commentators addressing the wisdom of allowing the
catalyst theory under other non-environmental statutes that establish causes of action that often
involved the federal government as a defendant. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 1365 (discussing
how, under the Equal Access to Justice Act, "the government is necessarily the party against whom a
citizen is litigating ....
[Thus] a broader definition of prevailing party than Buckhannon's is
justified.... [Blecause of the government's role, the implications of the Buckhannon rule are more
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implications of the sovereign immunity doctrine,4 19 the fact that it is
often injunctive relief sought,420 the reality that when correction is sought
mootness may be easier,4 2' the hope that compensation is beneficial to
public policy,

422

and the observation that in suits against the government

"catalytic fee claims frequently arose in the context of systematic reform
litigation, often originating as challenges to statutes or administrative
policies. '423 Together, these may suggest that rather than a "one-size-fits-

severe than when a private party is involved."); Arkush, supra note 9, at 149-50 (discussing how, in
the FOIA context, "[b]ecause FOIA applies exclusively to federal agencies, it carries a greater need
for private enforcement"); Loring, supra note 8, at 1002 (criticizing Buckhannon because it "failed
to distinguish between public and private defendants and underestimated the ability of public
catalyst theory defendants to meet the strict mootness standard"); Russell & Gregory, supra note 22,
at 358 (noting that the distinction between private and public defendants in fee-shifting litigation "is
pivotal to a determination of the fairness of shifting fees").
418. See, e.g., Miller, supranote 9, at 1365 ("There is a greater disincentive to litigate against the
government than a private party, so more encouragement of citizen suits is needed. A disparity
exists because of government's greater resources and expertise."); and Florio, supra note 41, at 721
("Citizen plaintiffs often face defendants, such as the government and private industry, with vast
resources to defend their cases.").
419. For further discussion of the sovereign immunity implications of fee-shifting regimes, see
generally Wright, supra note 34, at 1246-53. See also King & Plater, supra note 34, at 85-92
("Even though in most cases the doctrine of sovereign immunity has long been circumvented as a
ban to environmental litigation, it may continue to pose obstacles to fee recoveries."); id.(describing
use of sovereign immunity doctrine toavoid assessment of fees against government defendants).
420. See, e.g., Hecker & Weidel, supra note 334, at 1797 ("Environmental citizen suits are
different from civil rights litigation because citizen suit plaintiffs cannot be awarded damages.");
Florio, supra note 41, at 713 ("[C]itizens do not benefit financially from bringing suit. Instead, relief
is usually limited to obtaining an injunction ....
").
421. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 9, at 1366 ("[T]he government could moot cases by voluntarily
changing its behavior. The government may be in a better position to change its harmful behavior if
it chooses to do so."); Ugalde, supra note 11, at611 ("Under the Buckhannon standard, if the agency
chooses to take an action prior to a judicial order, thereby rendering the action moot, the plaintiff
loses eligibility for a fees award. Environmental citizen plaintiffs are thus less likely to risk bringing
these actions .. ");Brusslan, supranote 8, at 1349 ("EPA can seek to avoid paying attorney's fees
by taking the legally required action before a final judgment, which may render the case moot. With
a significantly lower prospect of recovering these fees, the number of environmental suits against the
government is bound to decrease.").
422. See, e.g., Babich, supra note 11,at 10,137 (noting "Congress' policy of treating citizen
enforcers as public servants"); Miller, supra note 9, at 1366 ("The impact of unreasonable
government action is profound.... Improper behavior by the government must be deterred, and
citizen suits are invaluable in this respect .... In a suit with the government, a citizen not only
protects his own interest but refines public policy."); id. at 1367 (arguing in favor of
"[c]ompensation for citizens who promote the public welfare" due to the "unfairness of expecting a
citizen to bear this cost when he is serving a public purpose"); id.at 1371 ("Allowing catalysts to
recover also may create an incentive for the government ex ante to ensure that its behavior is beyond
reproach ...").
423. Trotter, supra note 70, at 1435.
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all" catalyst rule, Congress should consider a separate rule for
government defendants and private defendants.
Thus, Congress should review catalyst doctrine not merely in a
vacuum but as part and parcel of a much-needed
and long-overdue look
424
at environmental fee-shifting statutes generally.
Fans and foes of the Buckhannon ruling have called on Congress to
take action in this regard. Critics of Buckhannon argue that the "mistaken
decision begs a congressional response,, 425 and they call Buckhannon
"an implied call to arms to Congress to codify a critical aspect of current
common law, the catalyst theory.,,4 26 Indeed, even pre-Buckhannon
commentators in other contexts urged Congress to respond to perceived
judicial misadventure in narrowly interpreting fee provisions of federal
statutes.427
Justice Scalia's concurrence in Buckhannon also acknowledged a
potential response from Congress. Although he clearly favored an end to

424. But see MILLER, supra note 1, at 130 (suggesting that it is the narrow interpretation of, and
not the statutes themselves that is problematic and arguing that "[t]here is little evidence that the
attorney fee award provisions of the environmental citizen suit sections are in need of major
adjustment.").
425. Loring, supra note 8, at 975.
426. Id.at 1005; see also id.at 1005-06 (arguing that Congress should respond to Buckhannon
by "inserting a definition of prevailing party that includes the catalyst theory within each fee-shifting
statute. The plain meaning of the prevailing party definition would then compel courts to apply the
catalyst theory to appropriate plaintiffs for attorney fee recovery."); Brusslan, supra note 8, at 1349
("Congress may easily restore the catalyst theory by amending environmental citizen suit
provisions."); Luban, supra note 390, at 246 (urging public interest advocates to "work to enact
legislation to reverse Buckhannon"); Mahusky, et aL, supra note 9, at 42 ("Historical precedent
indicates that the most likely source of redress from the constrictive view of the Rehnquist Court
with respect to such fee-shifting statutes lies in Congressional action."); Coyle, supra note 8, at Al
("Congress will be asked to overturn Buckhannon by amending fee shifting statutes expressly to
permit the catalyst theory."); Chemerinsky, supra note 390, at 555 ("Congress could revise the
attorney's fees laws to nullify Buckhannon and specify that plaintiffs who are the catalyst for action
are the prevailing party.").
427. One of the most extensive such commentaries may be found at Sternlight, supra note I11,
at 599-607. In discussing the Supreme Court's fee shifting jurisprudence in the civil rights context,
Ms. Sternlight argued:
[T]he Supreme Court's seven-year attack on the civil rights fee-shifting legislation has
effectively acted as a repeal of that legislation ... It is clear that unless Congress steps in to
restore the legislation to what its drafters originally envisioned, many victims of discrimination
will be deprived of competent representation to fight for their rights....
Congress does not face an easy task. Whereas the legislation it originally passed was extremely
simple, the Court has developed a highly complex body of laws governing fee litigation.
Congress must address the Supreme Court's fee decisions by passing new statutory
clarifications or amendments.
Id.at 599; see also Brand, supra note 27, at 306-09 (advocating broader role for Congress in
attorney fee controversies).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 29:1

the catalyst theory, he observed that there is a critical role for the
legislature to play in this context and opined:
Congress is free, of course, to revise these provisions-but it is my guess
that if it does so it will not create the sort of inequity that the catalyst theory
invites, but will require the court to determine that there was at least a
substantial42 8 likelihood that the party requesting fees would have
prevailed.

Since Buckhannon, several observers have made proposals to address the
catalyst question legislatively. 429 Indeed, Congress is currently
considering S.1117, a bill introduced May 22, 2003, by Senators
Feingold, Kennedy, and Jeffords. 430 The bill, titled the "Settlement
Encouragement and Fairness Act," provides in substance that:
428. Buckhannon, 532 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., concurring).
429. See, e.g., Loring, supra note 8, at 1006:
Congress could import aspects of prior case law to require that a catalyst plaintiff meet Justice
Ginsburg's three-part threshold test: (1) that the plaintiff present a genuine, colorable claim,
rather than a nuisance suit; (2) that the defendant provide some of the benefit sought by the
plaintiff; and (3) that the plaintiff s suit be a substantial or significant cause of the defendant's
change in behavior. The requirement of a genuine claim would allay concerns that the plaintiff
filed a non-meritorious claim for its nuisance value. The fact that the plaintiff benefited from
the change in behavior would prove that the plaintiff achieved some degree of success on the
claim, and so could be said to have prevailed. Finally, a plaintiff would be forced to prove that
the claim caused the defendant's action, so that the plaintiff would not be compensated for
filing a claim after the defendant had decided to act.
See also Brusslan, supra note 8, at 1349:
Congress can define "prevailing party" to include a plaintiff who sues and achieves all or some
of the relief sought in the complaint, whether by judicial order, consent decree, voluntary
change in the defendant's conduct or otherwise. The plaintiff would have to show some nexus
between its lawsuit and defendant's changed conduct. This amended definition would likely
withstand constitutional scrutiny and place citizen plaintiffs in the position they were in before
Buckhannon.
In addition, "at its September 2001 annual meeting, the Vermont Bar Association adopted a
resolution recommending that the State's Congressional delegation endorse legislation to overturn
the Buckhannon decision." Mahusky, et.al., supra note 9, at 42. The resolution provides:
[T]he assembled membership of the Vermont Bar Association formally recommends that the
Vermont Congressional delegation take all steps necessary to introduce, support, and enact
federal legislation that would overturn the Buckhannon decision and authorize awards of
attorney fees to those plaintiffs whose lawsuits achieve the relief they seek even in the absence
of a judicially-approved settlement or judgment on the merits.
Id. at 43 n.30.
In a more narrow context, see Hanson, supra note 9, at 554-59 (urging Congress to take action to
overrule Buckhannon in the context of IDEA litigation).
th
430. S. 1117, 108 Cong., I" Sess. (2003). This is the successor to a similar bill, S. 3161, 1 0 7 'h
Cong., 2 d Sess. (2002) that was also introduced by Senators Feingold, Kennedy, and Jeffords, and
was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. No action was taken on S. 3161 prior to the end of
the 1 0 7th Congress. See Tebo, supra note 285, at 56 (noting that Senator Feingold's proposal to the
Bill S. 3161 is discussed more fully in Bill
10 7th Congress "was put on the back burner.").
Introduced to Reinstate "Catalyst Theory" as Basis for Attorneys' Fees, 44 GOv'T CONTRACTOR
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In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, or of any judicial or administrative rule,
which provides for the recovery of attorney's fees, the term "prevailing
party" shall include, in addition to a party who substantially prevails
through a judicial or administrative judgment or order, or an enforceable
written agreement, a party whose pursuit of a non-frivolous claim or
defense was a catalyst for a voluntary or unilateral change in position43by
1
the opposing party that provides any significant part of the relief sought.
Congress has not yet acted on this bill.432 In the view of one
commentator, this reflects the nature of political decision-making:
[T]here is [a]... subtle explanation for the Congressional inactivity.... It
is much more difficult to interest the public, and therefore Congress, in
laws about aspects of jurisdiction and court procedure. Buckhannon may
be vitally important to civil rights litigants, but it is not a ruling that will get
headlines.433
As proposed, the bill provides a small degree of clarity to the currently
ambiguous situation. By adopting the title "Settlement Encouragement
Act," the proposal clarifies Congress' intent that encouraging settlements

473 (Nov. 27, 2002) and Marcia Coyle, Some in Congress Seek to Restore Federal "'Catalyst"Fees,
BROWARD DAILY BUS. REV. A10 (Sept. 20, 2002).
431. S.1117 § 8(a). The bill goes onto provide:
(b)(1) If an Act, ruling, regulation, interpretation, or rule described in subsection (a) requires a
defendant but not a plaintiff, to satisfy certain different or additional criteria to qualify for the
recovery of attorney' fees, subsection (a) shall not affect the requirement that such defendant
satisfy such criteria,
Id. at § 8 (b)(l), and
(b)(2) If an Act, ruling, regulation, interpretation, or rule described in subsection (a) requires a
party to satisfy certain criteria, unrelated to whether or not such party has prevailed, to qualify
for the recovery of attorney's fees, subsection (a) shall not affect the requirement that such
party satisfy such criteria.
Id. at § 8 (b)(2).
432. In addition to S. 1117, there are two more narrow bills pending in the House of
Representatives that also concern the definition of "prevailing party." These are more narrow than
S. 1117, however, because they purport only to redefine "prevailing party" for purposes of the Equal
Access to Justice Act ("EAJA") and do not intend that their amended definitions has general
applicability. The more recent of these two bills is H.R. 2282, 10 8 1hCong., 1st Sess (2003). Called
the Equal Access to Justice Reform Act of 2003, this bill was introduced by Representatives
Manzullo and Blumenauer on June 2, 2003. It provides, in relevant part, that
"Prevailing party" includes, in addition to a party who prevails through a judicial or
administrative judgement or order, a party whose nonfrivolous claim or defense was a catalyst
for a voluntary or unilateral change in position by the opposing party that provides any
significant part of the relief sought.
Id. at § 5(a) (amending 5 U.S.C. § 504(b)(1)) and Id. at § 5(b) (using identical language to amend 28
U.S.C. § 2412). An identical definition was also provided for in H.R. 2204, 1 0 8 thCong., I' Sess.
(2003), introduced by Rep. Manzullo on May 22, 2003.
433. Chemerinsky, supra note 390, at 556.
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is a primary goal in formulating fee recovery rules. Indeed, in his
statement accompanying the introduction of S. 1117, its sponsor, Sen.
Feingold, spoke forcefully in favor of S. 11 17's potential to advance this
goal:
Ironically, the failure to correct the Buckhannon decision could lead to
plaintiff's attorneys dragging out law suits beyond a point in time where the
parties could reach a fair settlement, in order to insure that they meet the
Buckhannon definition of"prevailin~party." This will increase the costs of
litigation and discourage settlement.
The proposal also includes some limitations to the unfettered
discretion of the courts in making fee awards. For example, the bill
mandates that the plaintiffs claim be non-frivolous and requires that the
action taken in response to the suit provide "a significant part of the
relief' that the fee-seeker sought. These requirements would avoid
having catalyst claims asserted too easily or quickly.
Unfortunately, however, this proposal is a very narrowly tailored piece
of legislation. It is a direct response to the decision in Buckhannon and
has the narrow aim of overruling that case.435 Thus, it does not address
the broader issues outlined above and does not seem to be based on any
post-Buckhannon fact-finding as encouraged above. Without careful
study, the effect of this statute will be the mere restoration of the preBuckhannon status quo, although there is no empirical evidence that the
pre-Buckhannon rule correctly achieved Congress's goals.
More problematically, the proposed legislation does not address the
relationship between statutes that use "prevailing party" language and
those using the "whenever ... appropriate" standard. As a result, if this
bill is passed, the catalyst theory will be revived via statute for
"prevailing party" situations. However, it will only be preserved by the
more tenuous circuit court rulings in "whenever... appropriate"
situations. Ironically, there would then be no statute that explicitly
allows the catalyst theory under the more liberal "whenever appropriate"
standard, but there would be such a statute allowing the catalyst theory to
be used for claims made pursuant to the facially more restrictive
"prevailing party" statutes. This anomolous result should not be feeshifting policy.
Finally, the proposed bill does not take into account the special
attributes of environmental litigation that may warrant a different
434. Statement of Senator Feingold, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 22, 2003.
435. See Statement of Senator Feingold, CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, May 22, 2003 (saying of S.
1117, "[t]he bill I introduce today restores the catalyst theory that the vast majority of courts had
approved prior to the Buckhannon decision as a basis for seeking attorney's fees").
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approach. The proposed statute is a broad one whose goal is to create a
generally applicable solution to a definitional problem that arises in a
vast array of statutes. However, the unique features of environmental
litigation warrant at least some consideration as to whether there should
be different statutory language in the environmental context.
Rather than adopt this proposal, Congress should take four steps to
address the issue of fee-shifting. First, Congress must engage in the
broad-based factual and policy inquiries outlined above,4 36 with
particular attention to the ways in which the fee rules encourage
settlement. While the temptation to address the issue narrowly is strong,
indeed, mere reaction against Buckhannon is not sufficient. Instead, any
response should involve careful consideration of the wisdom of allowing
catalytic recovery and an evaluation of the best ways in which to tailor a
bill to achieve the goals of citizen suit statutes.
Second, after Congress has conducted a full study of catalyst recovery,
it should adopt a uniform "prevailing party" standard for all
environmental statutes. The wisdom of having two different standards
for the recovery of fees is not apparent. There seems to be no clear
distinction between environmental statutes employing the two different
standards. For example, the CAA 437 and the CWA 438 use different
standards, although there is no compelling reason to do so. Moreover,
having two standards can create confusion. Absent a true difference in
the citizen enforcement regimes of the statutes that employ these
standards, there seems to be no reason to continue to have two different
standards.
Instead, all environmental statutes that allow fee-shifting should be
amended to award attorney's fees only to "prevailing parties." This
standard is preferable to the "whenever appropriate" test because it is
less open-ended and limits trial court discretion. This will encourage
greater uniformity, making it less likely that similar litigation will result
in widely divergent results. In addition, the "prevailing party" standard
will ensure that some success is required before an award of fees. The
"whenever appropriate" standard is not as clear in that important regard.
Finally, having one standard will protect the law from developing along
two "tracks," one for the "prevailing party" statutes and one for the
"whenever appropriate" statutes.

436. See supra notes 429-35 and accompany text.
437. CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2002).
438. CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(d) (2002).
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Third, Congress must remedy problems with legislative ambiguity.
The law in this area has often been plagued by vague statutory language
that is unaccompanied by a clear statement as to the intended meaning.
Thus, any new legislation that Congress proposes must provide detailed
definitions of all terms included in the statute so that courts are not left to
combing uncertain legislative histories for clues as to Congressional
intent.
Once Congress takes these three preliminary steps, it can turn to its
fourth task: the substantive drafting of a fee-shifting statute that responds
to Buckhannon.439 Such a statute should continue to authorize the award
of attorney fees to the paradigmatic "prevailing parties" who achieve
their success in a traditional judicial proceeding. However, the statute
should also authorize the award of catalyst fees in a very narrow, welldefined set of circumstances. Such fee awards should be allowed where
the plaintiff achieves a desired result through a non-judicial arena 440 and
can satisfy the following requirements:
1. To be eligible to receive attorney fees under the catalyst theory, the
relief sought must have been obtained more than thirty days after
the filing of the complaint.
Requiring that a plaintiff may achieve an award for a catalytic
recovery only after thirty days have elapsed since the filing of a
complaint is a key feature of the proposed statute. It establishes that if a
plaintiff achieves relief through extrajudicial means within thirty days
after the litigation is formally commenced, no attorney fees will be
awarded under the catalyst theory regardless of how successful the
plaintiff might have been.441

439. As was noted above, however, Congress should precede the drafting of the fee-shifting
statute with a thorough examination of the broader issues linked to the fee-shifting statutes
themselves. If this empirical study results in the conclusion that termination of attorney fees
generally, or the extension of attorney fees to both prevailing plaintiffs and defendants is desirable,

then obviously a different conclusion from this one will follow. However, that discussion is beyond
the scope of this Article. While it is desirable for Congress to undergo such an inquiry, because a
radical reworking of the general fee-shifting structure seems unlikely at this time, this Article will
take a pragmatic approach and focus on developing a sound catalyst proposal that will fit into the

current fee-shifting structure.
440. This would include, but not be limited to, such things as private settlement agreements and
unilateral actions taken by the defendant.
441. However, a plaintiff who achieves a result through the traditional judicial process within
thirty days will not be barred from a fee recovery.

plaintiffs asserting the catalyst theory.

This thirty day period applies only to those
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This may result in disappointed plaintiffs who achieve desirable
substantive goals that quickly moot their cases and yet are not
compensated for their fees. However, this provision gives defendants a
powerful incentive to settle early in the litigation. By having a "safe
harbor" of thirty days, defendants who may be tempted to delay or
engage in protracted litigation may decide to grant the relief sought early
on, and thus enjoy a guarantee that no attorney fees will be assessed
against them. Those most likely to settle are those defendants whose
cases are weakest or those who make the prudential judgment that the
costs of continued litigation outweigh the costs of early compliance.
These cases should be disposed of quickly.
Furthermore, the extremely short timeframe of thirty days helps ensure
that the uncompensated plaintiff has not invested years of time and
expense in the litigation. Naturally, in circumstances where there are
significant pre-litigation expenses such as research, investigation, and
expert consultation, a plaintiff may have sunk considerable costs into the
litigation even prior to the filing of the complaint. Such plaintiffs,
concededly, will suffer as a result of this provision. However, the
advantages of this element for encouraging quick resolution of citizen
suits outweigh this cost.
In addition, thirty days is not an unfairly short timeframe for a
defendant who truly wishes to take advantage of this safe harbor. Most
citizen suits cannot be filed until after notice to the potential parties and
the government, and the passage of a statutory period of time for the
government to opt to handle enforcement.4 42 Thus, defendants will have
had notice of the proposed claim long before the thirty-day period has
even begun running. Naturally, in a case where granting relief is
complex and time consuming, a defendant will not be able to comply

442. See, e.g., C.A.A. 42 U.S.C. § 304(b)(1)(A) (prohibiting the bringing of a citizen suit "prior

to 60 days after the plaintiff has given notice of the violation (i) to the Administrator, (ii) to the State
in which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator of the standard, limitation, or order);
C.W.A. 33 U.S.C. § 1365 (b)(l)(A) (employing identical notice requirements in the Clean Water Act

context); E.S.A., 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g) (2)(B)(i) (prohibiting the bringing of a citizen suit "prior to
sixty days after written notice has been given to the Secretary setting forth the reasons why an
emergency is thought to exist with respect to an endangered species or a threatened species");
SMCRA, 30 U.S.C. § 1270(b)(a)(A) (prohibiting the bringing of a citizen suit "prior to sixty days
after the plaintiff has given notice in writing of the violation (i) to the Secretary, (ii) to the State in
which the violation occurs, and (iii) to any alleged violator"); SWDA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(b)(2)(A)
(prohibiting the bringing of an action "prior to ninety days after the plaintiff has given notice of the
endangerment to-(i) the Administrator; (ii) the State in which the alleged endangerment may occur;
(iii) any person alleged to have contributed to or be contributing to [the violation]").
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with this brief period to enjoy the benefits of the safe harbor. However,
this provision will help weed out those cases that can be easily resolved.
2. If the relief sought is obtained more than thirty days after the filing of
the complaint, a plaintiff can employ the catalyst theory to recover
attorney fees for relief obtained outside the judicial process if, and
only if, the plaintiff has achieved a substantial part of the relief that
was sought in the complaint.
This part of the test requires that the plaintiff did "prevail" in a
substantial way. This requirement should be interpreted in precisely the
same way as courts weigh whether someone is a "prevailing party" in a
traditional judicial proceeding. Thus, if someone who wins merely
nominal damages in a judicial decision is denied fees as a prevailing
party, so too should a party who achieves such damages in an out-ofcourt arena. Conversely, if a party who wins only 30% of the relief
sought is granted fees if this recovery was a judicial one, so too should a
party who achieved such a result extra-judicially be granted fees.
It is important that these two standards be the same so that judicial
remedies are not treated with any priority. If an important goal is to
provide incentives for efficient, out-of-court settlements, Congress
should not adopt a rule that would favor a judicial remedy. On the other
hand, because the judicial process may be the only option available to a
plaintiff facing an obstinate defendant, the judicial process should not be
unduly disadvantaged either. Thus, a consistent rule will focus not on
procedure but rather on the substance of the recovery achieved. In
addition, having the same rule apply in both instances will ensure that the
jurisprudence in this area can be developed more consistently as
precedents from both types of cases will be applicable to the other.
Developing an extensive set of precedents early should generate
consistency quickly and provide more developed guidance to the courts.
3. If the relief sought is obtained more than thirty days after the filing of
the complaint, and the plaintiff has achieved a substantial part of the
relief that was sought in the complaint, a plaintiff can employ the
catalyst theory to recover attorney fees for relief obtained outside
the judicial process if, and only if, the underlying legal claim was
meritorious.
This legal inquiry should probe the likely merits of the plaintiffs
claims (i.e., evaluate whether the claim is "non-frivolous" as required by
the proposed S. 1117). A non-meritorious claim could not be the catalyst

2004]

The Catalyst Calamity

for the fee award since such litigation should not be encouraged and
because it is unlikely in those circumstances that the defendants settled
because of the merits but because they believe the litigation to be a
nuisance. Catalyst recovery should not be available to plaintiffs who
merely harass a defendant into settling a claim. Rather, it should only be
reserved for those who prevail because their claim has substantive merit.
4. If the relief sought is obtained more than thirty days after the filing of
the complaint, and the plaintiff has achieved a substantial part of the
relief that was sought in the complaint, and the underlying claim
was meritorious, a plaintiff can employ the catalyst theory to
recover attorney fees for relief obtained outside the judicial process
if, and only if, there is a causal connection between the relief
obtained and the filing of the suit.
Determining causal connection requires a diligent factual inquiry into
the circumstances of the relief sought and obtained. Evidence that the
outcome achieved was in the defendant's plans prior to the litigation can
help establish that the litigation was not the catalyst for the defendant's
actions, as can evidence that the defendant may have been pressured into
providing the relief sought by parties other than the plaintiff. Evidence
such as this would destroy the causal connection between the relief
obtained and the suit brought.
At this stage of the test Congress must recognize that there are
significant differences between an environmental suit against the
government as opposed to against a private party,443 and it should create
a different burden of proof for these two circumstances.
A. Government Defendants:
Suits brought against the government often seek injunctive relief in the
form of broad reform of programs, processes, and regulations. These
outcomes may often be more difficult to trace to a particular citizen's
litigation than an action against a private party. Moreover, an agency or
a legislature is more subject to political pressures, lobbying efforts, and
appropriation constraints than a private party, and these factors may
make it more difficult to trace the cause of the reform to a citizen's
litigation. This issue is particularly problematic when the defendant is
the government and the requested action is a change in legislation,
regulation, or policy rather than a request for enforcement or a suit
443. See supra notes 413-423 and accompanying text.
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against the government in its capacity as polluter. As noted by one
commentator:
Because these [agency] decisions are generally influenced by political
forces, follow a lengthy internal deliberative process, and reflect a response
to a multitude of concerned interests within and outside the government,
the likelihood that a change in general governmental policy is attributable
to the filing of a particular lawsuit is greatly diminished .... [I]t is likely to
be the unusual case in which the pendency of a lawsuit can be said to have
served as the catalyst for a change in general overnment policy, even
when the lawsuit sought a similar policy outcome.
In addition, in a suit against the government, the basis for fee awards
should be more strictly construed because of sovereign immunity
concerns and because the ultimate cost of the fee awards is borne by the
taxpayers. They should not be asked to fund litigation against the
government unless it can be shown that the litigation achieved a public
goal that would not otherwise have been achieved.
Thus, the citizen plaintiff seeking fee recovery under the catalyst
theory should bear the burden of proving causation when it is seeking
catalyst fees against a government defendant. The plaintiffs must
successfully argue that there is a factual connection between the
initiation of their litigation and the award of the relief. If they are unable
to meet this burden, fees should not be awarded. Conversely, if they do
meet the burden of proof, the government defendant should then have the
opportunity to refute the claim and the evidence supporting it.
B. Private Party Defendants:
In contrast, a private party defendant is not as subject to outward
influences as the government. While it is true that there may be multiple
factors that lead to a private defendant's voluntary action, that action is
less likely to be the result of a confusing blend of internal and external
political factors. In addition, when a plaintiff recovers against a private
party, the costs are not directly borne by the taxpayers but by a defendant
who was in violation of a law or regulation. These circumstances
warrant the presumption that if part (2) and part (3) of the test above are
met (i.e., the plaintiff's claim resulted in "substantial" relief and the
plaintiffs claim was "meritorious"), then the plaintiffs litigation was the
catalyst for the relief. Thus, in suits against private defendants, it should
be the defendant's burden of proving that the litigation was not the
catalyst. The defendant will have ready access to its business records

444. Sisk, supranote 41, at 284.
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which can indicate whether the relief sought was being pursued
independently of the plaintiffs claims. 445 As always, the plaintiff has the
opportunity to refute the defendant's argument. However, the plaintiff
should not have to prove the existence of the causal connection. Instead,
establishing the absence of a causal connection should be the obligation
of the private defendant.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's decision in Buckhannon has had, and will
continue to have, a significant impact on environmental litigation.
Unfortunately, it has ushered in an era in which fee-shifting is an
unsettled area of law and in which widely divergent results may be
found. While circuit courts are bound by the Buckhannon decision, there
has been a great deal of variation in the way in which courts have
interpreted the scope of the decision. This should be of particular concern
to environmental lawyers.
Citizen suits are an integral part of
environmental enforcement, and the availability of fee-shifting is an
important aspect of citizen suits. The current state of case law applies
Buckhannon's structures to cases arising under "prevailing party"
statutes but not under "whenever... appropriate" statutes.
This
distinction is problematic for many reasons.
Despite the issues and the complications it has raised, Buckhannon
may also serve as a timely invitation for Congress to reconsider attorney
fee-shifting more broadly. In doing so, it must assess the policy
implications served by fee-shifting generally and by the inclusion, vel
non of fee awards for catalysts as part of that regime. This Article
proposes one way in which Congress may respond to Buckhannon and
help resolve the catalyst fee-shifting debate with greater clarity and
precision than currently exists. It attempts to balance the interests at
stake in this debate and to mediate between the extreme positions in this
controversy.
If Buckhannon can serve as a catalyst for such a
development, it will have made a substantial contribution to
environmental law.

445. Naturally, this may raise the possibility of fraud as a defendant may be tempted to
misrepresent its past plans to create the impression that the relief sought was in the works prior to the
litigation. However, this possibility of fraud seems to be no greater in this context than in many
others.

